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Abstract 
 
The dissertation contributes to both development economics and the new institutional 
economics. It mainly concerns long-run economic analysis. We argued and showed 
that pure neoclassical models without considering institutional factors cannot 
correctly analyze the real economic development, esp. for a transitional economy. 
Meanwhile, we showed that more neoclassical analytical skills can be incorporated 
into institutional analysis. The marginal analysis, for example, is successfully adopted 
in this dissertation dealing with the concepts like transaction cost and rent which often 
appear in the new institutional economics. The combination of both analytical frames 
can generate more explaining power on the real economy.  
The dissertation discusses the relationship between economic growth and 
income/wealth distribution. Several views on the problem of growth-inequality nexus 
have been established: firstly, we confirmed that institutional arrangements are crucial 
for economic performance. A good institutional arrangement will benefit both 
economic growth and income/wealth distribution in the long run; secondly, we 
enhanced some of the former neoclassical viewpoints on wealth inequality evolution 
during growth, arguing that the crucial roles of rent distribution and more equal 
dissemination of education should be noted for achieving “common prosperity”; 
finally, we pointed out that inequality has a negative relationship with economic 
growth in the long run. To the opposite, equality takes a positive effect on sustainable 
growth, especially for a transitional economy experiencing the tertiarisation process.  
This dissertation is a comprehensive study on the growth-inequality nexus based on 
the economic performance of P. R. China since reform and opening up in 1979. Thus 
the dissertation is also a contribution to the understanding of the so-called “China’s 
Economic Miracle”. The dissertation challenges the prevalent optimistic perspective 
on China’s sustainable growth and provides counterarguments. The analysis also leads 
to suggestions for China’s future reform which will help the economy overcome the 
“middle-income trap” problem.  
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The dissertation’s content is summarized as follows: in Chapter 1 we summarized the 
basic characteristics of economic growth and income/wealth inequality during this 
period of China as a background introduction of the study. Then we made an 
empirical research in Chapter 2 on explaining China’s income inequality since 1990s 
with institutional analysis, pointing out that the tertiarisation process plays a crucial 
role for both income/wealth distribution and sustainable economic growth. We argued 
that there are mainly three institutional arrangements in China blocking the process of 
tertiarisation: China’s political and cultural institutions which make this country a 
very high rent-seeking economy, the double-track economic system and the 
dual-sector economy dividing into rural and urban sectors. In Chapter 3 we built three 
models to deepen our analysis. In the 1st model we extended the 
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans growth model to explain how inequality evolves with two 
representative agents representing “inside institution” (“tizhinei”) and “outside 
institution” (“tizhiwai”) economies in China. The 2nd model shows that the 
double-track economic system should be transferred into a single-track one in order to 
maximize the output. We finally established a generalized model and proved that in a 
rent-seeking economy excluding labor wage, when the rent distribution is more equal, 
the wealth distribution will be also more equal in the long run. We turned to build a 
new theoretical frame based on a newly defined “transaction cost” in Chapter 4 in 
order to present another angle to look at both the short-run and long-run economic 
size changes. We put forward the concept of “unit transaction cost” and explored its 
relationship with economic growth. The analysis in this chapter confirms and deepens 
the arguments of the new institutional economics on economic growth. In Chapter 5, 
we extended our analysis on rent-seeking space and discussed the effect of inequality 
on economic growth from the perspective of rent. Combining the arguments of 
Chapter 2, the negative long-run relationship between income/wealth inequality and 
economic growth is established. Finally, we discussed the conclusions and 
implications of the dissertation in Chapter 6. We argued that one doctrine of Marxism 
that the economic base determines the superstructure is strongly doubtful in the short 
run if we treat 30 years’ development as a short-run historical view.  
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Chapter 1 
 
China’s Growth-Inequality Performance since Reform and 
Opening up  
 
1.1 The economic dream of China 
China is a country with more than 5000 years’ civilization and the legendary story of 
Chinese history shows it began with a very ideal society under the production level at 
that time. The chief representative and one of major creators of Chinese civilization 
Kong Zi (Confucius) who lived from 551 BC to 479 BC called his dreaming society 
“Da Tong” which means a world of great harmony. This “Da Tong” society, in 
Confucius’ view, has once nearly realized at a very ancient time in China. This society 
is not only equal but also enjoys satisfying wealth and happiness. He said: 
大道之行也，天下为公，选贤与能，讲信修睦。故人不独亲其亲，不独子其子，
使老有所终，壮有所用，幼有所长，矜、寡、孤、独、废疾者皆有所养，男有分，
女有归。货恶其弃于地也，不必藏于己；力恶其不出于身也，不必为己。是故谋
闭而不兴，盗窃乱贼而不作，故外户而不闭，是谓大同。（《礼记》） 
(At the time of realizing “Da Tong”, the world is publicly owned by all the people. 
The people who have the highest moral level and ability will be elected to be the 
leader. Every one of the society is trustable and people live together in harmony. 
People not only treat their own relatives as their relatives and not only treat their 
children as their children, which will lead the old to enjoy the rest of their lives, will 
have the youth to contribute according to the talent and will let the little to get the 
good education. The old without family and the disabled can enjoy supports. All the 
people have satisfied jobs and happy marriages. People neither like to waste the 
wealth nor to save them. People are worrying that they cannot fully contribute their 
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ability and their contributions are not for themselves. Thus the tricks will be checked 
and the bad things like stealing or robbery won't appear, even that you can safely 
leave the door open at night. Such a society is called the “Da Tong” society. Record of 
Rites) 
 
As argued above, we know that the dream of “Da Tong” contains much more than just 
materialistic civilization. Such a society requires quite high moral level as well. But 
concerning the economic argument, I have to say that the above ancient Chinese ideal 
is quite similar to the idea of common prosperity with distribution based on need 
proposed by a great German scholar Karl Marx in late 19th century. It is thus not 
strange to me that communism has a deep cultural root in China since the country has 
been calling for the “Da Tong” society for thousands of years. The creator of People's 
Republic of China Zedong Mao even said in the late 1950s that the “Da Tong” society 
is the ideal society the communists hope to build. However, it is quite ironic to see the 
reality: today China's inequality situation is one of the worst countries in the world, 
under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC). But we should not 
blame this to CPC blindly because before 1980s, China is a quite equal economy 
when its Gini coefficient was just about 0.16 in town and cities. It is obvious that with 
the rather equal society in early 1980s, China does not like the “Da Tong” society at 
all. In 1979, the year China began to reform and open up, the economy was very poor 
with about 250 million rural populations living in absolute poverty (China Economic 
Times, 2007.5.31). Also, strictly speaking, it was not so equal as the Gini coefficient 
shows. The equal situation only lies among the common population. The government 
officials who enjoyed a lot of invisible benefits and conveniences lived much better 
lives, although their wage income was not much higher than the most other people. 
Another opposite case is United States which is the strongest country in the world and 
its people are very rich. However, during 1980 to 2005, more than 80 percent of total 
increase in Americans' income went to the top 1 percent. The Nobel laureate in 
Economics Paul Krugman labeled the post-1979 epoch of U.S. the “Great 
Divergence”. Economic history clearly shows that it is very difficult to realize the 
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perfect goal: common prosperity.  
There are several points I hope to point out here: the institutions after the primitive 
society make the perfect or absolute equality impossible. The human institutions have 
a solid core that is power. Somebody has more power than somebody else and some 
organizations have more power than some else. This power inequality is promised by 
varieties of contracts which are a reflection of institution. In the so-called capitalism 
society, the laborers and entrepreneurs create wealth together but obey different 
distribution rules. This is already analyzed by Adam Smith (1776). Whether 
capitalism is “the end of history” as what Francis Fukuyama argued in 1992 is not our 
concern here. At least, in the current predictable reality, we cannot define common 
prosperity as absolute equality. That is to say, the dream of common prosperity should 
not be a Utopia whose varieties of forms existing in past literatures. Utopia is also a 
good dream but not the real dream. The dream we are talking about is something that 
can be realized.  
In a dynamic economic system, the only possibility of realizing common prosperity is 
to update the distribution shares during economic growth. Without economic growth, 
the redistribution will not be Pareto-improvement. The deprivation of wealthy group 
will destroy the economic efficiency and turn out to be the China’s situation before 
reform and opening up. The growth-inequality nexus is thus a very important 
economics problem for realizing common prosperity. We start our analysis from 
China’s economic background before reform and opening up.  
 
1.2 The economic background before 1979  
The end of Mao’s (Zedong Mao, first Chairman of P. R. China) time in 1976 offered 
China a new opportunity to change. In December 1978, the Third Plenary Session of 
the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) symbolized the 
beginning of the time “reform and opening up”. Xiaoping Deng (1904-1997)，the 
recognized “core leader” of the 2nd generation of CPC is treated as the chief designer 
of this great development strategy.  
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From 1949 to 1979, China was a pure planned economy and rather closed. At Mao’s 
time, frequent political movements were part of Chinese people’s life. This 
phenomenon reached the peak during 1966 to 1976 when the Great Culture 
Revolution took place. Such political movements influenced the economic 
performance, e.g. all the colleges and universities were shut down during the Great 
Culture Revolution which seriously damaged the human capital accumulation and 
much of the working time was used to doing political movements. During these 30 
years, ironically, Chinese people’s average living standard made little improvement, 
although Mao promised in 1957 that China would catch up with the developed 
countries like UK within 15 years. This, however, doesn’t mean that China’s GDP 
growth performance in this period was very low. On the opposite, China’s average 
GDP growth rate from 1952 to 1978 reached 4.39% with a negative TFP (Total Factor 
Productivity) growth rate of -1.37% according to the calculations of Maddison (2007).  
Zhu (2012) reported the TFP during this period was -1.07. This means that the good 
performance of growth during this period came from the accumulation of productive 
factors and suffered a high rate of inefficiency. Maddison’s calculations also showed 
that the low TFP growth mainly came from the capital productivity. This phenomenon 
can be explained by the strategy of prioritizing heavy industry adopted by Chinese 
government during this period (see Table 1.1). The private investment in this period’s 
China can be hardly found. 
 
Table 1.1 Sectoral share of investment in capital construction, 1952–78 
(%) 
 
Agriculture 
Light 
industries 
Heavy 
industries Other 
First Five-Year Plan (1953–57) 7.1 6.4 36.2 50.3 
Second Five-Year Plan (1958–62) 11.3 6.4 54.0 28.3 
(1963–65) 17.6 3.9 45.9 32.6 
Third Five-Year Plan (1966–70) 10.7 4.4 51.1 33.8 
Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971–75) 9.8 5.8 49.6 34.8 
Note: The table was chosen from Justin Yifu Lin (2011) Demystifying the Chinese Economy, 1st Edition, 
Cambridge University Press. Original Source: Statistics on China’s investment in fixed assets 
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(1950–78), compiled by the Department of Statistics on China’s Investment in Fixed Assets, National 
Bureau of Statistics of China. 
 
Imitating the development strategy of former Soviet Union, Chinese government 
believed that the catch-up strategy by prioritizing heavy industry was the correct way 
to realize socialism effectively. Obviously, for an agricultural economy like China in 
1950s, it is not possible to support this capital-intensive strategy. Thus the economic 
system was twisted including suppress the wage rate in order to reduce the cost (Lin, 
2011a). The planned economic system was endogenously promoted by the 
development strategy since it is not possible for government to subsidize the heavy 
industry for over 30 years without a firm control on the national resource (Lin, Cai 
and Li, 1994). This planned and distorted economy is proved to be lack of efficiency 
in every case of economies in global economic history.  
In 1955, the State Council of China formally issued the documents to establish the 
system of the urban-rural dichotomy in household registration (“Hukou”). The 
household registration system has a long historical tradition in China for thousands of 
years. But besides the reason of historical tradition, the urban-rural dichotomy is also 
the result of prioritizing heavy industry strategy since it is not possible for the 
capital-intensive plants with planned economic system to create enough jobs for 
laborers from rural migrants (see Table 1.2). This institution lasts till now and there 
are still many obstacles to abolish it completely. But since 1979, the system has been 
loosened step by step. This dual economy has a huge impact on China’s long-run 
development which I will explain further in later chapters.  
 
Table 1.2 Sectoral employment structure, 1952–78 
(%) 
Year Agriculture Industry Other 
1952 83.5 6.0 10.5 
1965 81.6 6.4 12.0 
1978 73.3 12.5 14.2 
Note: The table was chosen from Justin Yifu Lin (2011) Demystifying the Chinese Economy, 1st Edition, 
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Cambridge University Press. Original Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 1992. 
 
With the above background, the income/wealth distribution within this period 
appeared with two basic characteristics: firstly, the income inequality problem was 
successfully limited. It is reported that the Gini coefficient in 1952 was 0.22 (Risso 
and Carrera, 2010) and the Gini coefficient of the whole country was less than 0.3 in 
the late 1970s and 1980s (Feng, 2004), specifically it is reported that the Gini 
coefficient in 1978 was 0.29 for the rural area and 0.16 for the cities and towns (Xu 
and Li, 2011); secondly, the per capita income level was kept quite low. According to 
the calculation by Maddison (2007), the Chinese per capita income in 1952 was 538 
(1990 GK Yuan) and in 1978 it became 978 (1990 GK Yuan).  978 Yuan was very 
low, compared to Hong Kong, for instance, that its per capita income was 9277 GK 
Yuan that year.  Actually, China’s per capita GDP measured in purchasing power 
parity in 1980 was only 30% of the average level of Sub-Saharan African economies. 
Further, in 1981 around 84% of Chinese people were living in poverty (Lin, 2012).  
 
1.3 Growth and distribution performance since 1979  
Usually, the past 33-year reform and opening up in China is divided into three parts: 
1979-1992, 1992-2001 and 2001 till now. The first period is the early economic 
reform period which started from and mainly focused on rural areas. In 1992, with the 
well-known southern trip made Chinese leader Xiaoping Deng, China set up the goal 
of establishing the socialism marketing economic system in CPC’s 14th National 
Congress which symbolized that the reform was deepened. In 2001, China entered the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) which means the opening up reached a new level.  
This 33 years’ economic performance in China presented a completely different 
picture from the past. Firstly, its average GDP growth rate has reached about 10% 
(from 1979 to 2009, China’s average annual growth was 9.9%) with the lowest 
growth rate (less than 2%) happened in 1989 with the Tiananmen political turmoil. 
IMF (2010) reported that China’s real GDP per head had increased nearly thirtyfold 
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over the past 30 years, measured at purchasing power parity. Now the World Bank 
lists China as an upper middle income country with per capita GDP reached 4428 
USD in 2010. In 1978, the per capita GDP was 210 USD (Lin, 2011a). As early as in 
2004, the World Bank reported that China’s poverty ratio reduced to 2.8% of the total 
population.  
Secondly, China’s inequality situation has shown a continuous upward trend during 
the 30 years. It is commonly accepted that Gini coefficient already passed 0.5 in 2010. 
Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics even reported the Gini coefficient of 
Chinese households’ income reached 0.61 in 2010. The National Bureau of Statistics, 
P. R. China also published the official Gini index for the past 10 years in 2013 (see 
Table 1.3). The data quality, however, has been under serious doubt and debate in 
China. Nevertheless, we can still see that the inequality degree in China is rather high.  
 
Table 1.3  
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Gini  0.479 0.473 0.485 0.487 0.484 0.491 0.49 0.481 0.477 0.474 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, P.R. China 
 
The comparative statistics between pre and post reform periods show that growth is 
more important than equality for overcoming poverty, at least for a poor economy like 
China in 1979. Also, the experience shows that higher inequality trend alone cannot 
stop the high growth rate or stagnate the GDP growth, at least for the early 
development period from a poor economy to a middle-income level economy.  
Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 below describe the growth performance and income 
inequality performance in China from 1980 to 2010.  
 
Figure 1.1 
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Note: Growth rates from 1980 to 1990 are calculated by GDP given by Maddison (2007) and growth 
rates from 1991 to 2010 are calculated by GDP given by International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook Database, April 2012.  
 
Figure 1.2 
 
 
Note: Gini coefficients from 1981-2004 (except 1991) are the results calculated by Cheng (2007); Gini 
coefficient for 1991 is the result calculated by Wang (2010); Gini indexes from 2005 to 2010 are 
chosen from several resources: Gini coefficients for 2005 and 2006 are chosen from Chen and Dai 
(2011). Gini indexes for 2007, 2008 and 2009 are reported by The World Factbook of Central 
Intelligence Agency, USA. It is a common sense that the Chinese Gini index in 2010 is above 0.5, 
according to a report made by Xinhua Agency published in May 21
st
, China Economic Information 
Daily. We set it as 0.5 here.  
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1.3.1 Basic Characteristics of China’s growth performance since 1979 
1. A gradual process of reform and opening up with a double-track economy  
China’s reform follows a way of gradually advanced reform which is opposite to the 
“shock therapy” adopted by Russia in early 1990s. This way means a double-track 
economy during the transition from a pure planned economy to a marketing economy 
under strong governmental control. Chinese government believes that this way can 
reduce the pressure against the reform. This is the basic characteristics of China’s 
growth since 1979. The 30 years’ experience proved that this process is at least 
successful for promoting growth. The opening up to the outside world adopts a 
gradual course. Private economy is allowed to develop but the traditional state-owned 
economy still plays a dominant role in the main strategic fields. The freedom of 
private economy also follows a gradual step. Government still keeps the right of 
deciding prices of many commodities, e.g. the oil and electricity price. And it also 
takes active measures with monetary and fiscal policies to intervene the economy, 
even in the prosperous normal time. As is shown in Figure 1.1, the growth 
performance in 1980s was much more volatile than that in the later periods. This 
phenomenon still lacks enough attention and explanation. 
 
2. An urban-rural dual economy 
As introduced earlier, the urban-rural dual economy was designed by Chinese 
government as early as in 1950s in order to support the development strategy of 
prioritizing heavy industry. This dual economic system keeps running during the 
reform and opening up. There is still 72% of Chinese population identified as rural 
“Hukou” holders (Meng, 2012). Although millions of rural laborers have been 
migrating to cities and towns, the registration institution (“Hukou”) causes much 
discrimination to them in cities. They don’t enjoy the equal treatment as urban 
citizens in many fields such as housing, insurance, children education, wage rate, etc. 
The reform on the urban-rural dual economy is rather complicated, facing high 
pressure from the urban side. Many of the Chinese economic problems are generated 
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by this specific institutional stickiness. A deeper analysis related to this will be 
presented in Chapter 2.   
 
3. An economy with prevalent rent-seeking actions 
China is an economy with huge rent-seeking space. According to Tollison (1982), 
rent-seeking activities are pointing to the activities of wasting resources competing for 
artificially contrived transfers. According to Hartle (1983), rent-seeking is to invest 
real resources in the expectation of gaining better situation of their wealth by 
changing legal rights or maximizing the benefit of earlier policy changes which 
created non-exclusive rights.  
China is still far from a law-ruled society with high quality. Some people who are 
close to political power keep big advantages in the society in every aspect. The rights 
facing the law are different for different people/firms with “Guanxi” (meaning 
relationship) culture. With such a fact, China is an economy with prevalent 
rent-seeking activities. The so called “grey revenue” which is generated by the rents is 
huge in China and normal inequality calculation doesn’t include this part. There are 
two levels of this kind of rent. The first comes from the double-track economic 
institutional arrangements in which the state-owned enterprises naturally keep a close 
relationship with governments. They are protected by the governments intentionally 
and thus easily access to financial market. It is reported that in 2010 more than 95% 
of the loans going to the SOEs. They also have many monopoly rights which mean 
that much of their revenue comes from the rent.  The second level comes from the 
political institution which lacks efficient monitoring system. One of the leading 
principles of directing political reform is the “three insisting”: insist on the leadership 
of Communist Party of China, insist on the democratic leadership of the people and 
insist on the rule of law. Obviously there are contradictions among the principles. In 
reality this means the government officials and their relatives or some “friends” can 
enjoy much better business opportunities and treatments. Such phenomenon is so 
prevalent in China that makes the whole economy a high-rent economy. Such social 
infrastructure makes a big influence during China’s economic development which 
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obviously stays in the frame outside the neo-classical economics since there is no 
institutional factor in the neo-classical world. We will present a detailed analysis on 
this observation in the dissertation.  
 
The above three points are the institutional characteristics of Chinese economy during 
growth. Concerning the pure growth performance, there are four other basic 
characteristics:  
 
4. Mixed Pareto improvements 
From the long-run perspective, both rural and urban Chinese people greatly benefited 
from the economic growth. But a more careful observation will find that the first 
period of the 30 years’ reform (1980-1991) is a Pareto-improvement process and the 
second (1992-2000) and third period (2001-2010) are only to be a sense of 
“Kaldor-Hicks compensation” progress if we divide Chinese population into several 
groups. That means in the first period all groups of people in China were getting 
better but during the later two periods some groups of people were becoming worse, 
although this part of welfare loss can be compensated by the other parts. The Gini 
index cannot reflect this delicate difference. 
In 1980s, with the beginning of Household Responsibility System (HRS)
1
, the rural 
efficiency had greatly improved and thus the revenue increased. Meanwhile, as the 
beginning of city reform, the higher economic freedom brought the growth of the 
urban economy. During the 1980s, the reform of state-owned economy was staying at 
an early stage and workers were still enjoying stable and safe revenues. So there is no 
group of people suffered a loss during this period.  
In 1990s, as the government promoted the reform of privatization of state-owned 
enterprises (SOE), many workers were laid off (“off-post”). The official jobless rate 
by the end of 1990s was over 10 million and the actual number was believed to be 
much higher (Gerth, 2010). These people gradually formed the poverty problem in 
cities and most of them still stay in poverty today.  
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5. Continuously growing investment 
From the view of GDP accounting, in 2011, net export contributes zero to economic 
growth but the investment on capital-intensive sectors made by state-owned 
economies contributes more than 50% of the growth. And an obvious observation on 
China’s economy is that the total investment amount in China from 1979 to 2009 has 
been continuously growing. The data of the real total investment in China is not 
available but we can use the “Total Fixed Assets Investment” made by the China 
National Statistics Bureau as a proxy of the trend. According to the statistics, the total 
fixed assets investment has been continuously rising during the past 30 years and the 
increasing speed became much quicker since 1990s. It is noted that the contribution 
ratio of the added value of the total fixed assets investment on GDP growth always 
surpasses the ratios of the other economic sectors’ added values. Between 1978 and 
2004 the average growth rate of the total fixed assets investment reached 12.4% 
(Wang and Cai, 2006). Also the state-owned investment has been always much larger 
than private sector’s in China and the incremental speed of state-owned investment 
has been much faster, reflecting the characteristics of the socialism economy.  
 
Figure 1.3  
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Figure 1.4  
 
 
Unit: Hundred of Millions Yuan RMB  
Resource: Data collected from the Annual Statistics Reports, National Bureau of Statistics, P. R. China 
 
6. The composition of demand 
The continuously growing supply ability in China has been supported by fast growing 
export with relatively low domestic consumption. According to the calculations of 
World Bank, China’s export grew by 16% per year from 1979 to 2009. China’s share 
in world exports of goods and non-factor services increased from 0.8% to 8.4% 
during the 30 years (Lin, 2011b). Meanwhile, China’s international reserves reached 
2130 billion USD in June 2009 (Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011)).  
China’s household consumption as a percentage of GDP, however, fell from 51% in 
1985 to 35% in 2009. The problem of insufficient domestic demand is caused by this 
which lowers down the speed of industrial update. We will also analyze this 
phenomenon in Chapter 2.  
 
7. Industrial structure updates slowly 
Although Chinese economic system since 1979 has gradually changed, the secondary 
industry still plays the biggest role in Chinese economic development. Global 
experience shows that it took around 20 years for East Asian “Four Dragon” 
economies to complete the industrial structural change from an economy mainly 
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contributed by primary industry to the one contributed by tertiary (service) industry. 
China, however, is still struggling on climbing the “industry ladder” after 30 years’ 
high growth experience.  
 
Table 1.4 Industrial output growth rates between 1991 to 2011, China 
Year  Primary Industry Secondary Industry  Tertiary Industry 
1991 0.03 0.142 0.053 
1992 0.037 0.128 0.092 
1993 0.04 0.204 0.093 
1994 0.035 0.174 0.087 
1995 0.045 0.136 0.08 
1996 0.051 0.123 0.08 
1997 0.035 0.108 0.082 
1998 0.035 0.092 0.076 
1999 0.028 0.081 0.075 
2000 0.024 0.096 0.078 
2001 0.028 0.087 0.074 
2002 0.029 0.099 0.073 
2003 0.025 0.125 0.067 
2004 0.063 0.111 0.083 
2005 0.052 0.114 0.096 
2006 0.05 0.125 0.103 
2007 0.037 0.134 0.114 
2008 0.055 0.093 0.095 
2009 0.042 0.095 0.089 
2010 0.043 0.122 0.095 
2011 0.045 0.106 0.089 
Source: Data collected from the Annual Statistics Reports, National Bureau of Statistics, P. R. China 
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Figure 1.5 Industrial output growth rates between 1991 to 2011, China 
 
Source: Data collected from the Annual Statistics Report s, National Bureau of Statistics, P. R. China 
 
We can see from the above figure that during 1990s, there was a convergence of 
growth rates of secondary and tertiary industries. But this trend did not continue in 
2000s. Generally the growth rates of secondary industry had always been higher than 
the other two industries. Till 2011, the percentage of added value of Chinese tertiary 
industry was still less than 50% which is even lower than the level of some other 
developing countries. But the added value of secondary industry reached 46.9% in 
2011 which was above all historical achievements of developed countries.  
 
1.3.2 Basic characteristics of China’s income/wealth inequality since 1979 
To be exact, income distribution is different from wealth distribution. But these two 
variables are often used as proxies to each other. We don’t differentiate the two 
variables in the dissertation for the main goal is to see the growth-inequality nexus.  
 
1. Inequality situation worsening in every aspect  
China’s inequality is mostly reflected in three aspects: rural-urban disparity, regional 
income disparity and income disparities among sectors. Data shows that for all these 
aspects the inequality situations have been worsening.  
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Table 1.5 China’s Rural-Urban Income Disparity since 1979 
 
Year    Per Capita net income      Per capita disposable income      Ratio of  
of rural households (CNY)     of urban households (CNY)      Incomes 
 
1979           160                     387                   2.42 
1980           191                     477                   2.50 
1981           223                     491                   2.20 
1982           270                     526                   1.95 
1983           309                     564                   1.82 
1984           355                     651                   1.83 
1985           397                     739                   1.86 
1986           423                     899                   2.12 
1987           462                    1002                   2.17 
1988           544                    1181                   2.17 
1989           601                    1375                   2.29 
1990           686                    1510                   2.20 
1991           708                    1700                   2.40 
1992           784                    2026                   2.58 
1993           921                    2577                   2.80 
1994          1221                    3496                   2.86 
1995          1577                    4283                   2.71 
1996          1926                    4838                   2.51 
1997          2090                    5160                   2.47 
1998          2162                    5425                   2.51 
1999          2210                    5854                   2.65 
2000          2253                    6280                   2.79 
2001          2366                    6859                   2.90 
2004          2936                    9422                   3.21 
2005          3255                   10493                   3.22 
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2006          3587                   11759                   3.28   
2007          4140                   13786                   3.33 
2008          4761                   15781                   3.31 
2009          5153                   17175                   3.33 
2010          5919                   19109                   3.23 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2011, National Bureau of Statistics, China 
 
Table 1.6 Comparison of eastern and western regions: rural per capita net 
income 
 
Year     Eastern (CNY/person)        Western (CNY/person)          Ratio 
1978     139                       116                         1.20 
1990     848                       534                         1.59 
2000     3063                     1593                         1.92 
 
Source: Reports of the National Bureau of Statistics, China  
 
 
Table 1.7 Comparison of eastern and western regions: urban per capita 
disposable income 
 
Year     Eastern (CNY/person)        Western (CNY/person)        Ratio 
1978     372                        341                      1.09                              
1990     1621                       1265                     1.28 
2000     7682                       5487                     1.40 
 
Source: Reports of the National Bureau of Statistics, China  
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Figure 1.6  Average wage difference between sectors in 2010 
 Source: Reports of the National Bureau of Statistics, China 
 
It is reported that in 2010 the highest revenue industry in China is finance and the 
lowest is primary industry. The average wage difference between them reached 4.2: 1 
and this ratio was between 1.6 -1.8:1 during 1980s (China People’s Daily, 2011.12.2).  
 
2. A strange but long-existing combination  
If we divide China’s economy into two industries of competitive private economy and 
monopolistic state-owned economy, we will find that the average wage is much 
higher in the state-owned industry (this can be seen in Figure 1.6). Further, its wage 
growth rate is also much higher. According to Banister (2007), the average real annual 
wage growth rate in unban manufacturing sector during 1992 to 2004 was 7.5% but if 
excluding state-owned and collectively owned economy, the growth rate becomes 
4.6%. This is a unique phenomenon because the state-owned economy is lack of 
efficiency. There are large amount of studies showing that the productivity of Chinese 
private economy is much higher than that of the state-owned economy.  A deeper 
observation shows that the private economy’s income distribution is much more 
unequal. As a result, provinces with more private firms have much higher income 
inequality (Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2011).  
 
3. Who get what? 
According to Gerth (2010), China’s newly rich class can be divided into four groups: 
the individual entrepreneurs (“getihu”), people who took advantage of the 
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double-track price system, people who are land speculators and managers of 
state-owned enterprises. I would like to point out that there is another group obviously 
exits: the corrupted governmental officials of all levels. The poorest people are mainly 
the poorest in rural areas, most “off-post” workers of SOEs and most rural migrants in 
cities. It is obvious that the newly rich class, as introduced here, has a close 
relationship with rent-seeking activities under the economic and political institutions 
of China.  
There is a comparatively rather small middle-income class in China. China now has a 
population close to 1.4 billion. Around 150 million own some luxury goods and 250 
million can afford to buy some (Gerth, 2010). That means more than 1 billion people 
still cannot consider consuming some luxuries. Some reports (like Newspaper 
Fazhiwanbao July, 18
th
, 2010) also showed that the percentage of Chinese who 
became the middle-income class had reached 23%, if we put 11800-17700 U.S. 
dollars per year as the standard. The rather small middle-income class caused the 
inadequate inner effective demand for the productions. For the long time, Chinese 
economy is balanced by quick growth of exports. From 1979 to 2009, China’s export 
growth rate reached 16% per year. When the coming of economic crisis happened in 
2008, Chinese export sector also met with huge crisis since it is difficult for them to 
keep the business running with a shrunk global market. Chinese government 
recognized this problem and has been trying to expand the inner demand power with 
better distribution. So far this problem has not resolved and it becomes the major 
economic trouble for the sustainable growth of China.  
 
4. Labor income share  
Traditionally, income distribution is divided into two parts: the primary distribution 
and the redistribution. It is generally accepted that China’s income inequality is 
mainly caused by the primary distribution (National School of Development, Peking 
University, 2013). Labor income share is an important part of the primary distribution. 
Functional distribution concerns the labor income share. Data shows that the labor 
income share had been keeping increasing since 1979 with the process of 
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decentralization of governmental economic powers. But this process ended by 1995 
from when the labor income share has gradually reduced (China Development Report 
of People’s Well-being 2011, pp.124-125). Such a reduction is prevalent in China 
except very few provinces or cities like Beijing.  
 
 
Table 1.8 China GDP Structure (%)  
 
Year      Labor Revenue     Net Taxation of Producers        Earned Surplus  
 
1993         49.5                 11.7                        24.8 
1994         50.3                 12.0                        23.8 
1995         51.4                 12.3                        23.3 
1996         51.2                 12.9                        23.2 
1997         51.0                 13.6                        22.3 
1998         50.8                 14.3                        21.7 
1999         50.0                 14.9                        21.7 
2000         48.7                 15.3                        21.9 
2001         48.2                 15.6                        22.2  
2002         47.8                 15.8                        22.9 
2003         46.2                 14.1                        24.2 
2004         41.6                 14.1                        30.3 
2005         41.4                 14.1                        29.6 
2006         40.6                 14.6                        30.7 
2007         39.7                 14.2                        31.3 
 
Source: Yearbooks of the National Bureau of Statistics, China 
 
1.4 Concluding remarks  
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The above basic characteristics of China’s growth-inequality performances since 1979 
are the background for further theoretical and empirical studies. There are some other 
points we didn’t include, e.g. production overcapacity during the past 10 years as a 
result of both insufficient domestic demand and blind investments. To fully explain all 
the details of these facts is not the task of this dissertation. We will focus on the 
relationship between China’s growth experience and income/wealth distribution since 
1979. But since all the economic factors are related, our analysis will also shed light 
on understanding these performances.  
The Chinese economic development during the past 30 years is obviously unique and 
complicated but it also contains beneficial lessons for other developing economies, 
even for developed economies. The dissertation is a try to put forward a consistent 
logic contained in such historical economic facts with both empirical and theoretical 
studies.   
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Chapter 2 
 
Inequality, Industrial Structure and Institutional 
Arrangements during China’s Growth Miracle since 1990s 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter studies the growth-inequality nexus based on China’s economic 
performance since 1990s. There are several theoretical and empirical questions the 
chapter hopes to discuss. Firstly, China economy has already experienced more than 
30 years’ high growth rates since 1980s. Whether this performance can sustain and 
how long it can sustain generates many debates. To answer these important questions, 
we have to understand the crucial problems that block China’s economic growth. This 
chapter tries to present a consistent analysis on the issue from the perspective of 
growth-inequality nexus. Secondly, the chapter aims to do an analysis on how the 
inequality is shaped during a dynamic structural change and how institutional 
arrangements are related.  
The analysis will be based an empirical study on the influential factors of income 
inequality in China since 1990s. There are several considerations for choosing the 
time zone for analysis since 1990s: firstly, the 1980s for China is the early reform 
period which mainly focus on rural areas. Till 1990 when China completed “the 7th 
five-year plan”, the tertiary industry (especially the privately-owned) had not really 
begun to develop. Thus if we include this period into the analysis, the effect of tertiary 
industry will be affected, which, as we will show, has a significant role in the 
problems we need to analyze. Secondly, we will have to face the problem of 
heterogeneous data quality since the only data available for this period is published by 
Chinese government which is different from our data set from 1990s.  
This research is different from the static view on the determinants of income/wealth 
distribution since the process of economic growth is dynamic that nearly all the 
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variables of the economy will change during this long-run process. We are interested 
in how these changes affect the evolution of income/wealth distribution and which 
factor has the dominant effect. Further, the issue of income inequality in China should 
be paid more attention than usually thought for another reason: there are many 
so-called “style facts” of economic growth recognized in western economic 
performance. One of the facts is that in the long run balanced growth the functional 
income distribution (wL/rK) remains roughly constant (Kaldor, 1957). This is obvious 
unsettled in China since the Gini index shows that the income inequality has been 
continuously becoming larger (see Table 2.1 and Table 2.2). This may be or should be 
related to some other style facts which have not appeared in China either, like the 
Kuznets inverted U-shaped relation between income inequality and GDP per capita as 
well as the structural transformation from agriculture to service.  
As expected, the empirical results of the chapter showed that the Kuznets “inverted U” 
curve has not appeared in China yet. Also, the chapter pointed out that the 
tertiarisation process (meaning the development of the tertiary industry comes to the 
stage of dominating the economy) is closely related to income distribution and the 
slow tertiarisation process has played the major role in explaining the increasing 
income inequality since 1990s in China. Then the chapter discussed the role of 
tertiarisation in the growth-distribution nexus theoretically and presented an 
institutional analysis on the phenomenon of slow tertiarisation in China afterwards. 
The chapter put forward that continuous reform on the “three” key institutional 
arrangements will be crucial for the sustainable development of China in the future: 
the political institution, the double-track economic institution and the urban-rural 
dual-sector institution. This research thus is meaningful for understanding the 
challenges faced by China to jump over the “middle-income trap”.  
The chapter is arranged as follows: section 2.2 is the literature review; section 2.3 
presented the empirical study on explaining income inequality during China’s growth 
experience since 1990s; section 2.4 discussed the role of tertiarisation in 
growth-inequality nexus; section 2.5 put forward an institutional analysis on the 
phenomenon of slow tertiarisation process of China; section 2.6 put forward several 
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policy suggestions for China’ future reform; in section 2.7 we discussed the “pro-poor” 
growth problem based on China’s experience; in section 2.8 a concluding remark is 
presented.  
 
2.2 Literature review 
The issue that how income inequality is influenced during economic growth is a very 
important economic problem and the economics field has been discussing it for quite 
a long time. It is a very interesting phenomenon that the classical economics tends to 
argue that the income inequality will become increasingly larger (see the review of 
Bronfenbrenner (1971) Chapter 4) whereas the neoclassical economics tends to 
support the opinion that the income inequality will become flattened with continuous 
economic growth (see Stiglitz (1969), Chatterjee (1994), Li, Xie and Zou (2000), etc.). 
The former stand is based on functional distribution theory and the later is usually 
applied with personal distribution theory. These two distribution theories, however, 
are not the curial cause for the ideas’ difference. This debate hasn’t reached a solid 
conclusion yet, although few economists continue to debate it. In the more recent 
economic history, the earliest well-known empirical and theoretical study on the 
problem of how income inequality is affected during economic growth comes from 
Kuznets (1955) whose discussion applies to both personal and functional distribution 
concepts.  
Kuznets’ research is based on the historical data for US, England and Germany. His 
argument leads to the well-known result that there is an “inverted U” relationship 
between national income and income inequality. This “inverted U” curve means that 
during the early period of development when the transition happens from the 
pre-industry to the industry civilizations, the income inequality widens; then the 
widening trend will become stabilized for some time and will reach the period of 
narrowing at the later stage of development. He also pointed out that there are at least 
two kinds of powers leading to greater inequality during the early development period. 
The first is the higher saving rate of richer people which brings about the difference of 
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assets’ returning and the second is the structural change of an economy that 
development will bring the economy out of agriculture. With two basic facts that the 
average per capita income of rural population is lower than that of the urban and the 
urban areas often have larger inequality than the rural areas, he argued that with the 
increase of the urban population, the urban inequality will take higher effect. Also, the 
average productivity in urban areas increases much faster than that in rural areas. 
These are the reasons why early structural changes will lead to higher inequality.  
For the power of saving’s effect, Kuznets pointed out three counteracting factors: the 
demographic reason, the freedom of individual opportunity and the change of service 
income. Since the above three factors are influenced by different growth patterns, the 
final comprehensive result of the saving’s power is indefinite. Here Kuznets 
emphasized the class mobility between the poor and the rich where the rich group 
doesn’t have much rent so that the lower class’ wealth can grow faster during the 
structural update.  
Thus the “inverted U” curve mainly comes from the second power: the structural 
change. With a self-designed table of two economic sectors: agricultural and 
non-agricultural, Kuznets assumed reasonable numbers and calculated the results. The 
table he created contains much information on the evolution of income distribution 
and this table shows an “inverted U” curve where the inequality will be narrowed 
during the later stage of urbanization and industrialization. Kuznets pointed out that 
the narrowing inequality should be most likely to occur with the rise in the income 
share of the poor group in the non-agricultural sector. He gave two explanations for 
this phenomenon: the first is the self-adaptation effect and the second comes from the 
support of a democratic institution.  
Kuznets (1955) offered a comprehensive argument on the issue that how income 
inequality is affected during the growth process. Unfortunately, the later studies only 
focused on the “inverted U” curve but ignored most of the arguments in his paper. In 
this chapter I will choose to apply some points of Kuznets’ arguments on analyzing 
China’s growth-inequality nexus since 1990s. These applications seem very effective.  
The later empirical studies have serious controversies on Kuznets “inverted U” 
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hypothesis. Deininger and Squire (1998) presented a review on relative discussions. 
They tested the hypothesis with panel data covering 108 countries from 1960s to 
1990s. Generally speaking, the Kuznets hypothesis can find more proof from 
developed countries than developing countries. But from the point of my view, this 
result just proves the validity of Kuznets hypothesis since the “inverted U” curve 
describes the process of an economy from developing stage to developed stage. Also, 
they reported that not all developed countries and developing countries supported 
Kuznets curve. Methodologically, they found some evidence supporting the 
hypothesis with cross-section estimation but this result is very sensitive to regional 
dummies. The estimation with panel data doesn’t show any support for the hypothesis. 
They also tried to test individual countries with time series data. Their findings are not 
so supportive for Kuznets hypothesis. Some countries’ data even show a U-shaped but 
not “inverted U” curve. In my view, this result mainly comes from the time range of 
the data. For example, they failed to see any statistically significant relationship 
between inequality and income for some developed countries and for China. The 
reason is that for the period from 1960s to 1990s, these developed countries have 
already stayed at the later industrialization stage and China was a pure planned 
economy before 1980s.  
Barro (2000) also tested the validity of Kuznets “inverted U” curve with a group of 
panel data covering roughly 100 countries over 30 years since 1960s. He found that 
the Kuznets curve appeared as an empirical regularity but this relationship couldn’t 
explain most of the variations in inequality across countries or over time. His paper 
also discussed some individual effects of some factors on income inequality, like 
international trade, education, etc.  
An issue needs to be paid attention is that Kuznets didn’t discuss the change of 
inequality after an economy completed the structural transition. Thus it is not 
reasonable to doubt the “inverted U” curve with applying data of limited time range 
from mature developed economies. To understand how growth in these countries 
affects income inequality is also important and there are some studies focusing on the 
determinants of income inequality for such economies. We should look at these results 
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but separate them from the Kuznets hypothesis. Unfortunately, most traditional 
studies mixed this crucial difference.  
Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Penalosa (1999) made a review on the discussions on the 
effect of growth on earnings inequality, esp. the situation in OECD countries from 
1970s to 1990s. They agreed with Jan Tinbergen (1975) that it is the acceleration of 
the growth of the relative demand for skills that increased the skill premium which 
explains the trend of earnings inequality. They further argued that there are mainly 
three reasons to explain the acceleration: the impact of trade, the skill-biased 
technological change and the organizational change within firms. They concluded that 
economic growth does not necessarily bring a reduction in inequality. For the above 
three factors influencing inequality, they argued that technological change is the major 
determinant and channel from growth to inequality since trade effect is carried over 
by technical change and organizational change is also affected by it. One report of 
OECD in 2011 (see the Reference) discussed the growing income inequality in OECD 
countries over the past two decades. The main resources that the greater inequality 
comes from were identified to be the distribution of wages and salaries which account 
for 75% household incomes of working-age people. The above three factors continued 
to be the driving force of such trend plus tax and benefit system change and 
household structure change.   
As mentioned above, checking Kuznets hypothesis needs to cover longer economic 
development periods and it is different from checking how the inequality is 
determined for developed countries. Mah (2003) made an empirical research on how 
the inequality of South Korea was determined from 1975 to 1995. Since South Korea 
in this period transited from an agricultural economy to a developed economy, he 
found a support for Kuznets hypothesis and the turning point is between 5000 USD to 
6000 USD. But he didn’t find any support for the view that globalization effects (like 
trade and FDI) influenced the GINI index which was similar to the argument of 
Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Penalosa (1999). This result also supports my view that 
we should look at the problem of Kuznets hypothesis and income inequality 
determinants based on development stages. Since China is a transitional economy, we 
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can suppose that its income inequality change is experiencing part of the Kuznets 
“inverted U” curve and the structural change will be the main impetus behind it. The 
later study will initially prove that this hypothesis is true.  
The effect of macro policies on income inequality is another topic. Thurow (1970) 
used Beta distribution to simulate the actual income distribution since he found that 
the Beta distribution result was fit to U.S. income distribution statistics from 1949 to 
1966. He divided the analysis into white people and black people and concluded that 
growth would be a good policy instrument for more equality in blacks and inflation 
would be a proper policy instrument for more equality in whites. He also suggested a 
proper macro policy is needed for less inequality which shouldn’t be too vigorous.  
There are several different angles in the literatures studying China’s income 
distribution. Zhao, Li and Riskin (1999) argued that the Kuznets curve didn’t have the 
statistic support from China’s regional income distribution. Wu and Perloff (2005) 
analyzed China’s income distribution from 1985 to 2001. They showed that the rising 
income inequality between rural and urban areas in China accounts for most part of 
the increasing inequality. Wang and Fan (2005) analyzed Chinese regional income 
inequality from 1980s. They pointed out that the larger regional income inequality 
mainly came from the increased income inequality among rural income levels in 
different areas. They argued that more capital lead by market power flew to eastern 
area of China which caused the greater regional inequality. The factors of human 
capital and policy design also take effect. Wan, Lu and Chen (2006) discussed the 
relative problems concerning growth-inequality nexus, using panel data of provinces 
of China from 1987 to 2001. They failed to find the evidence for the Kuznets curve 
but found an opposite U curve. Their results showed that the fiscal expenditure on 
supporting rural development and urbanization significantly reduced the income 
inequality and more openness increased the inequality. Further, they found that the 
growth of non-state-owned economy has a negative effect on income distribution. 
This is also consistent with the argument of Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011) 
that provinces with more private firms have much higher income inequality.  
 
  
29 
2.3 An empirical study on explaining China’s income inequality 
2.3.1 Methodology and data 
I apply time series OLS method as the basic estimation method. The method of 
applying the panel data from provinces of China, in my view, has several problems: 
firstly, China is a very unbalanced economy. The coastal provinces are much more 
advanced than the inner land. This means that the cross section or the panel method 
will possibly bring the problems of measurement errors, heterogeneity and omitted 
variable bias.  
Measurement errors: so far there isn’t any official statistics on each province’s level of 
income inequality. Also in China’s political institution, the data reported by different 
local governments are not of the same level of reflecting the truth. The measurement 
errors could lead to an estimation bias. From the point of my view, there is no way to 
resolve this problem.  
Omitted variable bias and heterogeneity: since different provinces are staying at 
different development stages, the determinants for the growth may be different. Thus 
the problem of the omitted variable bias and heterogeneity will easily appear.  
The following equation is estimated to examine whether the Kuznets “inverted U” 
curve appeared in China during the past 30 years:  
Gini coefficient (t) =β 1log(GDP)(t)+β 2log
2
(GDP)(t)+β 3market capitalization(t) 
+β 4inflation+u(t)                       (1) 
where u(t) is the conventionally assumed error term. Ifβ 1is positive andβ 2 is 
negative, it means that the Kuznets hypothesis is valid.  
Since China is a transitional economy, based on Kuznets’ hypothesis, structural 
change should be the main impetus behind the change of income inequality. To 
examine the determinants of income inequality, the following equation is estimated:  
Gini coefficient(t)=β 1log(GDP)(t)+β 2industrial growth rates difference(t)+ 
β 3government expenditure(t) +u(t)         (2) 
where u(t) is the conventionally assumed error term and the crucial factor: 
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Here tertiary industry is just another expression of service industry. GDP is reported 
in constant prices with unit of Billions RMB Yuan; Government expenditure is 
reported as percentage of GDP; Market capitalization is reported as percentage of 
GDP of the publicly listed companies.  
In equation (1) and (2) I include market capitalization, inflation and government 
expenditure as the additional variables which influence the Gini coefficient. The 
factor of market capitalization has been rarely applied in such regressions but its 
influence on income inequality should be clear as a progress of financial market. 
Inflation and government expenditure are usually treated as negatively influencing 
inequality and positively influencing inequality respectively.  
 
Data  
There isn’t any Chinese official Gini index available for the past 30 years and the 
existing calculations on Chinese Gini index are rather diversified. Measurement error 
is not a problem that can be avoided and there will be different estimation results if 
applying Gini coefficients from different studies. Based on a critical attitude, I chose 
the Gini index calculated by Cheng (2007) as the main sample for estimating income 
inequality of China. His study results have been frequently discussed and introduced 
in literatures. Gini coefficients reported in Cheng’s study are from 1981 to 2004, 
except the coefficient for 1991. For the consistency of data standard, I left the Gini 
coefficient for 1991 for blank.  Gini indexes from 2005 to 2010 are chosen from 
three resources: Gini coefficients for 2005 and 2006 are chosen from Chen and Dai 
(2011). Gini coefficients for 2007, 2008 and 2009 are reported by The World 
Factbook of Central Intelligence Agency, USA. It is a common sense that the Chinese 
Gini index in 2010 is above 0.5, according to a report made by Xinhua Agency 
published on May 21
st
, China Economic Information Daily. We set it as 0.5. The data 
are reported in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Gini 
 
0.3993 0.4183 0.43 0.4169 0.3946 0.3964 0.4001 0.4124 0.4275 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Gini 0.4331 0.4297 0.443 0.4419 0.4573 0.4624 0.415 0.469 0.48 0.5 
 
The basic attitude of choosing the above data for Gini index is based on the fact that 
during the past 5 years Chinese people have been feeling the worsening trend of social 
justice and equality. The Gini coefficients in Table 2.1, although come from different 
sources with different calculation processes, can describe China’s income inequality 
change approximately. 
Meanwhile, although in January 2013 the Chinese government (National Bureau of 
Statistics) published the Gini index they calculated (Table 2.2) from 2003 to 2012 
with the equality situation getting better and better since 2008, their calculation 
without issuing the calculation details is highly doubtful. But in order to see whether 
the empirical result is robust with changing the Gini data, I also performed regressions 
with changing the data from 2003 into the ones issued by the National Bureau of 
Statistics, P. R. China. The results are reported in Table 2.8.  
 
Table 2.2 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Gini  0.479 0.473 0.485 0.487 0.484 0.491 0.49 0.481 0.477 0.474 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, P.R. China 
 
Data for the industrial growth rates are counted from the data provided by Annual 
Statistics Reports, National Bureau of Statistics, P. R. China (Table 1.4). Other data 
for the period 1991-2010 comes from the World Bank website Open Database for 
China and the website of International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 
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Database, April 2012.  
 
2.3.2 Empirical results 
The main regression results reported below (Table 2.3 to Table 2.7) are based on the 
Gini index in Table 2.1. We start by checking the data stationarity by unit root tests. 
The results are presented in Table 2.3 with the method of Augmented-Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) unit root tests.   
 
Table 2.3 
Results from ADF Unit Roots Test for the data from 1991(1992) to 2010 
 
Series               Prob.  Observations 
Gini coefficients 0.7869 19 
Market capitalization    0.2432 20 
Log (GDP)                 0.9834 20 
Inflation                  0.3674 20 
Government expenditure    0.9214 20 
Industrial growth rates 
difference 
0.0454 20 
Note: Null hypothesis is unit root.  Lags’ numbers are 0 in the ADF equation necessary to eliminate 
AR errors.  
 
As shown above, only the variable “industrial growth rates difference” is stationary. 
But a deeper observation shows that three other variables seemingly non-stationary 
are trend stationary: 
 
Series Prob.  Lag length 
Log (GDP) 0.0718 4 
Government expenditure    0.02 3 
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Market capitalization 0.01 4 
Note: Results from ADF Unit Roots Test with a constant and linear trend. 
 
And the rest two variables are non-stationary but stationary with 1st difference: 
Series Prob.  Lag length 
Gini coefficients  0.0011 0 
Inflation 0.0293 0 
Note: Results from ADF Unit Roots Test with 1
st
 difference. 
 
Since the regressions’ models are OLS regression, non-stationary and trend stationary 
are not crucial for OLS regression assumptions (Wooldridge: Introductory 
Econometrics, pp. 363, pp. 382) except the potential problem of spurious regression. 
We can resolve the worry of spurious regressions here with checking the cointegration 
relationship. The unit root tests on the two equations’ residuals prove that the 
residuals are stationary (not reported). Thus the non-stationary variables are 
cointegrated and the problem of spurious regression is avoided.  
The results of regression (1) and (2) are presented in Table 2.4.  
 
Table 2.4 
OLS estimation results with time series data from 1992 to 2010 
 
Variable (1)  Coefficient       Variable (2)            Coefficient 
 
Log (GDP)        0.025 **           Log (GDP)                   0.041*** 
(0.009)                                         (0.003) 
Log
2
(GDP)        0.003 **          Industrial growth rates difference  0.896*** 
                 (0.001)                                         (0.225) 
Market capitalization -0.000 ***        Government Expenditure         0.005*** 
(0.000)                                         (0.002)        
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Inflation          0.002***                                             
                 (0.001) 
Adjusted R
2            
0.81                                           0.81 
No. Obs.           19                                             19 
 
Note: The dependent variables for both regressions are the Gini coefficients. ** means statistically 
significant at 5% level.*** means statistically significant at 1% level. Values within the parentheses 
below the estimated coefficients denote the standard errors. 
 
Some additional tests are also shown to support the results (Table 2.5): 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey tests are performed to test heteroskedasticity. The results 
show that this problem doesn’t exist in these two regressions. The Ramsey RESET 
tests are performed for these OLS regressions and the results show that the functional 
forms are appropriate. Residual Breusch-Godfrey LM tests and Durbin-Watson tests 
are checked for the autocorrelation problem. The results show that our regressions 
don’t suffer from such a problem.  
The OLS regression requires the error term obeying the Gaussian distribution 
(Normal Distribution). We performed the Jarque-Bera tests. The results accepted the 
null-hypothesis that the residuals obeying the Gaussian distribution. From the 
skewness and kurtosis values, we can see that regression (2) is better than regression 
(1) in this standard since samples from a normal distribution have an expected 
skewness of 0 and an expected kurtosis of 3. According to Jarque and Bera (1987), the 
critical values of Jarque-Bera test for 20 observations are 2.13 for 10% significance 
level and 3.26 for 5% significance level, using 10000 replications.   
 
Table 2.5 
Equation (1)          Equation (2)   
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey             1.29                     0.57 
(F-Statistics)                                      
Ramsey RESET Test                1.47                     0.55 
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(F-Statistics)        
Breusch-Godfrey LM tests           0.10                     0.47 
   
(Prob.:Chi-Square (2))                
Durbin-Watson Statistics            1.46                     2.13 
Jarque-Bera Test                   1.46                     2.38 
(P-Value)                         0.48                     0.30 
(Skewness)                       -0.14                    -0.86 
(Kurtosis)                         1.67                     3.12 
Note: Chi-Square (2) for Breusch-Godfrey LM tests means that there is no serial correlation up to 2 
lagged periods.  
 
There are many OLS regressions suffer from the problem of endogeneity or the OLS 
estimations will not be consistent. For the regressions here, considering that there are 
many other variables that could explain some part of the Gini coefficients besides the 
explanatory variables here, the “other variables” may also be correlated with the 
existing explanatory variables. Further, the level of income inequality may also affect 
economic performance and thus causes the endogeneity problem.  
I apply instrumental variables to resolve the problem in the above two regressions. 
Since the autocorrelation problem is proved to be non-existed and the regressors in 
the OLS structure are contemporaneous time series, I choose the lagged variables of 
the regressors as instrumental variables. Similar choices are taken by Barro (2000). In 
order to make the test more trustable, I choose two kinds of instrumental variables: 
the first group takes one-period lagged values as the instrumental variables and the 
second group takes two-periods lagged values the instrumental variables. 
The results from 2SLS regressions show that after adding such instrumental variables, 
the coefficients of the second regression testing the effect of industrial structural 
change are still significant (see Table 2.6). The estimation result from adding 
instrumental variables for the first regression testing the Kuznets hypothesis, however, 
becomes non-significant (see Table 2.7). 
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Table 2.6 
2SLS estimation results with instrumental variables for regression (2) 
 
Variable                   Coefficient 1               Coefficient 2 
 
Log (GDP)                         0.041***                        0.042*** 
          (0.004)                          (0.004) 
Industrial growth rates difference       1.175***                         0.903*** 
                                  (0.400)                          (0.270) 
Government Expenditure              0.005**                         0.004** 
          (0.002)                          (0.002) 
Durbin-Watson                       2.12                            2.10 
No. Obs.                             19                              18 
 
Note: The dependent variable is Gini index. Time series data is from 1992 to 2010. The instrumental 
variables for the column of “Coefficient 1” are one-period lagged value Log(GDP)(-1), Industrial 
growth rates difference (-1) and Government Expenditure (-1); The instrumental variables for the 
column of “Coefficient 2” are two-periods lagged value Log(GDP)(-2), Industrial growth rates 
difference (-2) and Government Expenditure (-2); ** means statistically significant at 5% level. *** 
means statistically significant at 1% level. Values within the parentheses below the estimated 
coefficients denote the standard errors. 
 
Table 2.7 
2SLS estimation results with instrumental variables for regression (1) 
 
Variable                  Coefficient 1               Coefficient 2 
 
Log (GDP)                         0.128                          -0.035 
          (0.192)                         (0.102) 
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Log
2
(GDP)                         -0.01                           0.01 
                                  (0.024)                         (0.013) 
Market capitalization                 0.002                          -0.001 
          (0.004)                         (0.002) 
Inflation                            0.002                          0.003 
                                  (0.004)                         (0.002) 
Durbin-Watson                       1.99                           2.17 
No. Obs.                             19                            18 
 
Note: The dependent variable is Gini index. Time series data is from 1992 to 2010. The instrumental 
variables for the column of “Coefficient 1” are one-period lagged value for all regressors; The 
instrumental variables for the column of “Coefficient 2” are two-periods lagged value for all regressors. 
Values within the parentheses below the estimated coefficients denote the standard errors. None of the 
results are significant. 
 
Testing Over-identification Restrictions 
Taking the lagged value as instruments in time series regressions can be seen in many 
literatures. But considering that the appropriateness of the instrumental variables are 
always doubtful, I also tested the relationship between the instrumental variables and 
error term using over-identification restrictions test for regression (2).  
The test is divided into three steps: (1) obtain the 2SLS residuals   with all the 
instrumental variables; (2) then regress the residuals   on all the instruments to 
obtain the R-squared value; (3) under the null hypothesis that all instrumental 
variables are uncorrelated with the original error term u(t), nR
2～Chi square 
distribution and check it with 5% critical value in the distribution.  
The R
2
 we get is 0.1 with 18 observations. The 0.05 critical value for the Chi-square 
distribution with 3 degree of freedom is 7.815. Thus from the result achieved by the 
above steps we accept the null hypothesis which means that all the instrumental 
variables are uncorrelated with the original error term. 
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Robust Test 
For seeing whether the empirical results of regressions (1) and (2) are robust with 
changing the Gini data, I also performed regressions with only changing the Gini data 
from 2003 into the data issued by the National Bureau of Statistics, P. R. China. The 
results are reported in Table 2.8.  
 
Table 2.8 
 
Variable (1)        Coefficient      Variable (2)                Coefficient 
 
Log (GDP)               0.031 ***         Log (GDP)                        0.041*** 
(0.007)                                             (0.004) 
Log
2
(GDP)               0.002 **          Industrial growth rates difference       0.629** 
                        (0.001)                                             (0.274) 
Inflation                 0.002***          Government Expenditure             0.005**     
(0.001)                                             (0.002)        
Adjusted R
2
               0.84                                               0.82 
Durbin-Watson            1.11                                                0.92 
No. Obs.                  19                                                 19 
 
Note: The dependent variables for both regressions are the Gini coefficients with changing the Gini 
coefficients from 2003 to 2010 into the data reported by the National Bureau of Statistics, P. R. China. 
** means statistically significant at 5% level. *** means statistically significant at 1% level. Values 
within the parentheses below the estimated coefficients denote the standard errors. 
 
Discussions 
Based on limited observations, the empirical results initially (with instrumental 
variables estimation results not significant) proved that the Kuznets “inverted U” 
hypothesis didn’t appear in China from 1992 to 2010. This result is also supported by 
the regression result reported in Table 2.8. In regression (1), after changing the Gini 
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coefficients from 2003 to 2010 into the data reported by China National Bureau of 
Statistics, the regressor “Market capitalization” is not significant anymore but the 
other results are generally similar. To be noted, equation (2) is not a proper structure 
for identifying Kuznets inverted U-shape hypothesis since the regressor log
2
(GDP) is 
not significant in that structure. From the results of estimating equation (1), it seems 
that China is still staying at the first half the “inverted U” curve that the income 
inequality is still increasing as GDP grows. Market capitalization and inflation don’t 
show much influence on Gini index. But from the regression on equation (2), 
surprisingly, the industrial growth rates difference nearly has 90% of the explaining 
power on both regressions with and without instrumental variables. Although this 
doesn’t mean that 90% of the variation in income inequality is caused by this factor, it 
means that when industrial growth rates difference increase by 1 unit, Gini coefficient 
in China will decrease by nearly 0.9 units. Government expenditure, although usually 
thought as important, didn’t play a big role in China. Another 4% comes from GDP 
growth. Clearly, for the 20 years, higher GDP achievement has a positive effect on the 
increment of Gini index. I also tried to change the formula of the regressor “industrial 
growth rates difference” to the other possibilities like differences between the 
secondary industry and the tertiary industry and between the average growth rate of 
the sum of secondary and tertiary industries and the primary industry. The results are 
still significant but either of two factors’ influence will reduce to less than 50% (not 
reported). So the factor of industrial growth rates difference I used here has the 
biggest explaining power to see the economic structural effect on this issue. Table 8 
shows the explaining power of the industrial growth rates difference is robust. After 
changing the Gini coefficients from 2003 to 2010 into the data reported by the China 
National Bureau of Statistics, the results are still significant with just lowering the 
coefficient of the industrial growth rates difference to 63%, which still shows the 
major role of the factor in explaining inequality. 
Although the factor of industrial growth rates difference proves to be closely related 
to income inequality, very few literatures paid attention to this as reported in the 
session of “Literature Review”. The result also proves the argument of Kuznets (1955) 
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that the industrial structure update has a major role in shaping the trend of income 
inequality. The difference between the empirical results and the Kuznets’ argument 
lies in the tertiary industry’s role. Kuznets (1955) divided the industrial structure into 
agricultural and non-agricultural which means he didn’t talk about the specific role 
played by the tertiary industry. In our estimation structure, the tertiary industry plays a 
determinant role in affecting industrial growth rates difference since the larger the 
growth rate of tertiary industry, the smaller the difference will be. This also means 
that the role and effect of tertiary industry on the change of income inequality should 
be paid more attention. Although the other direction that reducing the sum of the 
growth rates of the primary and secondary industries can also reduce the degree of 
industrial growth rate difference, this is not the case we should consider since it is the 
direction opposite to growth promotion.  
 
2.4 The role of tertiary industry and growth-inequality nexus 
The global economic history shows that the economic structural update is 
accompanied by continuous economic growth and meanwhile the Kuznets “inverted 
U” curve appears during the whole transitional process. As a style fact, the developed 
economy experiences the process from primary industry domination to tertiary 
(service) industry domination as a share of GDP. So the emergence of tertiary industry 
is usually seen as the natural result of economic growth. Also, the empirical studies in 
this chapter show that the effect of industrial update of tertiary industry has a very 
significant explaining power on income inequality in China. The higher the growth 
rate of tertiary industry, the lower the income inequality will be. Thus the Kuznets’ 
arguments on the “inverted U” curve are also supported by the empirical results in this 
chapter, that is, the income inequality will naturally lower down as the economic 
growth continues to the stage of tertiarisation.  
However, our empirical results also generated a more complicated picture. This 
chapter shows that from regression (1), we didn’t see the “inverted U” curve 
happened in China yet, with continuously higher growth rates of the secondary 
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industry than those of the tertiary industry (See Figure 1.5). In my view, China has 
long ago passed the point that the tertiary industry should have grown faster than the 
secondary industry but its development has been blocked by the economic and 
political institutions which will be explained in the next section. The neoclassical 
growth economics, however, generally assumes that tertiarisation process will be 
automatically realized during growth and they don’t pay any attention to the 
possibility of institutional block for successful tertiarisation. But this chapter’s results 
also support the attitude of neoclassical economics towards the evolution of income 
inequality during growth. Differently, I would argue that economic growth is also the 
result of successful industrial update from primary to tertiary and this process can be 
stopped or blocked by many reasons.  
Let’s further discuss the economic role of tertiarisation from both the demand and 
supply sides. For the demand side, the tertiarisation process is usually explained by 
the higher income elasticity of the tertiary industry since people will consume more in 
tertiary industry with rising income (Chenery, 1982). The rising income, however, 
comes from continuous economic growth without very high inequality in 
income/wealth distribution. If the income inequality is very serious, the demand 
power will be deterred even with high growth rates since richer people have a higher 
propensity to save (Kaldor, 1955). Stiglitz (2012) also presented the similar argument 
that the income inequality will lead to insufficient demand for supply growth. We 
should also be aware of that demand from outside the country cannot support the 
growth of tertiary industry since most of the service is non-traded products. China is 
exactly an example that its secondary industry has been promoted by exports for a 
long time and its tertiary industry cannot find sufficient support from trading. For this 
reason, the income inequality generates a negative effect on tertiarisation. China’s 
case shows that tertiarisation could be very hard to complete under very high 
economic growth rate. We should be aware of that the very high economic growth 
rates in China were supported during early period of economic development which 
doesn’t mean that they will be supported during the later stage when tertiarisation 
should exert more influence. Further, our empirical results show that the effect of 
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industrial update of tertiary industry also has a very significant explaining power on 
income inequality in China. This means that the tertiarisation process further impact 
the income/wealth distribution in an economy. This seems there are mutual effects 
between tertiarisation and income/wealth distribution. The effect of tertiarisation on 
income inequality can be explained from the supply side.  
For the supply side, the tertiarisation is the result of continuous economic growth 
which means that the sustainable technology innovation in the economy is the crucial 
factor behind tertiarisation. Tertiarisation is the process of enhancing overall 
productivity since it is updating the resource to higher value-added industries. And 
this is the reason why the average wage rate in the tertiary industry is higher than that 
of the other two industries. The tertiary industry has a higher value-added per labor or 
capita input, meaning the production resource will be used more efficiently. After the 
mature stage of secondary industry when its marginal profit rate is suffering the law 
of diminishing marginal returns, a competitive economy will enter the stage of 
tertiarisation automatically and the tertiarisation process will also increase the 
productivity of both secondary and primary industries. This is the reason for the 
higher average wage rate which lowers the inequality degree. It should be noted that 
the effect of tertiarisation on inequality is different from that of technology 
innovation.  
Some literatures also mentioned that the industrial transitional process is partly 
endogenous to entrepreneurial response (See Peneder, 2002). Remember both Karl 
Marx and Joseph Schumpeter emphasized the entrepreneurs’ role on continuous 
technology innovation. This logic also points to the importance of an institution which 
supports entrepreneurial spirit.  
Traditionally, tertiarisation is seen as a natural result of economic growth and its effect 
on growth is treated as much smaller than within industry productivity growth. 
Peneder (2002) empirically tested the effect of industrial update on economic growth 
and the result showed that the effect was not as big as expected since most growth 
power came from productivity progress within each industry. However, he didn’t 
check how much the productivity progress within each industry is affected by 
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tertiarisation. These previous studies on the effect of industrial update on growth, 
from the point of my view, didn’t fully understand the effect of tertiarisation on 
growth. Particularly, these understandings haven’t clearly seen the importance of 
successful tertiarisation on continuous economic growth for transitional developing 
economies. The above discussion on the role of tertiarisation shows that there is an 
inner link among growth, distribution and tertiarisation: tertiarisation is the result of 
continuous economic growth but it also means that only with successful tertiarisation 
the economic growth can be sustained from a developing to a developed economy. 
The reason is that for the demand side tertiarisation is the condition of continuously 
sufficient demand with a more equal distribution to support the supply growth and for 
the supply side tertiarisation is the realization process of higher overall productivity. 
McMillan and Rodrik (2011) empirically confirmed that most difference of growth 
rates between developing countries was contributed by update of overall labor 
productivity which is determined by structural change. The above logic also leads to 
the crucial effect of equal income/wealth distribution on long-run economic growth.  
To sum up, the above argument points to the importance of growth with equal 
distribution for a transitional developing economy. The belief that unequal distribution 
is good for growth (esp. in the long-run) is strongly challenged here. So what kind of 
economy can realize the sustainable growth from a developing stage to the developed 
stage which means that the tertiarisation process will be successful? For 
understanding the answer to this question, it is a good idea for us to see what can 
block the progress of tertiarisation and China is the right case for this phenomenon.  
 
2.5 Why tertiary industry develops slowly in China? An institutional 
analysis  
The economic structure of China has experienced a big change during the past 20 
years. In 1990, 73.6% of the population was still living in rural areas producing 27.1% 
products of GDP. These numbers updated to 27.1% for rural population and 11.3% for 
GDP contribution in 2009 (Lin, 2011b). The growth rates of secondary and tertiary 
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industries are also very high.  
From Figure 1.5, we can see that the growth rates of tertiary industry in China during 
the past 20 years are generally lower than the growth rates of secondary industry. 
From the view of employment rate, it is reported that by the end of 2011, the 
employment share of tertiary industry reached 35.7% which is bigger than that of 
secondary industry (29.5%) and primary industry (34.8%) (China People’s Daily, 
2012.6.5). But the state sector still keeps 77% of total urban employment in tertiary 
industry in 2007 which contrasts 15% in manufacturing (Zhu, 2012). From the 
perspective of output, according to China National Bureau of Statistics, in 2011 the 
tertiary industry’s contribution to GDP is 43.1% which is much less than that of 
developed economies where the ratio is usually larger than 70%. This ratio is even 
lower than the countries in the similar development stage like India. Considering the 
bubble in China’s real estate market and real estate is a big part of tertiary industry, 
the tertiary industry is even smaller in China if the bubble effect is omitted. 
 
Figure 1.5  Industrial output growth rates between 1991 and 2011, China 
 
Note: The column line shows the output growth rates and the row line shows the time range. 
Source: Data collected from the Annual Statistics Reports, National Bureau of Statistics, P. R. China. 
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growth rate of tertiary industry will be higher than that of secondary industry when an 
economy enters the stage of tertiarisation. Obviously, we haven’t seen China reached 
this stage. However, China has already reached the stage of high middle-income level 
according to World Bank and should have already entered the period of tertiarisation. 
As argued above, tertiarisation is the condition for generating sufficient demand to 
support growth. But China’s growth experience has already proved that the process is 
rather difficult to realize, e.g. the 2004 annual Central Economic Work Conference of 
China decided to alter China’s growth path to rely more on the domestic consumption 
and the central government have tried many ways to realize the goal. So far, however, 
the goal is still far from reach. Then what is blocking China’s steps toward a tertiary 
industry-dominated economy? This is the question we should try to answer.  
 
The “three” crucial institutional arrangements 
I would like to argue that the basic reason for slow tertiarisation in China is deeply 
rooted in its institutional arrangements. The marketing economy in China now is far 
from a real competitive market. To the opposite, China is a very high rent-seeking 
economy. From the point of my view, there are three crucial institutional 
arrangements to be primarily responsible.  
Firstly, China’s political institution makes this country a very high rent-seeking 
economy. There are three influential contents of the political institution. The first part 
is the difficulty to realize the high-level law-ruled society under the one-party 
leadership, although China has made much progress to a law-ruled society since 1979. 
Under current political institutions, Chinese government officials still own much 
power to intervene the judiciary process since the judiciary sector in China is not 
independent. Further, their power on managing public resources is weakly limited and 
the public monitoring power in China is very weak. As a result, the corruption 
phenomenon is quite prevalent. This makes real fair competition very hard to realize.  
The second part is that China’s working units are divided into “outside institution” 
units and “inside institution” units. The “inside institution” means the part controlled 
by CPC and the promotion channel has the same ranking arrangements. The “inside 
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institution” units include all levels of governments, some kinds of enterprises (like the 
State-Owned Enterprises) and public-sector units. These units have a natural closer 
relationship with political power and their rent-seeking space is much larger than the 
“outside institution” units. Especially, nearly all the financial sectors in China are 
“inside institution” units which keep the monopoly status.  
The third part is the institutional arrangements on how the local officials’ 
performances being measured and judged. In fact, the promotion of the local officials 
is mainly based on two kinds of reasons: the political relationship with the 
higher-level officials and the economic performance (GDP) of the place in charge. 
This institution is called “local competition” which is argued by some economists like 
Steven Cheung to be the most important growth motivation behind China’s growth 
miracle. For this incentive arrangement, every local government chief is trying the 
best to build the relationship with senior officials and to expand the GDP of the place 
they stay. The former one leads more corruptions and the later one leads to the 
investment-led growth model since the investment is the quickest way of increasing 
GDP growth rate.   
Besides, China has a long tradition of “Guan Xi” culture. For thousands of years, 
China is a country ruled by people but not ruled by law or any religion. Also, the 
traditional Chinese culture represented by Confucianism emphasizes the effect of clan. 
With such complicated historical reasons, the Chinese “Guan Xi” which means 
relationship has been a kind of culture prominent in China. Fairness and justice are 
always influenced by “Guan Xi”. Because of the “Guan Xi” culture as well as the 
political institution which supports the culture to take effect, China is a country with 
very large rent-seeking space. The people and organizations with closer and better 
“Guan Xi” have larger rent-seeking space. Under many situations, the rent-seeking 
activities can exert the determinant effect on varieties of issues.  
Secondly, China is adopting a double-track economic system. The National 
Development and Reform Commission of China has the authority to decide prices for 
many resources and products, like agricultural products, water, oil, steel, electricity, 
medicine, transportation, etc. These resources are mainly controlled by State-Owned 
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Enterprises (SOEs) with monopoly power. This is a long tradition formed in pure 
planned economy after 1949 that governments can keep the input prices low enough 
to subsidize industrialization. Although many sectors are open to private economies, 
the most important economic sectors in the economy are still owned by State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOE). Although the reform is marketing economy oriented, the CPC still 
holds a belief that the so-called “socialism marketing economy” should be labeled by 
the existence of SOEs which takes the main part in an economy.  
With this economic structure, the price system of the double-track economic system 
has two levels: the first level is that although there are official prices for some 
commodities determined by the central government, there are also market prices for 
these commodities, like agricultural good. The second level is that the prices for some 
goods (e.g. the oil) are strictly determined by the central government and the prices 
for some goods are purely determined by the market. Thus the whole price system of 
the double-track economy is complicatedly distorted. Further, the SOEs are mainly 
capital-intensive which are supported by very low interest loans from state-owned 
banks and their relationships with governments are very close. In China, the Chairman 
of the Board of SOEs has the same rank as the officials in the governments. The ranks 
are between the levels of Director and Minister. To the opposite, the private 
economies are very difficult to get loans since most loans go to SOEs. Wu (2000) 
reported that state sector controls much of China’s capital. Kuijs and Wang (2005) 
reported that the small and medium-sized companies which were mainly private 
received less than 10% to total bank loans. Most of the private companies are thus 
labor-intensive and they feel very hard to update into capital-intensive industries.  
Thirdly, the economy is a dual-sector economy dividing into rural and urban sectors. 
The system of household registration (“Hukou”), although has been loosening, is still 
the main block for labor flows. The dual economy makes a very unequal development 
between rural and urban areas which limits the income growth of rural habitants. Most 
of them don’t have many welfare supports like limits on children’s education and 
verities of insurances. Only 20% of migrants get access to urban health insurance in 
2010 and 12-13.5% of migrants get access to unemployment insurance from 2008 to 
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2010 (Meng, 2012). Another crucial economic result is that the wage rate of migrant 
laborers in cities is thus depressed with discriminations and occupational choices. 
Rural laborers in China are always the weaker side in contract games, compared with 
the rights of urban citizens. Their hourly wage rate on average is only 45% of the 
average urban workers who own the “Hukou” (Meng, 2012).  
 
The effect of the institutional arrangements 
The above three institutional arrangements strongly distorted China’s market and 
affected both the demand and supply sides for the successful tertiarisation.  
Firstly, the private economy has to face the competition of SOEs with very unfair 
conditions. This leads the Chinese economy to a very strange combination: the private 
economy is forced to develop labor-intensive industries which are mainly in the 
secondary industry (China National Bureau of Statistics, 2004). They firstly entered 
the low-end tertiary industry in the early reform period as the owner of some small 
businesses like tiny restaurants and education service which have smaller scale 
compared to those in primary and secondary industries. However, tertiary industry is 
marked with both capital intensive and labor intensive. The industries of finance, 
transportation and real estate, for example, are important parts of tertiary industry. 
Most of these capital-intensive and very high-value added industries are occupied by 
SOEs. Lin and Li (2001) also argued that in China most of the capital-intensive 
enterprises are SOEs. The private economies are very difficult to compete with them 
without equal treatment by institutions. Many tertiary capital-intensive industries are 
still monopolized with entry limitation. Most (70%, Lin (2011a, Chapter 9) ) of the 
commercial loans of “inside institution” financial sectors are flowing to SOEs.  
However, the SOEs entering the tertiary industry have very low efficiency. Lin and 
Tan (1999) developed a concept called “viability” for analyzing SOEs in a socialism 
economy. Lin (2011a) explained this concept as:  
“Viability” is the capacity of a normally managed enterprise to earn a socially 
acceptable normal profit in an open, free and competitive market, without external 
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support or protection. “Normally managed” means that there is no major problem in 
its operation or management. “Normal profit” refers to an average profit acceptable 
to the market. “Open” means that the domestic market is connected with foreign 
markets. “Free” means free access to the market. “Competitive” means that there is 
no monopoly in the market.  
With this concept, he argued that the China SOEs existing with varieties of 
governmental supports and privileges are actually non-viable and endogenously bring 
the distorted banking system and the regulation of market access.  
Liu (2000) found that the SOEs have the lowest efficiency in China, using 
input-output method. Lu (2003) reported that the efficiency difference between SOEs 
and private economy had been keeping increasing, although the efficiency of SOEs 
also somehow improved. There are many literatures explaining the phenomenon 
which can be summarized as huge rent-seeking space enjoyed by SOEs. One 
argument is about the “soft budget constraint” which means that the SOEs don’t have 
real budget constraint as private economies and thus their incentive to improve the 
efficiency is very low. Further, their investments with the loans are generating huge 
waste which also causes a big burden for the banking system. The private sectors are 
thus difficult to get sufficient and timely loans for development. This leads to 
long-time monopolies in many fields and lack of competition. Besides, SOEs (and the 
state-related sectors which are “inside institution”) in China are low efficient but they 
can offer higher wages and welfare to the employees. This causes a high misallocation 
of both human resource and physical capital: the best talents compete to enter the 
SOEs but their high marginal productivity is limited by SOEs’ institution. Meanwhile, 
the competition is not fair among the talents who are trying to enter the state-related 
sectors (including the SOEs) because of the rent-seeking activities which lead a 
mismatch between the high-payment (or welfare) jobs and the talents who own the 
relative qualified productivity. The system of SOEs also supported governmental 
interventions into the economy. Kuijs and Wang (2005) argued that more investment 
will enter industries other than the secondary industry and labor resource can also be 
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allocated more efficiently without governmental interventions. Since the 
capital-intensive industries in tertiary industry are occupies by such SOEs, the growth 
rate of tertiary industry is highly depressed. To the opposite, the secondary industry 
grows faster because private economies are forced to concentrate on labor-intensive 
manufacturing industries and luckily, China indeed has a comparative advantage of 
labor-intensive industries compared to developed countries. This is reason behind the 
picture why the growth rate of tertiary industry has been keeping lower than the 
secondary industry. However, the comparative advantage of such private enterprises 
in the secondary industry has been diminishing as Chinese economy grows and this 
leads to the structural problem more serious. 
Further, SOEs have very low incentive to update their productivity as a response to 
market competition because they don’t have much competition pressure. The lack of 
entrepreneurial spirit of SOEs blocks the efficiency update including technology 
innovation. Meanwhile, the private companies which are very sensitive to market 
competitions are lack of capital to burden the cost of technological innovation. They 
also have much weaker support from government and thus are in shortage of many 
other “rents” compared to SOEs. There is indeed a competition between the private 
economy and state-owned economy in China. However, the competition is not fair 
which greatly reduces the competition pressure on SOEs. And since the competition is 
closely related to “rent”, most private companies are also focusing on “Guan Xi” 
building (investment) but not productivity promotion. The competition for 
rent-seeking further makes the rents more prevalent and more expensive which lead 
the economy more unfair. There are some models arguing the efficiency of the 
double-track economic system, e.g. Lau, Qian and Roland (1997, 2000) modeled the 
double-track reform strategy and argued that it is not only efficient but also 
Pareto-improving. Their models, however, are far from reality. There isn’t “rent” in 
their models and the planned economic units work as the private economic units. Thus 
these models do not fit China’s reality during reform. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) argued that there are two reasons why rent-seeking is very costly to growth. 
The first reason is that rent-seeking activities exhibit very natural increasing returns 
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which attract more and more resource to rent-seeking activities from productive 
activities. The second reason lies in that rent-seeking, esp. public rent-seeking by 
governmental officials, is prone to hurt innovative activities since innovations often 
need public supports like patterns and licenses. Both these two reasons obviously 
exist in China whose economic and political institutions limit the update speed of 
technology. The above arguments revealed the reasons why China is a fast-growing 
economy but lacks internationally competitive large companies. Also, the average 
wage rate of the whole economy is highly depressed and the domestic demand is thus 
insufficient.  
As argued above, the double-track economic institution as well as political institution 
blocked the natural growth of Chinese private economy. The urban-rural dual system 
which limits the national labor market also negatively influences the tertiarisation 
process. We can see this from several angles:  
firstly, the house registration system blocked the shape of a competitive labor market 
which distorted the labor price. The migrant laborers from rural area stay at a weaker 
situation in gaming wage contract. An even worse effect is that rural migrants are 
nearly impossible to enter SOEs to enjoy the higher income with welfare and most of 
them have to enter private economies with accepting very low wage rate. Only 7.3% 
of rural migrants are employed in the state sector in 2009 (Meng, 2012). To 
summarize, the depressed low labor cost supports and stimulates the private economy 
in labor-intensive industries, esp. in the manufacturing secondary industry.  
Secondly, since there is much welfare loss of rural laborers caused by the house 
registration system, the migration process from rural to urban areas is blocked. The 
amount of money they can transfer back to their rural families is also limited. From 
Figure 1.5 we see that the growth rates of agricultural industry have been much lower 
than the other two industries. One important reason is the slow and even repeated 
migration process of rural laborers since the quick and sustainable migration is one of 
the key conditions for raising productivity in agriculture during economic transition. 
The above logic means that the household registration system limited the income 
growth of around more than 60% of Chinese people who are still living in rural areas 
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and who moved to urban areas without “Hukou”. This also means that the national 
average education level is limited by the system. So from both the demand side and 
the supply side, the registration system restricts the conditions required for continuous 
tertiarisation.  
The above arguments put forward the basic reasons behind the slow development of 
tertiarisation in China. Behind the high GDP growth rates, China is a highly distorted 
economy: all the product market, resource market and labor market are distorted by 
such institutional arrangements. The whole economy is thus low efficient and weak. 
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) estimated the effect of China’s resource misallocation on 
TFP and they calculated that China’s TFP will increase around 30%-50% if capital 
and labor in China are assumed to equalize marginal products to the extent like that in 
United States. Many studies already pointed out that the raising of TFP or efficiency 
is the only way that China can sustain its high growth rates and realize its growth 
potentials and this needs basic institutional reforms.  
 
2.6 Policy suggestions 
As a suggestion for China’s future reform, the successful and quick tertiarisation is the 
goal that should be focused. The chapter argues that China’s tertiarisation is slow 
because of three main institutional arrangements: political institution, double-track 
economic system and rural-urban dual economy. Accordingly, the relative future 
reforms should focus on these institutions and this will also be a process of 
deprivation of rents.  
To be more exact, the current institutional reforms should focus on the privatization 
for the main industrial update blocks, esp. liberalizing the tertiary industry; abolishing 
the system of household registration and building a high-quality law-ruled society. 
These reforms are connected with each other and should be promoted at the same time 
or the high growth rate of China will face unsustainable problem in the near future 
and the traditional problem of “middle-income trap” will appear.  Although Chinese 
government has already paid attention to develop tertiary industry, there is one trap of 
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tertiarisation China should avoid: this chapter doesn’t mean that continuing 
tertiarisation with more state-owned economy can also be a choice. The tertiarisation 
process must be completed with economic liberalization, or many of the arguments in 
section 2.4 cannot be established any more. The Chinese government, therefore, 
should not only look at the development speed of tertiary industry but also pay 
attention to the development path. This seems different from the arguments of Wan, 
Lu and Chen (2006) and Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011) that the private 
economy exerts a negative influence on China’s income/wealth distribution. Their 
arguments are not wrong, however, from the static view. But from a dynamic 
viewpoint, continuing economic liberalization should be right choice.  
 
2.7 Pro-poor growth? A discussion with Dollar and Kraay (2002) 
China’s reform and opening up during the past 30 years has made a great achievement 
in reducing absolute poverty. According to China National Bureau of Statistics, the 
number of people living in absolute poverty reduced from 300 million to less than 100 
million which occupied the biggest share of global poverty reduction. But whether 
growth is a pro-poor process, based on the concept of relative poverty (a concept 
related to distribution, sometimes defined the bottom 10% or 20% of income 
distribution as the poor group), has been debating by economists. A recent most 
well-known result was achieved by Dollar and Kraay (2002). In the paper Growth is 
Good for the Poor, they made an empirical study based on 92 countries spanning the 
past four decades. Dollar and Kraay defined the “poor” as those in the bottom fifth of 
the income distribution of a country. Their regressions found that the general 
relationship between growth of the income of the poor and growth of mean (average) 
income is nearly one to one. Besides, their result is very strong since they also found 
that many other factors traditionally treated as influencing factors actually don’t 
matter at all for this relationship like the development periods and international trade. 
According to their results, we can have several implications:  
Firstly, the starting point of the poor in different countries matters. If the starting 
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income of the poor in two countries are different and their GDP grow rates keep the 
same, then the poor people will never have the same income in the two countries. 
Secondly, considering the real world, we can see that countries have different GINI 
index during different development stages. For example, in early 1980s, China’s GINI 
index was very low (less than 0.2) but now it is high (more than 0.5). According to the 
result of Dollar and Kraay (2002), if the per capita of China grows 9% since 1980s, 
the poor people’s income has also increased at nearly the same speed. The result of 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) actually changed our thought on the “Lorenz Curve”: 
suppose that in 1980, the bottom fifth people have 20% of the total income in China, 
thus in 2010 the bottom fifth people will also have 20% of the total income in China! 
The point (0.2, 0.2) in the Lorenz Curve will keep the same. We know that the Lorenz 
Curve of China in the past 30 years has greatly lowered the right downward. So the 
main reason to explain the change of GINI index will be that most of the change 
comes from the change of the other 80% people. One big problem lies in the work of 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) is that they didn’t show the result for each percentage below 
20%, thus we don’t know the change of points in Lorenz Curve below (0.2, 0.2). But 
since it is relatively much smaller, we can see that much of change is generated by the 
other 80% people.  
The above argument leaves many important questions which Dollar and Kraay didn’t 
explain:  
1. What is the economic theory to explain such a result that the income change of the 
rich people (as defined 80% of the population) should be a major contribution to the 
GINI index change？  
2. The result shows that the policy direction of achieving a good GINI index should 
mainly take care of the other 80% population under economic growth. Then what 
types of policies should be the optimal choices?  
Of course the above argument and questions rise only if the work of Dollar and Kraay 
is solid. However, Lubker, Smith and Weeks (2002) gave a fierce criticism on it. They 
put forward that the work of Dollar and Kraay has several serious flaws:  
1. The empirical work is based on theoretically unsound equations;  
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2. The data are seriously flawed;  
3. The policy variables are not defined appropriately.  
This paper can be seen as a comprehensive criticism. Besides, if their comment is 
solid, then the regression result of Dollar and Kraay will be very doubtful. Dollar and 
Kraay in the same year quickly gave a defending on their work and pointed out the 
criticisms of Lubker, Smith and Weeks are incorrect. Their response, however, didn’t 
cover all the problems pointed out by the three economists. Ravallion (2001) argued 
that both the pro-poor growth argued by Dollar and Kraay (2002) and the opposite 
position of anti-poor growth have some supports.  
Since Dollar and Kraay (2002) established their results based on panel data covering 
92 countries, it is meaningful and interesting to see whether a single transitional 
economy like China obeys the rule they set up.  
 
Table 2.9  Income share held by lowest 20% people in China 
 
Year          1993        1996        1999         2002        2005 
Share         7.35%       7.24%       6.39%       5.47%       4.99% 
 
Source: World Bank Website Open Database for China 
 
The above data shows that the income share held by the lowest 20% people in China 
decreased by 32% during the 12 years. We also have the Gini coefficients were 0.4183 
in 1993 and 0.4573 in 2005 which means that Gini coefficients increased 9.3% during 
the 12 years. These data shows several implications: the first is that China’s growth 
didn’t seem to follow the rule of Dollar and Kraay (2002) that growth is relatively 
good for poor with the relationship between growth of income of the poor and growth 
of mean income is one-to-one, although the absolute poverty problem has been 
greatly improved in China during the reform period. Also the change of “Lorenz 
Curve” cannot be explained only by the richer 80% population. The result of Dollar 
and Kraay (2002) is thus strongly challenged by China’s experience. But if we define 
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the “pro-poor” growth as alleviating poverty, the answer will be “yes”: growth is 
pro-poor.  
 
2.8  Concluding Remarks 
This chapter empirically tested the Kuznets “inverted U” curve with economic data of 
China since 1990s. During this period China successfully transited from a poor 
economy to a high middle-income level economy. The estimation results initially 
show that China seems still at the first half of the “inverted U” curve.  
The study shows that the industrial growth rates difference can explain most part of 
the income inequality change in China. The role of tertiarisation is very crucial for the 
change. We also discussed the importance of tertiarisation on sustainable growth. 
Finally, we argued that the development of tertiary industry is slow in China because 
of three main institutional arrangements which are political institution, double-track 
economic system and rural-urban dual economy. 
The study also confirms a link between growth and distribution that is the low income 
inequality should be good for growth in the long run, especially during the later stage 
of development when tertiarisation should become dominated. A proper economic 
institutional arrangement should be good for sustainable growth and equal 
income/wealth distribution in the long run as well. To the opposite, the worsening 
income inequality which is accompanying slow tertiarisation makes the sustainable 
growth difficult.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Inequality Evolution with Rent-seeking: from the 
Specific Case of China to Generalization 
 
3.1 Introduction 
It is worldwide acknowledged that China has been a fast-growing economy with 
worsening income/wealth distribution for over 30 years since 1979. Figure 1.1 and 
Figure 1.2 depict the details of both growth and distribution performance of China 
since 1980s (we use income Gini index as the proxy for wealth Gini index). The 
average growth rate reaches about 10% and the Gini coefficient has been keeping 
increasing. How to under this phenomenon is an interesting question and under hot 
debate. 
 
Figure 1.1 
 
Note: Growth rates from 1980 to 1990 are calculated by GDP given by Maddison (2007) and growth 
rates from 1991 to 2010 are calculated by GDP given by International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook Database, April 2012.  
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Figure 1.2 
 
Note: Gini coefficients from 1981-2004 (except 1991) are the results calculated by Cheng (2007); Gini 
coefficient for 1991 is the result calculated by Wang (2010); Gini indexes from 2005 to 2010 are 
chosen from several resources: Gini coefficients for 2005 and 2006 are chosen from Chen and Dai 
(2011). Gini indexes for 2007, 2008 and 2009 are reported by The World Factbook of Central 
Intelligence Agency, USA. It is a common sense that the Chinese Gini index in 2010 is above 0.5, 
according to a report made by Xinhua Agency published in May 21
st
, China Economic Information 
Daily. We set it as 0.5.  
 
There are many perspectives on how to explain the growing inequality in China. Lin 
and Liu (2003) argued that the increasing regional inequality of China rooted in the 
development strategy which doesn’t obey the comparative advantage. Wang and Fan 
(2004) analyzed Chinese regional income inequality from 1980s. They pointed out 
that the larger regional income inequality mainly came from the increased income 
inequality among rural income levels in different areas. They argued that more capital 
lead by market power flew to eastern area of China which caused the greater regional 
inequality. The factors of human capital and policy design also take effect. Wang 
(2007) emphasized the role of grey revenue in explaining China’s income inequality. 
I would like to look at the problem from a rent-seeking perspective. Let’s see who 
became rich in China. According to Gerth (2010), China’s newly rich class after 
reform and opening up can be divided into four groups: the individual entrepreneurs 
(“getihu”), people who took advantage of the double-track price system, people who 
are land speculators and managers of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). I would like to 
point out that there is another group obviously exists: the governmental officials of all 
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levels. And the poorest people in China are mainly the poorest in rural areas, most 
“off-post” workers of SOEs and most rural migrants in cities. It should be noted that 
the newly rich class, as introduced, has a close relationship with rent-seeking.  
The “rent” we mentioned here is neither the Ricardian land rent nor the quasi-rent we 
usually mentioned in economics. According to Tollison (1982), rent-seeking is “the 
expenditure of scarce resources to capture an artificially created transfer” which is 
pointing to the activities of wasting resources competing for artificially contrived 
transfers. Rent, which often being treated as related to government powers, can be 
interpreted as a kind of privilege. These pursuing activities for rent can be competitive. 
However, the actions of rent-seeking cause pure waste and reduce the efficiency of 
competition for the overall society. Early analyses were mainly static which pointed 
out the welfare loss caused by rent-seeking activities of monopoly actions or 
international trade (see Tullock, 1967 and Krueger, 1974). Murphy, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993) put forward two reasons why rent-seeking is very costly to economic 
growth. The first reason is that rent-seeking activities exhibit very natural increasing 
returns which attract more and more resource to rent-seeking activities from 
productive activities. The second reason lies in that rent-seeking, esp. public 
rent-seeking by governmental officials, is prone to hurt innovative activities since 
innovations often need public supports like patterns and licenses.  
China is an economy with very large rent-seeking space which is shaped by its 
institutions. Under current Chinese political and economic institutions, the economy 
can be divided into two parts: inside institution (“tizhinei”) and outside institution 
(“tizhiwai”). This is the result of China’s gradual reform since 1979. The central 
government adopts the way of loosening the planned economy step by step. The 
groups inside the institution mean the ones controlled or at least partly controlled by 
the governments and they enjoy much more political power compared to the outside 
institution economy. The working units inside the institution contain varieties of 
governmental organizations and many enterprises. Thus the scope of this group is 
very large. For example, most Chinese universities are public and all of them are 
belonging to the group inside the institution. A very realistic incentive for the people 
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working in such units is that they have a possibility to be promoted according to the 
official rank (same as the governmental officials) whereas the people working in the 
units outside the institution don’t. As a result, the units inside the institution enjoy 
much larger rent-seeking space than the groups outside the institution. A well-known 
example in China is that the employees inside the institution can buy the real estate 
through their unit welfare system which will enable them to buy the house with much 
lower price (e.g. 10% of the market price).  
 
Figure 1.6  Average wage difference between sectors in 2010 
 Source: Reports of the National Bureau of Statistics, China 
 
If we divide China’s economy into two industries of competitive private economy 
which is outside institution and monopolistic state-owned economy which is inside 
institution, we will find that not only the average wage is much higher in the 
state-owned industry (see Figure 1.6), but also its wage growth rate is much higher. 
According to Banister (2007), the average real annual wage growth rate in unban 
manufacturing sector during 1992 to 2004 was 7.5% but if excluding state-owned and 
collectively owned economy, the growth rate becomes 4.6%. This is a unique 
phenomenon because the state-owned economy is lack of efficiency. There are large 
amount of studies showing that the productivity of Chinese private economy is much 
higher than that of the state-owned economy.   
The above distorted economic phenomenon is shaped by Chinese institutional 
arrangements with “Chinese characteristics”. In this chapter, I try to model and 
explain the phenomenon through including the institutional factors into the 
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neoclassical economic models. Observing that the economy is divided into two parts, 
we built Model 1 and 2 employing two representative agents. Each represents a 
position to the governments. The economic analysis on Chinese economy cannot 
ignore the effect of rent which means that we need to revise and extend the traditional 
neoclassical growth models. The models we built in the chapter show that the groups 
within the institution and the ones outside it have two different convergence points. 
This means the income inequality will be permanent without institutional innovation 
and the Kuznets “inverted U” curve will not appear. The models also show that 
transferring the “double-track” economy to a “single-track” one will boost the whole 
economy. The chapter finally generalized the models to show that the equal 
distribution of rent-seeking space will lead to equal wealth distribution dynamically. 
Here the rent-inequality nexus has been established. The chapter is to reveal and 
analyze the deep reason behind the Chinese Gini index performance but not to 
quantitatively explain the Gini index determinants.  
The content is arranged as follows: section 3.2 explains the incentives for rent-seeking; 
section 3.3 studies the wealth distribution evolution under neoclassical growth models 
with two representative agents; section 3.4 creates a generalized model to establish 
the rent-inequality nexus; section 3.5 is the concluding remarks. 
 
3.2 Why the agents will perform rent-seeking? 
In an economy constructed by “inside institution” enterprises and “outside institution” 
enterprises, a simple game analysis will show that both the two kinds of enterprises 
will perform rent-seeking which is a “Nash Equilibrium” solution.  
We assume the existing institution is fixed. Such an institution determines the 
payments of the game. Following the fact that rent-seeking can bring additional 
revenue and the agents inside institution own higher rents, the payments for the 
“outside institution” economy (represented by private enterprises) and the “inside 
institution” economy (represented by SOEs) are shown in Table 3.1:  
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Table 3.1 
                                           SOEs 
     
               Rent-seeking      
Private 
Economy    Rent-seeking Deny 
 
 
SOEs in China are acknowledged efficiency-lack. Liu (2000) found that the SOEs 
have the lowest efficiency in China, using input-output method. Lu (2003) reported 
that the efficiency difference between SOEs and private economy had been keeping 
increasing. There are many literatures explaining the phenomenon. One argument is 
about the “soft budget constraint” which means that the SOEs don’t have real budget 
constraint as private economies. This is a result of rent-seeking. Besides governmental 
subsidies, most (70%, Lin (2011, Chapter 9) ) of the commercial loans of “inside 
institution” financial sectors are flowing to SOEs. With the “soft budget constraint”, 
their incentive to improve the efficiency is very low. Further, their investments with 
the loans are generating huge waste which also causes a big burden for the banking 
system. The private sectors are thus difficult to get sufficient and timely loans for 
development. This leads to long-time monopolies in many fields with huge 
rent-seeking space and lack of competition. 
Based on this, we assume that the highest profit can be earned is 10 units for both of 
the two types of enterprises after considering cost. If both the SOEs and private 
enterprises don’t perform rent-seeking activities, the economy will stay at the fair 
competition status. Since the SOEs are much less efficient than the private economy, 
the private economy will earn the profit 9 units and the SOEs will only get 5. If only 
the SOEs perform rent-seeking activities, they will get 10 units and the private 
economy will get 3. This is the result under extreme unfairness. The private economy 
can still get 3 units because of their high efficiency. If only the private economy 
perform rent-seeking, the SOEs will get nothing and the private economy get 10. 
4,   6 10,   0 
 3,   10  9,   5 
Rent-seeking Rent-seeking Deny 
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Finally, if both the agents perform rent-seeking activities, neither of them can get 10 
units and SOEs can stay at an advantage with getting 6 units and the private economy 
get 4 units.  
These payments assumption is based on economic logic which can be adjusted. For 
example, we may assume that the profit of SOEs is greater than 0 when they don’t 
pursue rent-seeking and the private economy performs rent-seeking. But the profit 
cannot surpass that under the rent-seeking condition.  
The above payments show that there is a Nash equilibrium at the situation that both 
agents perform rent-seeking. The total payment will be lower than that under fair 
competition. This reflects the negative externality of rent-seeking activities. The 
institutional arrangements affected the revenue and cost of each agent’s activity. Thus 
it should be noted that the institutional innovation will change the Nash equilibrium 
through changing the payments. 
One thing needs to be noted is that the Nash equilibrium above is not a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. Rama (1993) argued that rent-seeking can be understood as a repeated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. This argument isn’t consistent with Chinese economic reality.  
The reason is that SOEs and the private enterprises have different efficiencies. If they 
compete at an environment without rent, the profit gained by SOEs will be definitely 
lower than that gained with rent, although the total profits will become larger.  
 
3.3 How income/wealth distribution evolves during economic growth 
with rent?  
3.3.1 Literature review 
The earliest neoclassical model on the evolution process of income/wealth inequality 
during economic growth can be traced to Stiglitz (1969). Stiglitz developed an 
analysis based on the Solow growth frame. He assumed a linear savings function 
which is totally exogenous, a constant depreciation rate, homogeneous labor and 
equal wealth division among one’s heirs. In such a growth frame, he managed to 
prove that the wealth and income will be asymptotically evenly distributed, whatever 
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the initially wealth distribution is. This result is also solid to nonlinear saving 
functions. But his study also shows that if the labor force is heterogeneous, the wealth 
distribution will be determined by the productivity distribution. Stiglitz (2012) 
reviewed this research in the book The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided 
Society Endangers Our Future and pointed out that the asymptotic even distribution is 
just a dream in the real world. He discussed the role of rent in the new book. His 
research in 1969, however, induced many researches later. Bourguignon (1981) 
deepened the analysis of Stiglitz (1969), proving that with the convex saving function, 
there can be two steady states with one equal distribution and the other one unequal 
distribution, depending on the inequality of the initial income distribution. 
Interestingly, his model showed that the unequal stationary distributions are “pareto 
superior” to the equal one, that is, his arguments tend to treat the unequal distribution 
as a good matter.  
From 1990s, most of the researches gave up the assumption of exogenous saving 
function and adopted the Ramsey optimization frame. Lucas (1992) discussed the 
distribution problem in a dynamic economy under different allocation mechanisms. 
The results are diversified and there is no unique trend of distribution evolution. 
Chatterjee (1994) did the pioneering work on the distribution problem under a 
standard one-sector neoclassical growth model. In his work, the individual wealth 
growth is related to the savings which is determined by optimization. This is a 
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans frame which differs the Stiglitz (1969)’s methodology. He 
showed that with some parameter restrictions, the wealth inequality will become 
higher when the economy stays at the situation of more than the steady-state per 
capita capital stock, vice versa. This is similar to the Kuznets inverted U-curve 
argument. Thus the economy will converge to a steady state of inequality. But this 
result can also be reversed if change some of the parameter restrictions. His paper 
shows that the degree of inequality will lower down without government intervention 
and stabilize at a lower level in the long run.  
Casselli and Ventura (2000) tried to apply the representative consumer theory to 
analyze the problem of income/wealth inequality in the neoclassical growth models. 
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They argued that the representative consumer theory doesn’t rule out consumer 
heterogeneity. They also argued that the representative agent model can be seen as 
having the average characteristics of an economy and thus they are able to construct 
the relative values of ai/a, ci/c and yi/y where the note i is the individual identify. My 
critics in the later section will show that the above arguments are not solid. They 
further analyzed the dynamic evolution of the relative values in the 
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model and the Arrow-Romer model. The results of wealth 
distribution dynamics are diversified with different setups. The choice of 
Cobb-Douglas technology or the CES technology affects the results for the 
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model whereas in the Arrow-Romer model the results will 
be even more diversified by choosing different specifications.  
Li, Xie and Zou (2000) also analyzed dynamics of wealth distribution within extended 
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model and endogenous growth model. The methodology 
they used is different from Casselli and Ventura (2000). They hope to get the 
evolution trend of individual wealth as aggregate capital stock goes larger. The results 
are that under the Ramsey frame, the inequality will converge to the steady-state 
capital stock; under the endogenous frame, the inequality will continue to expand or 
stays the same, depending on the setup of production function. The weak point of 
their paper is that the assumptions made during the calculations are not flexible and 
purely mathematical technique without well-argued economic intuition. They also 
made empirical tests with a panel data set to find the supports for the 
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans frame and doubt the validity of the endogenous frame.  
 
3.3.2 Neoclassical models with two representative agents 
The first model to be built here is an extended Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model. We 
hope to check how the inequality evolves under the assumption of continuous 
technological progress. Thus an exogenous frame is sufficient. The traditional 
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model doesn’t assume the existence of any economic rent. It 
also excludes the problem of distribution with only one representative agent.  
A Critic on the usage of one “representative consumer” on the problem of 
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income/wealth distribution 
It has been a tradition to apply “one representative agent” to analyze the problem of 
income distribution for some years. Caselli and Ventura’s paper (2000) has been 
treated as the pioneering work on this approach. They argued that the “representative 
consumer” doesn’t rule out consumer heterogeneity and can be treated as having the 
average value characteristics. They argued that the Gorman form requirement doesn’t 
affect the application of this theory into distribution problem. These viewpoints, 
however, are not well-grounded and they did not argue in detail in their paper either.  
Traditionally, economists modeling the economic environment with one 
representative agent by explicitly assuming that all the agents are homogenous. This 
is well-grounded for the following reason: the Gorman form requirement for the 
indirect utility function of each individual’s utility function implicitly assumes that the 
wealth distribution is equal for all the agents.  
The Gorman form requirement for consumer n can be described as: 
v
n
(p,w)=a
n
(p)+b(p)w
n
,  where the w
n
 is consumer n’s initial wealth, p is the price 
level.  
It is proved that if all consumers have indirect utility functions of the Gorman form, 
total demand of an economy can be written as a function of prices and total wealth 
and this is a necessary and sufficient condition (Mas-colell, A., Whinston, M.D. and 
Green, J. R. (1995)) A further analysis on the problem that whether the distribution of 
wealth matters for the above result shows that if for a fixed price each consumer’s 
wealth expansion path is a straight line and the slopes of the lines are the same, then 
wealth distribution won’t affect the total demand of an economy. In mathematics, the 
condition is: 
   
      
   
 
   
      
   
  where i represents the good i, n and m represent 
consumers. 
The above condition implicitly means that every consumer has the same wealth 
because only with the same wealth, the marginal change of the consumption of good i 
can be equal when their wealth changes.  The Gorman form thus assumes a world of 
equality and the form doesn’t mean the average amount of an economy in the real 
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world. As a result, the one representative consumer theory cannot be applied to 
analyze the distribution problem.  
 
Model 1: Decentralized agents problem 
The above critic doesn’t rule out the possibility of assuming more than one 
representative consumer in an economy and every representative consumer represents 
a group of people whose wealth expansion paths are paralleled. In this section I 
consider a closed economy with two representative agents: two representative 
consumers and two representative firms. The design of this is based on the argument 
that China’s economic resources are divided into two parts: “inside institution” and 
“outside institution” according to the relationship with governments. The firms 
“inside institution” are mainly SOEs and the firms “outside institution” are private 
economic agents.  
 
Households 
It is a tradition to apply the unit of household as the basic demand side. This setup is 
especially good for the growth-inequality study. An obvious fact is that the equal 
distribution should be considered from the perspective of household but not 
individuals. The education level of a father cannot be changed but this change can be 
realized by his children. The better wealth situation of the children usually means the 
parents are also becoming economically better. So the inter-generational change 
during economic growth is meaningful for social equality with this household setup.  
Similar to the setup of Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, we consider a continuous- 
time economy with an infinite number of long-lived agents. We assume that there are 
two representative households (consumers) in the economy. Household i’s 
instantaneous utility function is u(c(t)) where         
  
     
   
, i=1 and 2 with 
    and     which is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
We also suppose that the labor growth rate is     with L(0)=1.  Every household 
hopes to maximize the total utility U(t) where U(t)=                 
 
 
. The 
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assumption of u(t) is strictly increasing, concave, twice continuously differentiable 
with derivatives       and        as well as satisfies the Inada condition: 
       
       and        
      . The factor   represents the time preference 
rate and       which ensures the U(t) is bounded. We assume that both   and   are 
the same for the two representative households.  
Let ai denote the average amount of asset the individual i holds in the representative 
household, ri denote the risk-free market flow rate of return of assets and wi denote 
the average individual labor income (wage), we have the familiar evolution equation: 
   (t)=(ri(t)-n)ai(t)+wi(t)-ci(t).  This equation applies to both the two representative 
consumers with ai(0) given.  
The transversality condition is                        
 
 
      . This 
condition is to ensure the individuals would never want to have positive asset when 
the final (if there is) period finishes.  
Maximize U(t) subject to    (t) equation can generate the well-known Euler equation 
for the problem:  
      
     
 
 
 
         , c=C/L. 
 
Enterprises 
Rama (1993) already tried to describe the effect of rent seeking in the representative 
firm production function. Following this approach, we assume that there exist two 
types of enterprises. For simplicity, we use the notations i and   to represent the 
enterprises of the two different types. For the enterprises outside institution, the 
production function plays as Yi=F(Ki, ALi, Ri, R)=  
      
  
  
 
  . Ri represents the 
rent it owns and R represents the average rent of the whole economy.  
This setup has several implications: if 
  
 
  , it means that the firm’s rent level is 
greater than the average and thus enjoys the revenue brought by its rent; if  
  
 
  , it 
means that the firm’s rent level is smaller than the average and thus the firm suffers 
from the negative effect of total rent. We assume that         which means 
that the firm’s technology is neoclassical.  
  
69 
For the enterprises inside institution, the production function plays as    =F(   , A   , 
   )=   
       
      
 . For simplicity, we assume the two kinds of enterprises enjoy the 
same parameters                  means that all the enterprises inside institution 
take advantage of its individual rent and don’t suffer from the negative externality of 
the total rent. The variable “A” represents technology and we assume its growth rate 
is “g” which is totally exogenous.  
 
Discussions 
The distribution of rent to the two kinds of economy is based on China’s institutional 
arrangements and current economic reality. The enterprises inside institution doesn’t 
suffer from the negative externality of the total rent of the economy because their 
monopoly power and privileges are assured by the institution whereas the outside 
institution economy will suffer from the negative externality of the total rent, although 
they can also engage in building “Guanxi” and enjoy the result of rent-seeking.  
 
The two representative agents 
From the above setup, we can get the marginal product of resource K and L for the 
two kinds of the enterprises:  
For the “outside institution” enterprises,  
ri=
   
   
=   
        
  
  
 
 
 
 and  wi=
   
   
=  
       
     
  
 
 
 
   
For the “inside institution” enterprises,  
   =
    
    
=    
         
    
  and     =
    
    
=   
        
       
 .  
We can see the difference between the two representative enterprises of this setup by 
calculating the per capita income y, denoting y=Y/AL, k=K/AL and c=C/AL. For the 
“outside institution” enterprises, we have 
   
  
  
  
  
 
        
 
  
   
 
             
   
  
  
    
 
 
 
For the “inside institution” enterprises, we have 
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Since the rent of “inside institution” enterprises are much higher than the other, 
         Also the employment amount L of “outside institution” enterprises is much 
larger according to the reality of Chinese economy, we have        (the results is 
not affected if we assume that          Suppose that they have the same amount of 
capital, we will have           
From the expressions of y, we can also get the representative households’ revenues:  
      
    
  
    
 
 
,       
    
  
    
 
 
         
        
    
   
    
 
 
,         
    
   
    
 
 
          
It is obvious that        and       .  
 
Equilibrium analysis:  
This is a closed economy divided into two groups with two representative agents. 
Assume both the whole market and the markets of the two “inside institution” and 
“outside institution” sectors are complete and clearing, the per capita capital will 
equal to the per capita assets ki=ai for either of the two “inside institution” and 
“outside institution” sectors where i=1 and 2. When i=1, it means the “outside 
institution” economy; when i=2, it means the “inside institution” economy, which was 
represented by   in the “enterprises” section. For simplicity, in the chapter we assume 
the depreciation rate   is zero. The general equilibrium of the extended Ramsey 
economy is defined as below:  
 
DEFINITION 1. For either of the two “inside institution” and “outside institution” 
sectors, the economy stays at an allocation     
    
      
    
    
         
 
 and a price 
path    
    
  
   
 
  i=1 and 2, such that:  
(i)    
    
  
   
 
 and    
    
    
        
 
  maximize household’s utility and firm profit, 
for every i;  
(ii) The capital and labor markets clear all the time for either of the two sectors, given 
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initial capital stock K(0) and labor quantity L(0).  
 
Dynamics System 
Since we introduced technology progress rate g and normalized y=Y/AL, k=K/AL 
and c=C/AL, the dynamic conditions will be adjusted to be:  
      
     
 
 
 
             
                                       
where i=1 and 2 and yi=         .  
With the quantitative relationships analyzed above, we know that the value 
of        ,  ,  , g and n are constants for both of two sectors.       ,      . 
In steady state, we have 
      
     
   and       =0. From the quantitative relationships 
above, we have c1
*
(t) < c2
*
(t) and k1*(t) < k2*(t), * means the steady state value. 
These relationships can be described with the diagram in Figure 3.1: 
Figure 3.1 
c(t) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0                                                           k(t) 
 
 
A 
B 
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The convergence points of the two sectors stay at different places. Point A is the 
steady state of “inside institution” economy and the point B is the steady state of 
“outside institution” economy. The phase diagram shows that the consumption level 
of the two types of consumers will converge to two different points with point 
A>>point B. There is no power to limit the separation between A and B. This can 
explain why the Kuznets curve doesn’t appear in China. Further, when rent of the 
“inside institution” economy goes larger, point A will go higher and point B will go 
down which means that the inequality situation will become worse.  
It should be noted that in this kind of setup, even the equal distribution of rent cannot 
lead to equal income/wealth distribution since only the “outside institution” economy 
suffers from the total amount of rent. But the depreciation or dilution of rent of the 
“inside institution” economy will lead the whole economy more equal. This analysis 
means that this kind of institutional arrangement is extremely bad for the equality of 
an economy.  
 
Model 2: The Central Planner Problem 
The key problem of Model 1 is the assumption that general equilibriums exist in both 
of “outside institution” and “inside institution” economies. In this section we consider 
the social planner problem which can avoid such an assumption. Also, Model 1 
cannot be applied to analyze the effect of inequality on growth. In this section we 
consider an economy with endogenous rent-growth through the investment on rent. 
Assume that the capital is allocated to investment and rent, following the similar laws 
of motion with the same depreciate rate  . For simplicity, assume that we don’t have 
the population growth and technological progress here. 
There is a benevolent social planner whose goal is to maximize social welfare. There 
is only one representative consumer whose neoclassical utility function becomes 
U(t)=              
 
 
. The instantaneous utility function is u(c(t)) where         
      
   
, with     and     which is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution. There are two representative enterprises whose production functions are 
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Yi and    . The social planner chooses a plan so as to maximize the utility subject to 
the resource constraint of the economy, taking K(0) and R(0) as given: 
 
Max U(t)=              
 
 
 
s.t.          
             
   Yi=F(Ki, ALi, Ri, R)=  
      
  
  
 
  . 
      =F(   , A   ,    )=   
       
      
 . 
   Y= Yi+    =C+I=C+IK+IR 
     where Ri+   =R.  
   K(0) and R(0) are given.  
 
We can apply the Hamiltonian method to solve this problem. For simplicity, we 
assume that       and    . This assumption makes the individual production 
functions: Yi and     keep the neoclassical characteristics when we move the rent 
factor to the Y side. We further assume that the “outside institution” and “inside 
institution” sectors have the same K and L. We define the R here as the sum of the 
rents which is different from the definition in Model 1.  
Define   
  
 
, we have  
Y= Yi+    = 
        
           
                    (1) 
The Hamiltonian problem is: 
                                
                          
from which we can deduce the first order conditions: 
  
  
     (2)    
  
   
     (3)    
  
   
     (4) 
together with conditions: 
  
  
      (5)  and  
  
  
      (6) 
we can obtain the Euler equation which tells us the growth rate of consumption: 
  
 
 
 
 
                            (7) 
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The part of                     is exactly the meaning of interest rate which 
is ri in the above section. Since we don’t have the technological progress speed g here, 
the structure (7) is exactly the same as what we get in the Ramsey model.  
From (5) and (6) we can get the relationship between K and R:  
  
           
   
   (8) 
Substitute the expression of K in equation (1) by the expression in (8), we have: 
      
               
      
  (9) 
From (9) we can see that when    ,     . This means that all the rent should 
be owned by the “outside institution” economy in order to maximize the total output. 
This result is consistent with the fact that the “outside institution” economy is far 
more efficient than the “inside institution” economy. As an implication, it also means 
that the “double-track” economy should be transferred to the “single-track” with 
abolishing the “inside institution” economy.  
 
Discussion 
This model is very similar to the classical one-sector growth model with physical and 
human capital. But the construction of the production functions made our model 
different. The problem of this model is that one of the implications of this model (also 
Model 1) is the monotone increasing relationship between the total rent R and the 
production quantity Y. This could come from three reasons: firstly, the model cannot 
reflect the opportunity cost made by the rent-seeking activities; secondly, the model 
doesn’t assume the negative influence of rent on economic efficiency, that is, the 
parameters   and   are independent of R; thirdly, the assumption that the inside 
institution economy doesn’t suffer from the negative externality of the total rent is 
very strict. We just use this setup to show the different institutional effects for the two 
kinds of economies.  
It should be noted that this central planner problem is set up with negative 
externalities which means the planner doesn’t resolve the externality problem under 
optimization process. This is consistent with Chinese economic reality that the 
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government tries to optimize allocation conditional on the existing institutional 
arrangements.  
 
3.4 Generalization of the models: the rent-inequality nexus 
In this section we study the general relationship between rent and wealth distribution 
within a dynamic frame. We give up the setup of the two representative agents. The 
basic setup is a revision of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model. One specialty here is 
that we assume the rent Ri in an economy obeys a certain distribution Ω  where 
            representing the heterogeneous households.  
 
Households 
We normalize the number of each household population as 1 which means that we 
don’t consider the labor factor L here. Household i’s instantaneous utility function is 
u(c(t)) where         
  
     
   
,     and     which is the inverse of the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Every household hopes to maximize the total 
utility U where U=              
 
 
. The assumption of u(c(t)) is strictly increasing, 
concave and satisfies the Inada condition:        
       and        
      . 
The factor   represents the time preference rate which is greater than 0.  
Let ai denote the amount of asset the household (or individual) i holds and ri denote 
the risk-free market flow rate of return of assets. Since our main aim is to study the 
rent-inequality nexus, for simplicity, we omit the wage factor in this modeling like the 
classical AK model (Rama (1993) also dropped the variable of wage). Thus we have 
the familiar evolution equation:    (t)=ri(t)ai(t)-ci(t), with ai(0) given and is supposed 
to be 1. Since we assume ri is not a function of time later, the evolution equation 
comes into use is    (t)=riai(t)-ci(t). The transversality condition also changes to 
                    .  
Maximize U(t) subject to    (t) equation can generate the Euler equation for the 
problem:  
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      . We also assume ci(0)=1.  
 
Enterprises 
We assume the production function of the enterprises is      
  
  
 
 
 
. K here 
represents capital, Ri represents individual rent and R represents the average rent of 
the economy. We don’t consider the factor “AL” here for simplicity. The production 
function is similar to the structure of the “outside institution” economy in the above 
sections. We don’t have the “inside institution” economy here in order to make the 
model general. However, the factor 
  
 
 is still there since rent-seeking activities exist 
in all kinds of the economies.  
The marginal product of capital thus becomes ri=
   
   
=   
    
  
 
 
 
.  Since we don’t 
assume that the factor of labor L plays a role in the production function, the wage rate 
is omitted. So this is an economy without considering the labor revenue. Dynamically 
the wealth inequality is just determined by the asset return which is related to rent.  
 
Equilibrium Analysis 
The general equilibrium of the economy is defined as below:  
 
DEFINITION 2. The competitive equilibrium of the economy with heterogeneous 
agents is an allocation     
    
      
    
         
 
 and a price path    
  
   
 
,   
         ,  such that:  
(i)    
  
   
 
 and    
    
        
 
  maximize household’s utility and firm profit; 
(ii) All markets clear all the time.  
 
From the asset evolution equation we have 
          
    
  
 
 
 
            
From 
      
     
 
 
 
       we have 
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We assume that in the above equations only ai and ci are functions of time. The other 
variables and parameters are independent of time. Except for the mathematical reason 
that such setup is much simpler for calculation, these assumptions can help us analyze 
the dynamic path of ai(t) distribution related to certain rent distribution as explained 
later.  
Thus we can get the expression of ai(t):  
                  
    
  
 
 
 
          
 
 
    
    
  
 
 
 
    
 
     
    
  
 
 
 
  
 
      
        
 
 
                
 
 
           
            
 
  
 
    
 
 
   
 
     
          
 
 
    
 
    
   
    
 
              (1)    
        
 
 
    
 
    
  
    
 
      
 
 
    
 
    
    
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
    
  
  
 
 
 
 
          
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
    
   (2) 
 
In order to make sure        , from (1) we know that the condition is 
 
 
    
 
    
   
    
 
            (3) 
From (3) we have the boundedness condition
1
: 
  
 
 
 
 
      . 
From (2) we can check the relationship between       and   . If 
  
 
 
 
 
      , 
       
                                   is monotone increasing with respect to ri. 
When 
  
 
 
 
 
        e can calculate the first order derivative of       with 
respect to    and then we have: 
  
78 
      
   
   
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
     
 
 
 
  
 
        
   
 
  
    
 
     
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
       
 
 
     
 
   
  
 
       
 
  
  
We can see that if t is large enough, the above equation is positive
2
. Thus       is 
monotone increasing with respect to ri when t is large enough.  
Then we have  
 
PROPOSITION 1. In an economy with the above setups, when the rent distribution is 
more equal, the wealth distribution will be also more equal as time goes to be 
sufficiently long.  
 
Proof: we assume the rent Ri in an economy obeys a certain distribution Ω  where 
           . R is the average rent in the economy and 
  
 
 represents the status of 
rent owned by individual i relative to the average rent. Caselli and Ventura (2000) 
firstly applied the concept of variance as the measure of inequality. We follow this 
method to explore the inequality-rent nexus. Define   
  
 
 and we hope to see the 
relationship between its variance and the variance of ai(t) based on the equation (2) 
when time t goes to infinity. It is obvious that ri is monotone increasing with respect to 
x. So ai(t) has the same monotone increasing relationship with x too. Then we assume 
one case for continuous distribution and one case for discrete distribution in order to 
make the result more robust. 
Firstly, we assume that the distribution of x is the uniform distribution: 
It is obvious that             =0 for any t>0;  
Secondly, we assume that the distribution of x is the two-point distribution with equal 
probability 1/2: suppose that the average rent of the economy is 1, one group of rents 
stays at 1/2 and the other stays at 3/2. With such a rent distribution,            
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. Then we change the setup as one 
group of rents stays at 1/3 and the other stays at 5/3. This means that the rent 
distribution is more unequal with variance of the first setup as 1/4 and the second 4/9. 
With the second rent distribution,            
 
 
     
 
 
  
 
 
     
 
 
  and 
V            
 
 
      
 
 
       
 
 
  
 
. Since      
 
 
       
 
 
       
 
 
       
 
 
 , 
             with the second setup is also higher.  This means that more equal rent 
distribution will lead to more equal wealth distribution.  
Q.E.D. 
 
Discussions 
The distributions assumed above are the simplest ones in both continuous and discrete 
distributions. But they have the explaining power on looking at the problem studied 
here. There are two points need to be noted:  
firstly, we don’t include the technology factor into the setup when generalizing the 
model. This exclusion is purely a simplification and the result will not change with 
adding technology factor. Thus in an economy with continuous growth, Proposition 1 
will not change;  
secondly, the sum of the parameters   and   in the production function    
  
  
  
 
 
 
 can be equal, larger or smaller than 1. This means that the above results are 
not subject to constant return to scale.  
This model excludes labor wage and treats capital revenue as the main income 
resource. We should be aware of this assumption that it makes the model somewhat 
different from the real economy. In capitalism economy, inequality is a product of the 
system as what Marx and many other scholars have argued. Smith (1776) already 
pointed out that the distribution rule between capitalist and workers are different that 
the former takes profit and the later earns wage. It is thus can be understood that the 
result of the model shows a kind of equal consequence without the existence of any 
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wage-dependent labor. Although the assumption is strict, the equal distribution of rent 
will be still good for the whole society to be more equally distributed. Stiglitz (1969) 
argued that if the labor force is heterogeneous, the wealth distribution will be 
determined by the productivity distribution. Following this argument and the 
neoclassical rule that the wage is paid by the marginal product, we know that human 
capital distribution matters here which is further mainly determined by education. The 
more equal proliferation of education will bring about more equal human capital 
distribution and further will bring about more equal wage revenue. The model built 
here enhanced the model of Stiglitz (1969). From both work we can call on the 
attention to more equal distribution of rent and education to achieve the goal of wealth 
equalization in the long run. 
The more important meaning of the result is to support the neoclassical frame that 
such frame can lead the world to be more equal which is different from most classical 
arguments which tend to propose that the income inequality will become increasingly 
larger (see the review of Bronfenbrenner (1971) Chapter 4) 
 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter studied the income/wealth distribution evolution during economic 
growth with rent-seeking. We extended Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model with two 
representative agents representing “inside institution” and “outside institution” 
economies. This arrangement is based on the special institutional arrangements of 
China’s economic reality. The model results are consistent with Chinese economic 
performances that the inequality has been going larger and larger without a Kuznets 
“inverted U” curve appeared so far.  
The first model with two-representative agents showed that the rent plays a 
determinant role in wealth distribution dynamically. Although the two-agent model is 
designed based on China’s institutional arrangements, the frame is also shedding light 
on looking at other economies. The second model implies that the “double-track” 
economy should be transferred to the “single-track” with abolishing the “inside 
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institution” economy so as to achieve the maximum output. We also generalized the 
model to study the rent-inequality nexus. The model shows that as time goes to be 
sufficiently long, rent distribution and wealth distribution are showing a positive and 
determinant trend that more equal rent distribution will lead to more equal wealth 
distribution in the neoclassical frame.  
The modeling work also reveals that the neoclassical frame which ignores the factor 
of institution cannot fully and correctly explore the development problems. The factor 
of rent is adopted to describe the role of institution in economic development. The 
results achieved in this chapter enhanced the arguments of Stiglitz (1969) and 
Chatterjee (1994) which expanded the understanding of rent-seeking space in 
economic development.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Economic Growth and Transaction Cost 
 
4.1 How to understand economic growth? 
4.1.1 Introduction 
Economic size is usually measured by GDP. GDP itself is not a difficult concept 
which simply means the total output and service provided within one year of a country. 
But how to understand its size change and dynamic growth is far more complicated 
and difficult than usually thought. People in this world never met constant GDP 
growth till late 18th century when the “industrial revolution” happened. According to 
the estimates of Maddison (2006), the annual average compound growth rate of the 
world per capita GDP is 0.00% from 0 to 1000 A.D., 0.05% from 1000 to 1820 A.D. 
and 1.21% from 1820 to 1998 A.D. If we focus on the history from 1500 A.D. to 2001 
A.D., we have the numbers below:  
 
Table 4.1 
Per Capita GDP Growth : World and Major Regions, 1500–2001 
(annual average compound growth rates) 
 1500-1820 1820-70 1870- 
1913 
1913-50 1950-73 1973- 
2001 
Western Europe 0.14 0.98 1.33 0.76 4.05 1.88 
W. Offshoots 0.34 1.41 1.81 1.56 2.45 1.84 
Japan 0.09 0.19 1.48 0.88 8.06 2.14 
West 0.14 1.06 1.57 1.17 3.72 1.95 
Asia (ex Japan) 0.00 –0.10 0.42 –0.10 2.91 3.55 
Latin America 0.16 -0.03 1.82 1.43 2.58 0.91 
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E. Europe & USSR 0.10 0.63 1.18 1.40 3.49 –0.05 
Africa 0.00 0.35 0.57 0.92 2.00 0.19 
Rest 0.02 0.06 0.82 0.65 2.83 1.75 
World 0.05 0.54 1.30 0.88 2.92 1.41 
Source: Maddison (2003), pp. 263. 
 
From table 4.1, we can see that between the year 1500 and 1820, world per capita 
income rose only 0.05 per cent a year. From 1820 to 2001, it averaged 1.23 per cent, 
nearly 25 times as fast. The history from 1950 to 1973 was obviously much more 
prosperous than we normally thought: the compound growth rate was close to 3%. The 
data shows that the economic growth after World War II has been much faster than 
before. This is the recovery effect which causes quicker convergence rate to the steady 
state, according to the neoclassical growth theory. There is another story, however, 
happened in the same period but completely different: even in the official report of 
Chinese government, around 1960 there were tens of millions of Chinese people 
starved to death. This is called “three-year natural disaster” in China which actually is 
caused by the failure of economic institution and policies. From 1952 to 1978, as 
introduced in Chapter 1, the average GDP growth rate in China was still 4.39%, 
according to Maddison (2007). It is thus obvious that economic growth is just one 
aspect of an economy. The distribution matters as well. The relationship between 
growth and distribution is thus an important question for development economics.  
We discussed the effect of growth on distribution in previous chapters. Before we 
move on to understand the effect of income/wealth inequality on economic growth, we 
need to explore the economic logics behind growth. For the phenomenon described 
above, one consistent theory is needed to explain all the levels and changes. In addition 
to explain why the global economy took off after Industrial Revolution (around 1820s)，
we also need to understand why we can have the continuous high growth rate after 
1820 and how to explain the regional different growth performances since then.  
There are too many economic theories to explain what happened and they usually 
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criticize or ignore each other. But it does not mean that the efforts made are wasteful. 
They do give the clues and logics toward the “perfect” answer. I contend that the 
full-picture behind the growth phenomenon should be viewed from a comprehensive 
angle. In the next section, I will introduce and comment on several important growth 
theories as a background for my further analysis on growth-inequality nexus. 
 
4.1.2 A reflection on the theories of economic growth  
It is not easy to comment on the main schools of economic growth. The difficulty 
comes from two ways: one is that different schools often ignore each other school's 
logic and methodology which makes each story usually unrelated. This phenomenon 
also happens within the same school. Different beliefs make economists walk on their 
own ways. Thus the arguments and models of such schools were not thoroughly 
discussed and corrected. This result makes the overall comprehensive understanding on 
economic growth difficult. The other problem is that the fundamental questions of 
analyzing growth were not scientifically solved, like what kind of production function 
is scientific for dynamic analyzing. Most economists just follow the tradition and use it 
without checking the ground.  
Based on the above two problems, I will in the following section try to offer a brief 
review with rethinking the mainstream theories and give comments. The numerous 
empirical studies on these schools will be by the large omitted, for the reason of space 
limitation plus that the empirical results are even more mixed for varieties of 
econometric techniques adopted.  
 
Domar's Work  
“Harrod-Domar Model” has been treated as the beginning of the modern period of 
explaining economic growth by dynamic models. Before this model, economists were 
focusing on static theories and rare mathematical models had been created to explore 
the problem of growth. Of course it does not mean that economists before Harrod and 
Domar didn’t offer any explanation on economic growth. Actually the founder of 
economics Adam Smith already argued the idea of wealth creation by increasing 
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division of labor with productivity advance. “Harrod-Domar Model” is treated as the 
beginning of the modern period mainly because its method and argument became the 
foundation of later main stream research: the neoclassical growth theories.  
However, there is something confusing here in the history of economic theory. 
Although the models developed by Harrod (1939) and Domar (1947) were called one 
name later, actually their arguments were not totally similar. Thus when in 1956, Prof. 
Solow criticized many points of the “Harrod-Domar Model”, actually some of the 
points he criticized were not appeared in Domar’s paper and he used the condition 
which Domar criticized. I would like to point out the importance of Domar’s model in 
1947 since his talented idea has been continuously ignored by most literatures in 
development economics.  
The key importance of Domar’s paper comes from the argument of the first part which 
is usually ignored (later textbooks often focus on the 3
rd
 part of his paper which is 
about the dual nature of investment). Domar began his paper in asking the question: is 
the absence of hoarding (of the demand) also a sufficient condition for full 
employment? He does not doubt the “necessary condition” but the “sufficient”. The 
question he put forward was based on Keynes who thought that if “S=I”, then full 
employment will maintain if started from full employment. Domar’s argument proves 
that “S=I” is not a sufficient condition to maintain full employment in reality, even 
from the status of full employment
2
. This means that the condition “S=I” isn’t suitable 
for dynamic equilibrium analysis. I would like to argue that this point has a key 
meaning since almost all the theoretical works after his paper ignored this point and 
continued to use the condition of “S=I” as the capital formulation in equilibrium 
dynamic growth process. Strangely, I didn’t see any criticism on Domar’s argument on 
this point in the later history or the second time to rethink the condition's effect in a 
dynamic process.  
Solow (1956) criticized that “Harrod-Domar Model” is based on the “crucial 
assumption that... there is one possibility of substituting labor for capital in 
production”. But in Domar’s paper, he even used a full paragraph to say that “capital 
may be substituted for labor”.  
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Domar repeatedly mentioned in his paper that the balance between demand and supply 
can be unstable thus neither technology nor saving, “guarantee a rise in income”. This 
argument, unfortunately, is also ignored by most following researches. Domar’s logic 
on the well-known “dual nature of the investment process” can be expressed by:  
   
 
 
        (1)             
The left side is the demand side which takes effects from a multiplier process. The   is 
the marginal propensity to save and the σ is what he called “the potential social 
average productivity of investment” which includes the capital depreciations and 
relative effects. The above equation clearly shows that the investment must expand 
continuously to ensure the full employment since the equation (1) means: 
  
 
    
where the right side is always positive in reality.  
Later researchers usually criticize the above result by a so-called “knife-edge” problem 
which is that if the real investment speed exceeds the required level, the demand side 
will exceed the supply side. Thus when the companies are making too much 
investment, they will face the dilemma of supply shortage and this information will 
further lead to more investment and the circle will go on, which means the economy 
will never go back to the balance. Although I don’t think Domar’s investment formula 
   
 
 
     is absolutely correct, I have to say that the above criticism is quite weak. 
Actually before they criticize after using many mathematical calculations, we can see 
this result from the equation structure: the left side is a multiplier effect and its 
realization speed must be faster than the right side. If criticizing that the demand side 
expansion by investment should be slower than the supply side, we need further proof 
which I didn’t see. Further, since the price will rise for the shortage, the demand power 
will be checked.  
The main problem of “Harrod-Domar Model”, in my view, stays in that the dual effects 
of investment cannot keep balanced in the long-run. Although in the short run, the 
demand effect can be equal to the supply effect, the demand effect will disappear and 
the supply effect will continue in the next period because of the increment of capital. 
The Domar model explains the growth effect of investment, putting it in a balance 
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frame. He does not explore further that when the balance is broken, how the economy 
goes back or how long the economy can survive to grow under such a break.  
 
Exogenous growth theory: Solow Model 
“Solow Model” is the key model in modern research of economic growth which is also 
the start of the exogenous growth theory. Solow model differs Domar model at a 
crucial point that he takes the condition “I=S” as the capital evolution process. This 
means he totally ignored what is argued by Domar that the condition “I=S” is not a 
sufficient condition to sustain the economy of full employment. I don't think Solow 
was aware of this when he was writing this paper because he did not spend any word 
on this. Unfortunately, all the later literatures also followed Solow's logic and didn't 
pay attention to this point. The later economists commented that it is because the new 
production function Solow applied that overcomes the “knife-edge” problem of 
“Harrod-Domar Model”. The function he applied is the commonly used one: Y=F(K, 
L). And this function is often revised as Y=F(K, AL) which is called “Harrod neutral” 
to incorporate the factor of technology into the production function, keeping the 
existence of steady state growth.  
Solow model and its relative later models show that the economic growth rate will 
converge to a steady state where the ratio of capital to labor or augmented labor (K/L 
or K/AL) will converge to a constant value (or constant growth rate), wherever the 
starting point is. The assumption is the concavity of the production function, or the 
production is constant return to scale. After just applying rather simple mathematical 
transition to K/L or K/AL (total derivatives), we can see the convergence result. After 
the convergence happens, only technology progress determines the growth rate in the 
long run. The original Solow model showed that there are two variables determining 
the steady state of country: the rate of saving and population growth.  
As is well known, the concavity of the production function of the whole economy was 
seriously criticized by the “Endogenous Growth” economists like Paul Romer (1986, 
1990). Romer put forward the idea that the whole economy shows an increasing return 
to scale and he thought that the main problem of Solow model comes from the 
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concavity assumption of production function. Let me leave this important debate to 
later discussion and look at other problems in the frame of Solow.  
I used the neoclassical production function in the dissertation but we have to admit that 
the production function F(K, L) is a myth. Domar did not use the production function. 
There are many debates and discussions on the simple-looking function in economic 
history. Even a big event called “Cambridge-Cambridge Controversy” was mainly 
focusing on the question that whether the production function is scientific and the 
debate results revealed many problems of production function. The controversy is 
mainly concerning static economics. Actually Solow was a member in the controversy 
and he realized the so-called “Wicksell Problem” behind the function and thus used the 
assumption of “only one commodity” in his model (it is already unrealistic). To repeat 
the details of this long time controversy is not the task of the dissertation. What I what 
to point out is that, even under the “one commodity” assumption, the production 
function is still not a scientific instrument in arguing economic growth process when 
combined with the condition “I=S”.  
The crucial reason is as what Domar pointed out that the capital formulation from the 
condition “I=S” is not sufficient to ensure full employment in the next period. So if 
using the formula:              to describe the capital formulation process (it does 
not matter whether you put depreciation effect in the equation), then the L in the 
production function of next period will be smaller, if we keep the population growth 
rate as zero. After periods, the unemployment rate will be higher and higher and the 
growth process will be seriously damaged. But this dynamic effect has been totally 
ignored if we use the production function.  
This is an example of contradiction between different economic schools. The 
neoclassical growth model which is built on Walrasian Equilibrium frame, assumes the 
full employment in any economic dynamic process. Domar, however, did not build his 
frame under such strict assumptions but based on the real economy.  
Let us recheck the production function Y=F(K, L). K and L are inputs including capital 
and labor. F(•) is a function and its meaning can be abstract. F(•), in my view, can be 
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seen as both a kind of institution and mechanism within which the capital and labor are 
arranged although in neoclassical economics it has no relationship with institution but 
only a math formula like Cobb-Douglas function. What I want to emphasize is that F(•) 
should be changing during long-run economic growth. But we never consider the 
change of F(•) when we do dynamic analysis. In 1980s, some social scientists and 
political economists began to study the supply side of modern industrial economies. 
Streeck (1992) summarized one of their main arguments that different institutional 
conditions may cause different production patterns that may represent functionally 
alternative.  
 
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans Model 
I already applied the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model in Chapter 3 to discuss the 
evolution of wealth distribution. The main improvement of this model compared to 
Solow’s is the explanation for saving rate which is exogenous in Solow model. The 
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model applies the optimization method to get the 
consumption and saving paths. Thus the model becomes more general and also more 
complicated. The technology progress is also the growth impetus which is still 
exogenous in the model. The steady state of the model is saddle-path stable. There are 
some technical differences between the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model and the Solow 
model, but both of them cannot explain the growth-determining factor: technology 
progress. Thus the later development has been focusing on modeling the technology 
progress which is called the “endogenous growth” models.  
 
Endogenous Models: Romer 
The school of endogenous growth has been the major school in understanding 
economic growth since Romer’s paper in 1986. Till today, it is still the main stream in 
economic growth, although many economists strongly criticize this school from many 
aspects. The representatives of this school are Romer, Lucas, Helpman, Aghion, etc. In 
this part I mainly refer to Romer’s work.  
The paper of Romer (1986) is based on his Ph.D thesis which firstly presented a formal 
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model showing that the production function exhibits increasing marginal productivity 
of aggregate knowledge. The elegance of his model is that the production function is 
continue to be concave to its own inputs and private knowledge but convex to the 
aggregate knowledge where he introduced the role of increasing return to scale to the 
model. This knowledge is separated from physical capital. He did not introduce the 
concept of human capital in that paper but we know that the knowledge can only 
understood by human. The technology in his model depends on the aggregate 
knowledge level. So he found a way to make the variable of technology endogenous. 
Romer not only contributed to the progress of new ideas but also to the model designs. 
Romer’s model assumes that the capital change is a function of the ratio of investment 
to private knowledge (only mastered by a firm). He gave up the tradition that capital 
change should be equal to new investment which originated by Ramsey (1928). Romer 
(1990) deepened his argument in 1986 and made the description of technology more 
deliberate. He treated technology component A as a non-rival input and H, the human 
capital as the rival component of knowledge. Further, he assumed that the technology 
evolves as a function of human capital employed in research. This model finally shows 
that population size does not have much relationship with growth, but the stock of 
human capital determines the growth rate. This is maybe the weakest point that often 
induces criticism that it means that the advanced economy with higher education level 
should always grow faster than the less advanced economy with much lower human 
capital. This is not the reality and thus we must find the answer for the mismatch of the 
model. From the point of my view, the above result roots in the assumption that 
       . Base on this equation, the stock of the human capital employed in research 
determines the change of technology. This argument may be reasonable to the most 
advanced economies but not for all economies since technology innovation can be 
imported from abroad without R&D and thus the human capital may not play a crucial 
role in technology updating. This paper, however, is a very important start for later 
models endogenizing technology progress with a simple way. Romer was thus able to 
influence two branches in endogenous growth theories with the two papers discussed.  
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The Reversal of Exogenous School 
Although the rising of endogenous growth school looks very promising, the insistence 
on exogenous models never quit. One important reason why economists doubt the 
exogenous models are not the ones I proposed above (like the production function or 
the dynamic full employment condition), but their theoretical predictions were 
understood as against the reality that the convergence in income variation in different 
countries never happened. But this belief has also been continuously challenged.  
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) added human capital to Solow Model and empirically 
test it. They changed the production function to  
   
H is the stock of human capital.  
Their test result on this simply revised exogenous model is surprisingly good: with 
 = =1/3, the model can account for 80% of international variation in income. The 
convergence also happens according to the rate the augmented Solow model predicts, 
holding population growth and capital accumulation constant.  
This paper has been widely scrutinized for its reliability of econometrics. In my view, 
the paper also suffers from the problem of unrealistic but important assumptions, e.g. 
they assumed that all countries have the same depreciation rates and technology 
innovation rates.  
Parente and Prescott (1994) is another strong support for the exogenous models. This 
paper analyzed the barrier to technology adoption. They argued that it is the difference 
in this barrier that leads to huge observed income disparity. They proposed that a 
country's Total Factor Productivity (measure the technology adoption) is a function of 
its policies and institutions and thus countries have more costly policies and 
institutions will have lower Total Factor Productivity.  
Further, in the paper The Failure of Endogenous Growth published in 2001, Parente 
summarized the past two main schools as below: 
 
My own assessment is that this line of research (endogenous school) has not proven 
  1))()(()()()( tLtAtHtKtY
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useful for understanding the most important question faced by economists today, 
namely, why isn't the world rich. Exogenous growth theory, in contrast, is.  
 
New Institutional Economics: Douglass North 
Analysis based on institutions or the so-called “social infrastructure” has become one 
important branch in explaining economic growth. Douglass North is one of the 
representative economists of the “New Institutional Economics”. In his many 
contributions, institution is treated as the main variable for economic growth because 
he argues that the transaction cost (defined by Coase (1960)) is the key to the 
performance of economies through the channel of increasing productivity, and 
institution is the determinant of transaction cost. As what he argued below, institution, 
which is totally ignored by neoclassical economics, plays the crucial role for economic 
growth: 
 
Modern economic growth results from the development of institutions that permit an 
economy to realize the gains from specialization and division of labor associated with 
the sophisticated technology that has developed in the Western world in the last several 
centuries.  
Source: Douglass C. North (1987). Institutions, Transaction Costs and Economic Growth, Economic 
Inquiry, 25, pp. 419-428. 
 
North argued that the institutional arrangement that lower the transaction cost (per 
exchange) is the promise for productivity progress. He agrees with the point that 
specialization and division of labor are the inner motivations for growth of national 
wealth. This point of emphasizing on the role of labor division was further developed 
by some other economist, like Yang (1991). North further argued that the development 
of specialization and division promotes the evolution of institutions because it will be 
required to secure the results of increased trade (this is not the root reason for 
institutional evolution which will be introduced below).  
North also pointed out the historical lesson shows that the political system often brings 
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inefficient institution innovation and thus causes stagnation. This point, in my view, 
should draw more attention from governments and further research is required. Then 
how to judge an institution is a good institution? North said in a speech (2002) that we 
still know little about institution. He said our knowledge on human institution is still 
very limited and no one knows what kind of institution is the best for economic growth. 
Also, we still know little about institutional change. For example, what is the optimal 
path for an institution to evolve? Economists used to think that the “Shock Therapy” is 
good for transition from planned economy to market economy and economic history 
proved that it is wrong for many countries.  
According to North’s logic, we can say that one of standards to judge whether an 
institutional innovation is good or not is to check whether the change will lower down 
the transaction cost. Further, the discussion of this dissertation also points out the 
importance of rent for distribution. Thus I would like to argue that another standard is 
to see whether the institutional innovation will subtract the rent-seeking space and 
make the rent distribution more equal. In addition, the experience of China since 
reform and opening up shows that the gradual reform path is workable. This 
philosophy is called “cross the river with touching the stones” (Xiaoping Deng). The 
gradual path shows the ability of overcoming the problems happened under the “Shock 
Therapy” path. This is an important topic deserves more studies.  
North pointed out that the most crucial motivation for institutional evolution is the 
fundamental change in relative prices. This is a very sharp view since normally people 
always relate institution to political game or revolution, etc. North argued that the 
change in relative prices will require people and organizations to make the new 
contracts which will change the norms and then the rules of the society. He also 
pointed out that the changes of ideas and values are also influenced by the changes in 
relative prices. The institutional innovation, however, is generated by the 
consideration of comparing the marginal benefit and marginal cost of inducing such a 
change. We can see from here that when technology updates and productivity 
increases, the relative prices will change automatically and thus the institutions will 
update at the same time. This also means that F(•) changes during economic growth. 
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North’s argument also built one connection between the new institutional economics 
and classical economics since the relative price is also a key concept in classical 
economics. Sraffa (1960) and Schefold (1997) showed that the relative prices are a 
function of the rate of profit in the classical economic frame. Combined with North’s 
arguments that the relative prices are the root cause of institutional innovation, this 
implicitly points out that the distribution takes a crucial effect on institutions. The 
previous chapters of the dissertation, however, already showed the opposite 
relationship that the institutions shape the distribution. Thus there seems to be a 
mutual causal effect between them.  
 
Summary  
The above ideas and theories are just part of the story on explaining economic growth 
(I did not review most empirical works and some other growth theories) and we can 
see that even these few theories have contradictions and many imperfect sides. We 
have to admit that the space of revising existing stories and creating new ones on 
economic growth is still huge.  
Of course, we can look at this problem more loosely that we may think that economic 
growth has not only one root. We may think that each of the factors mentioned above 
like investment, technology, human capital and institution plays the crucial role and we 
need them as higher or better as possible in a balanced step. But this attitude is not 
satisfying for really understanding the growth problem and we need a model that can 
incorporate the ideas with consistent logics.  
From the above theories introduced and commented, we can at least get some clues 
about the determinants of growth: 
First of all, the global history since industrial revolution clearly shows that the 
adoption of modern technology caused the sudden change of economic history. 
Modern technology is the fundamental root of the largely increased productivity. 
Without the modern technology, productivity can be increased by several other ways 
like update management or create a more efficient institution. But these other ways of 
updating cannot maintain.  
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Further, new technology is expensive to be discovered and broadcasted. There are two 
ways for a country to get new technology: through R&D itself or import from other 
countries. The adoption of the new technology (make it productive) is different from 
the invention of the new technology. So from the above argument, we can see that 
investment is a must for growth. Without continuous investment, R&D or 
technology-import cannot happen continuously. But since the property of diminishing 
return of capital accumulation, the progress of technology is the only reason for the 
continuous investment.   
Thirdly, Karl Marx and Joseph Schumpeter emphasized the entrepreneurs’ effect on 
continuous technology innovation. The institution of Capitalism is thus important for 
technology innovation. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) called the institutions 
encouraging economic growth “inclusive economic institutions”. The perfect 
competitive market, as supposed to be the best economic system to realize efficiency, 
directs the development of Capitalism institutions. The importance of an efficient 
institution reminds us that the government can give a visible hand on updating both the 
political and economic institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) pointed out that 
the “there is strong synergy between economic and political institutions”. This point 
can also be seen from our analysis in Chapter 2.  
Finally, the human capital, usually measured by education level, seems to have several 
crucial effects: firstly, it can be one important factor of influencing institutional 
innovation since institutions, as what North defined, are “rules, enforcements 
characteristics of rules, and norms of behavior that structure repeated human 
interactions”. Institutions are made by people. Thus people's human capital, in my view, 
plays a role here. Secondly, human capital obviously influences the possibility of R&D 
and adoption speed of new technology.  From the above logics, human capital is 
indeed an important variable since it has influences on both the above factors, although 
it may be not the most crucial factor affecting institutional innovation or technology 
adoption of a less developed country.  
One thing needs to be noted is that the role of the income/wealth distribution didn’t 
draw much attention in most growth theories. As I argued in Chapter 2, such models 
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usually implicitly assume that the inequality problem can be solved with continuous 
growth and it is not the crucial factor in growth frame.  
 
4.2 Transaction cost and the size of an economy 
4.2.1 Introduction 
After reviewing the main schools’ economic thoughts on growth, let’s come back to 
the most basic economic factor: transaction (exchange). In economic literatures, 
transaction has been discussed by some economists. Smith (1776) emphasized the role 
of labor division on promoting economic efficiency. He pointed out that the division 
of labor is not a result of human wisdom but from the propensity in human nature to 
do transactions which will bring them utility. Commons (1934) put forward the 
proposition that the transaction should be treated as the basic unit of economic 
analysis. Mao (2008) argued that wealth is created by fair and free transactions. He 
also pointed out that when both sides agree upon a deal, each side will get utility from 
the deal if the deal is agreed upon without any unfair factors like pressure or order. 
The frame of illustrating how transactions take effect on economic performance, 
however, is still somehow a black box in economics.  
Economics field paid more attention to the cost of transaction as what Williamson 
(1985) said “transaction cost kept reappearing”. The concept of transaction cost, 
since its appearance, has been applied much more frequently on the microeconomics 
field, e.g. the well-known school of transaction cost economics (TCE) developed by 
Williamson (1975, 1985, 1995) and some other economists. TCE is mainly concerned 
about economic organization. Although the new institutional economics is a try to 
include the neoclassical resources into the institutional analysis, the marginal and 
equilibrium analysis in TCE are very rare. The main way TCE does is to implement 
comparative institutional assessment of discrete institutional alternatives. North (1973, 
1987, 1989) applied the concept of transaction cost to explain economic growth and 
pointed out that transaction cost is crucial for the growth performance of an economy 
and institution is the determinant of transaction cost. His argument is established from 
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a long-run historical perspective and most of his effort is focusing on the role of 
institution. Although North’s effort updated our understanding on the role of 
transaction cost, the formal model on how transaction related to economic growth has 
not been well established. Yang and Borland (1991) built a model between labor 
division and economic growth, pointing out that the exchange efficiency affects the 
evolution of division of labor where they created a relationship between transaction 
cost and exchange efficiency. Their work on the transaction cost, however, contains 
two problems: the first is that the transaction cost defined in their paper is not exactly 
the traditional concept developed by Coase and Williamson; the second problem is 
that under their structure, the transaction cost will increase as the number of trade 
partners increases. At least, this assumption is too strong and not quite clear either. 
Besides, the researches on how to apply the concept of transaction cost to analyze the 
short-run macroeconomic fluctuations or the changes of the size of an economy are 
even more difficult to be found in literatures. Especially, “positive” transaction cost 
has always been treated as outside of the neoclassical main stream economics and 
ignored in most modeling works based on general equilibrium frame.  
I would like to argue that one of the crucial reasons for such incompleteness and 
neglect comes from the abstract and complicated meaning of the transaction cost. This 
concept was initially set up by Coase (1937, 1960) but gradually developed into 
similar but diversified understandings. Since Coase himself didn’t offer the name of 
“transaction cost” and his definition on it is somehow open to discussion, later 
economists further gave many definitions of this basic concept in new institutional 
economics. Arrow defined the concept as the “cost of running the economic system” 
(Williamson 1985, pp.18). For Arrow, transaction cost is like the friction in physical 
system which is the smaller the better. Williamson (1975, 1985, 1995) developed the 
definition of transaction cost, dividing it into several different kinds of costs, like 
search and information costs, bargaining costs, policing and enforcement costs, etc. 
Williamson (1985) gave a detailed definition of transaction cost which include ex ante 
and ex post types related to contract. Kasper and Streit (1998) defined that 
“transaction cost are the costs of employing recourses when people use markets to 
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exchange property rights”. Their definition is similar to Williamson’s. Further, 
Cheung (1998) argued that transaction cost is actually the “institutional cost” which 
measures all the costs which do not exist in a Robinson Crusoe economy. Obviously, 
his definition is much broader for the reason as he argued that it is usually impossible 
to differentiate one type of transaction cost from another.  Under the transaction cost 
concept of Cheung (1998), the more advanced the economy, the higher transaction 
cost will become and transaction cost is not the reason behind economic growth. To 
the opposite, North (1989) treated the transaction cost has an inverse relationship with 
the prosperity of an economy. I will point out later that the confusion here can be 
clarified by the concept “unit transaction cost”.  
Such abstract and diversified definitions make the concept hard to appear in 
neoclassical works which always assume the non-existence or zero quantity of 
transaction cost. Besides the definition reason, the new institutional economics, esp. 
the TCE, assumes that people have bounded rationality which is one background of 
the existence of transaction cost. For them, this cost is also closely related to human 
nature. This is also different from the neoclassical assumptions.  
I would like argue that the concept of transaction cost and transaction actions have 
some unique powers in explaining economic performance. The analysis based on 
them can not only avoid using both the production function and the full employment 
condition “I=S” in the analysis of economic growth, but also can analyze institutions 
like what North did and should be more applicable for a transitional economy without 
the institutional arrangements required in neoclassical equilibrium frame. State and 
customary institutions, as argued by Hodgson (1988), are required for a system of 
transactions. Williamson (1985) concluded that the institutions have the main purpose 
and effect of economizing the transaction cost.   
This section is devoted to enhance our understanding on the effects of transactions in 
economic performance. We will fulfill this goal by modifying the traditional concept 
of transaction cost. The revised concept of transaction cost in this section is a simpler 
one which mainly concerns the Williamson “ex ante” type of transaction cost (but not 
totally the same). The relationship between transaction (exchange) and the size of an 
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economy both in the short-run and long-run is studied with the new transaction cost. 
For simplicity, we assume a closed economy for the theoretical approach.  
 
4.2.2 The basic model 
4.2.2.1 The transaction cost formula with a newly defined concept 
I apply the concept of transaction cost to describe the feeling “easy” or “hard” to 
achieve an acceptable transaction (or exchange). The lower the cost means the easier 
to make the transaction done. But how can we describe the feeling “easier”? I assume 
that any transaction cost is a combination of transaction time, labor efforts and money 
cost (exclude final transaction price which is the price of the final good or deal) with 
different weights. The transaction time, transaction labor effort and money cost are the 
amount spent from the beginning of desiring to do a transaction till the end of the 
transaction completed.  
 
DEFINITION 1. The “transaction cost” is the cost of achieving an acceptable 
transaction which is a combination of transaction time, transaction labor effort and the 
money cost to complete the transaction (exclude the price of the final good or deal) 
with different weights.   
 
Denoting the definitions of the three factors in achieving an acceptable transaction as 
below:   
Time (T): the transaction time from the beginning of desiring to do the transaction till 
the end of completion; 
Labor (L): the labor effort spent from the beginning of desiring to do a transaction till 
the end of completion; 
Money cost (C): the money spent in achieving the transaction (exclude the final price) 
from the beginning of desiring to do a transaction till the end of completion.  
Here we assume that the desiring is accompanied by immediate action to pursue the 
transaction.  
If we let the T(t) mean the transaction time from the initial time t to t+T(t) with L and 
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C the functions of the transaction time where L(s) and C(s) means that at the time 
point s, the labor effort and money spent to achieve the transaction. Based on the 
above definition, we can express the transaction cost (TC) as: 
                        
      
 
          (1) 
where w1, w2 denote the weights of labor and money cost contained in a transaction. 
Similar to the production function, there are many possible forms to describe the 
relationship between L and C (like L and K in production function), the form 
presented here is just a simple general case of the possibilities and it won’t influence 
our analysis on the relative properties.  
The traditional concept of transaction cost, firstly put forward by Coase (1937, 1960) 
and later developed by many other economists like Williamson (1975, 1985, 1995), 
has more contents than the concept I defined here. What I hope to focus is the cost of 
achieving or realizing an exchange or transaction and thus I intentionally omit some 
traditional meanings of the transaction cost such as the ongoing monitoring costs and 
the implicit costs of contract incompleteness. There is no intention in my definition 
that such costs can be fully avoided by the efforts during the process of achieving the 
transaction. Later analysis of the section will show that the simplification of the 
traditional concept of transaction cost by focusing on the process of transaction 
achievement will enable us to build a channel between transaction cost and economic 
size as well as some other issues. Further, although the aspect of uncertainty is not 
included in the definition, it is already included in the frame since rational people will 
take all the uncertain factors into consideration and the effort for this is included in 
the factor of labor and money spent and the cost is also reflected by the transaction 
time length.  
About the unit problem, labor and money costs seem to have different units. We can 
adjust this difference by measuring the labor cost as the money he can earn like the 
wage revenue if the same amount of labor is used alternatively. Thus the final unit of 
formula (1) can be treated as the money unit.  
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4.2.2.2 Properties of the factors in the “new” transaction cost 
Intuitively, we can assume several properties of the three factors in TC(t) defined in 
the above section:  
1. The diminishing speed reduction of transaction time with the increase of 
transaction labor or money cost or the labor and money costs combined. That is, 
  
  
    and 
  
  
   with 
   
   
   and 
   
   
   . This property is opposite to the 
concavity assumption of production function.  
2. There are both substitution effect and complementary effect between the labor cost 
and money cost. That is, 
  
  
 0 and 
       
    
   (this is opposite to production 
function).  
3. The properties of TC(t) has similar characteristics to neoclassical production 
function F(K, L). That is, 
      
  
  , 
       
   
  ; 
      
  
  , 
       
   
  .  
 
The traditional production functions do not contain the factor of transformation time. 
The transaction time, however, is introduced into the TC function.  
 
4.2.2.3 Transaction volume and the “Unit Transaction Cost” 
Suppose there are   economic agents and let each agent’s wealth endowment 
(exclude the price of the final good) for pursuing a transaction is wi. Define the 
transaction volume as the amount of money transacted and xi where     to be the 
volume of transactions of agent i within a period and define TC to be the transaction 
cost contained in each unit of the transaction which means 1 dollar or 1 unit of other 
kinds of money used. We call the transaction cost contained in the one unit of money 
as the “Unit Transaction Cost”.  
Based on the arguments of Mao (2008), we assume that more transactions will bring 
higher utility which means that people hope to transact more since they can get higher 
utility. Let each agent’s utility function be     
 , where      . With the 
above setup, we have         . Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier, we can construct 
the Lagrangian formula: 
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from the first order condition we have 
    
   
 
 
 
   
 
So there is an inverse relationship between    and TC which means that when the 
unit transaction cost becomes lower, people will transact more.  
The concept of the Unit Transaction Cost has been established in this section which 
clarifies the delicate difference between the unit transaction cost and the total 
transaction cost. This difference proves very crucial in later arguments. The traditional 
economics concerning transaction cost didn’t differentiate the two concepts. Thus 
some economists like Cheung have the opinions that the more advanced the economy, 
the higher transaction cost. And some other economists like North argued in the 
opposite direction. I would like to argue that implicitly Cheung is pointing to the total 
transaction cost and North’s argument is based on the unit transaction cost, although 
he argued it as the “per exchange” transaction cost (1987).  
 
4.2.2.4 Unit transaction cost and the size of a closed economy 
Following the above notations, let’s denote TCi be the unit transaction cost faced by 
an economic element “i” within a certain period (strictly speaking, it should be a 
certain time point since the transaction cost will be different at different time points, 
but for simplicity I omit the difference here) and using xi to represent the total volume 
of the transactions made by the one element in the economy (include people, 
companies, governments and other organizations) within a period (e.g. for GDP the 
time measured is one year). Denote n<  describing the number of all the economic 
elements, so the transaction volumes of all economic elements in a closed economy 
can be described by the vector X=[x1, x2, x3....xn]. Plus, according to the above section, 
we assume that each xi is a monotone decreasing function of each related TCi which 
means that when the unit transaction cost becomes lower, the element's transaction 
volume increases during the time. The function is like: xi=fi (TCi).  
If we measure the size of an economy by its GDP, with the assumptions above, the 
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relationship between the unit transaction cost and the size of an economy can be 
easily seen from the standard calculation method of GDP.  
 
LEMMA 1. Given the assumption that the total volume of the transactions made by 
one economic element within a certain period is a monotone decreasing function of 
the related unit transaction cost, within a closed economy, if the unit transaction cost 
of every element of the economy decreases, the GDP will increase within the same 
period, meaning the size of the economy expands.  
 
Proof: A closed economy can be divided into three sectors: consumption, investment 
and government purchase which are made by consumers, companies and 
governmental organizations. For a closed economy, GDP=Cd+Id+Gd (d denote 
domestic). 
We have the individual transaction volume xi=fi (TCi) where fi (•) is a monotone 
decreasing function. Suppose that xc=xc1+xc2+…+xci, xI=xI1+xI2+…+xIj, 
xG=xG1+xG2+…+xGk where i+j+k=n which represent the total exchange volume in 
each of the three economic sectors. Thus if every element's unit transaction cost 
decreases, all of xc, xI and xG will increase. Plus, we can see each sector following a 
basic function relationship: Cd=f(xc), Id=g(xI), Gd=h(xG) where f (•), g (•) and h (•) are 
monotone increasing functions, then GDP will expand since 
GDP=Cd+Id+Gd=f(xc)+g(xI)+h(xG) when every element's unit transaction cost is 
lower.  
Q.E.D. 
 
The above result, however, is too strong since we cannot expect that all the economic 
elements in an economy will face the same direction of the changes of unit transaction 
costs within the same period. Even in a growing economy, some people and 
organizations will still face higher unit transaction costs for varieties of reasons. Thus 
the concept of “the average unit transaction cost” is of more interest. We want to see 
whether the average value of the unit transaction costs can determine the economic 
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size as Lemma 1 shows and how it takes effect. The following analysis is to explore 
the relationship between the average transaction cost and the size of a closed 
economy.  
 
4.2.2.5 The function of the average unit transaction cost  
Transactions are made by persons and organizations. As above, it is supposed that 
their total number is “n” where n<  and if we add all the individual transaction costs 
within a certain period “TCi” of all the economic elements together and divide it by 
the total number “n”, we can express the average unit transaction cost of a society (or 
an economy) by: 
            
 
  
But since the unit transaction costs of people and organizations are very different, we 
follow the proof of Lemma 1 and divide n into three parts: i consumers, j companies 
and k governmental organizations. Then we have the average transaction cost of each 
economic sector as:    
            
 
 , 
            
 
 , 
            
 
        (2)  
 
DEFINITION 2. The average unit transaction cost is a combination of the average unit 
transaction time, the average unit transaction labor effort and the average unit 
transaction money cost with different weights to complete the unit transaction 
(exclude the price of the final good or deal).   
 
If we denote the definitions of the three factors in this average unit transaction cost 
with small letters: Time ( ): the average unit transaction time, Labor (l): the average 
unit labor and Money cost (c): the average unit money cost.  
Similar to equation (1), we can express a proxy for (2) in each sector as: 
                         
      
 
      (3) 
w1, w2 denote the weights of labor and money cost contained in a unit transaction on 
average in one sector.  
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PROPOSITION 1. There is a relationship between the average unit transaction cost of 
each economic sector and the size of a closed economy measured by its GDP: suppose 
that every economic element in one of the three sectors of the economy follows a 
linear monotone decreasing function between transaction volume and unit transaction 
cost with the same the marginal effect of unit transaction cost on its transaction 
volume, then when the average unit transaction cost of the sector becomes lower, the 
part of GDP contributed by this sector will increase and thus when all the average unit 
transaction costs of the three sectors become lower, the GDP will be higher, that is, 
the size of the economy expands.   
 
Proof:  From the proof of Lemma 1, we know that Cd=f(xc), Id=g(xI), Gd=h(xG), 
where f (•), g (•) and h(•) are monotone increasing functions and the individual 
transaction volume xi=fi (TCi) where fi (•) is a monotone decreasing function. Also we 
have xc=xc1+xc2+…+xci, xI=xI1+xI2+…+xIj, xG=xG1+xG2+…+xGk where i+j+k=n which 
represent the total transaction volume of each of the three economic sectors with the 
average transaction cost of one sector represented by   
            
 
 , 
            
 
 , 
            
 
        (2)  
The question thus becomes: if the average transaction cost of one sector becomes 
lower, will the sum of xi in the sector higher? Since we know the weight of different 
TC in the sector is different, we need to see how the average amount takes effect.  
We now assume the function  
xi=fi (TCi) =aTCi+bi            (4) 
which is a monotone decreasing function. The assumption of the above function is 
based on two considerations: the first is that the linear form is a simple and general 
case; the second reason is that   
   
    
 which is a marginal value and thus we can 
assume the change of unit transaction cost within one sector has the same effect on 
the change of transaction volume. With such setup, when the unit transaction cost 
changes the same amount, the difference of the transaction volume xi is determined by 
the intersection value bi but not “a”.  
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Now the question can be formulated that if 
     
 
      (5), will we have the result that  
                       
 
        (6) ?   
If the function fi (TCi) is linear, then equation (6) will become 
                     (7) 
Since the function fi (TCi) is a monotone decreasing function, we can assume that   
a                  (8) 
From (5), (7) and (8), we can get the result of (6). However, if the function fi (TCi) is 
in other forms, like it is not linear or with “a” not fixed, we cannot always get the 
result of (6) and further additional conditions are needed.  
Thus if the average unit transaction cost of the one sector becomes lower, the sum of 
xi in the sector will be higher. For the same logic, when the average unit transaction 
costs of all the three sectors become lower, xc, xI and xG will be higher. Thus GDP 
will grow since GDP=Cd+Id+Gd=f(xc)+g(xI)+h(xG) where f (•), g (•) and h(•) are 
monotone increasing functions.  
Q.E.D.  
 
The effect of the average unit transaction cost can also be seen as the effect of the 
aggregate unit transaction cost. Interestingly, function (4) has the same structure of the 
well-known “Gorman form” in Microeconomics whose function is also similar. So 
here is another case to show the bridge from microeconomic foundations to 
macroeconomic analysis.  
The above proof shows that reducing every economic element's unit transaction cost 
is different from reducing the average unit transaction cost within one economic 
sector. The latter takes effect conditionally. Although we proved that the average 
transaction cost takes effect within each sector, if we consider that the function like 
equation (4) applies to all economic elements of a society, we can also generate the 
concept of “the average unit transaction cost of a society (or an economy)” and the 
relative results will be similar to the analysis based on the sector analysis. But this 
result will be much weaker than the analysis based on economic sectors since it is 
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more reasonable to assume “a” in the function xi=fi (TCi) =aTCi+bi quite different 
among people, companies and governments.  
We can also see that the concept of the average unit transaction cost is useful to look 
at the short-run macroeconomic fluctuations. It is clear that many reasons or factors 
are continuously changing the average unit transaction cost of each economic sector, 
sometimes positive and sometimes negative, and thus cause the economic fluctuations. 
We will present another way of looking at economic cycles, esp. crisis, based on 
factor movement speeds later in the chapter.  
                      
4.2.3 Implications for economic growth 
4.2.3.1 The Model 
We construct a simple two-period overlapping-generations (OLG) model to illustrate 
the problem dynamically. Assume that the economy has a representative individual 
living for two periods, in the first period she is young and in the second period she is 
old. Let her preferences be represented by a logarithmic utility function:  
                     
xt is the transaction volume in time t. The parameter   captures the importance of 
instantaneous utility in the first relative to instantaneous utility in the second.  
Suppose that the individual have no inheritance in the first period and only make 
revenues in this period when she is young, meaning that she can only make 
transactions by the revenue. The revenue should cover the whole transaction volume 
as well as the endowment for achieving the transaction. Then during the second 
period when she is old, the income left from the first period should cover the total 
transaction cost and the transaction volume for the 2
nd
 period. No heritage will be left. 
Let TC be the average unit transaction cost of a society and Yt be the income in period 
t, if we suppose that all the revenue will be spent during her life, then there will be the 
intertemporal budget constraint: 
                           
Now suppose there is a social planner who has the objective to maximize individual’s 
utility function subject to the intertemporal budget constraint. Let   be the Lagrange 
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multiplier, the Lagrangian for the this problem reads 
                                                    
The first-order conditions are 
         
              
                 
              
Resolving the two equations and rearrange, we can get 
    
  
 
   
 
     
       
 
If we make 
    
  
   to be a proxy of economic growth rate and suppose that the 
growth rate of unit transaction cost of society is 
     
   
   , then there is a clear 
relationship here: 
 
PROPOSITION 2.  
The higher the growth rate of average unit transaction cost of a society  , the lower 
the economic growth rate  , vice versa.    
 
This is a progress of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 didn’t 
include the factor of dynamic growth. Here the relationship between the growth rate 
of an economy and the growth rate of the average unit transaction cost of a society has 
been set up. This confirms and deepens the arguments of the new institutional 
economics on growth, like North (1973, 1987, 1989).  
 
4.2.3.2 The Long-run perspective 
The sector-based analysis in above sections can generate some aggregate long-run 
perspectives. If we view the phenomenon of economic growth as the long-run 
expands of the size of an economy, the economic history after industrial revolution 
shows a trend of reducing the average unit transaction cost for all economic sectors 
compared to the previous time which means that transactions become easier and 
easier for all economic sectors. For example, when a person who lived in 500 years 
  
109 
ago, if he hopes to travel 1000 kilometers to buy or sell something or to make an 
investment, he may have to spend half-year which means that he also spent much 
labor efforts and money compared to his income. But today, with the airplane, people 
can travel around within one day, spending little labor and the money is not so huge 
compared to his earning per month. This is the effect of modern technology on 
transactions. Another fact is the market development, for the long time before 
industrial revolution, people just have very few times to go to the market in a year 
since most of the articles they needed were supplied by themselves and not much 
surplus existed, thus the exchanges with other people were not so possible and 
frequent. The relative institutions were also formed according to the production level. 
For example, in ancient China, the governments set up some marketing places with 
limited time entry and many limitation policies. For example, at the Tang Dynasty 
China (AD 618-907), governments set up markets in authorized areas and limited the 
entry time. Today we even have the internet market which is beyond any ancient 
people’s imagination.  
Further, the progress of human capital, technology, institution or any other factors 
which have greatly influenced economic growth also means that they are causing the 
average unit transaction costs of all sectors to decline. The argument here does not 
intend to clarify the role of technology, human capital, institution or other factors in 
economic growth, but to show logic that all the factors influencing growth are related 
to the average unit transaction cost of each economic sector.  
We should pay attention to the changing speed of the average unit transaction cost. 
Before the industrial revolution when the world was suffering the long “Malthusian 
stagnation”, there was nearly zero growth of global economy and the changing speed 
of the average unit transaction cost was obviously very slow. After 1820 AD, 
technology innovations have been keeping improving the exchange instruments which 
greatly promote the changing speed.  
Based on the above observations of economic history, a judgment on the changing 
trend of the average unit transaction cost of each sector can be outlined. Firstly, we 
can suppose that the average unit transaction cost of each economic sector has been 
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reducing from the long-run perspective. Applying E(t) of equation (3) as the average 
unit transaction cost of one sector, we have      < 0 (      
     
  
 . Further, based 
on the facts of economic history, it seems reasonable to assume that, from the 
beginning of human history till around 1820 AD when the industrial revolution 
happened        <0 and        >0 from the industrial revolution till now. However, 
we cannot expect that there will be one day the value of E(t) = 0 because it is not 
possible, so I suppose that there will be a time the changing speed of the average unit 
transaction cost will slow down and the value of         will be negative again.  
Based on the above arguments, the E(t)-t curve as shown below can describe the trend 
of the average unit transaction cost for human economic history:  
 
Figure 4.1 
 
E(t) 
   
 
 
 
 
 
    0                                    t 
           
As the figure described above, I suppose that the E(t) cannot reach 0 but will go 
forward to it. Although I don’t think there is a limit of science and technology 
progress, the E(t) cannot be zero except that we don’t exist. The curve reflects the 
declining trend of the average unit transaction cost over history, that is, it slowly 
declines at the first stage and then it enters a fast-declining period which started from 
around the 1820’s AD and finally the speed will slow down. Further, when the E(t) 
stops declining sharply, the Y(t) will also enter an area of growing slowly and even 
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stop growing. Now we are staying at the second period, but it seems to be a very long 
history. The relationship among Y(t), t and E(t) can be described as: 
 
Figure 4.2  
 
  Y    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0                                     t                                 
 
  E(t) 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  0                                       t 
              
The result of “Figure 4.2” has an interesting similar shape as the production function 
usually applied by economists. This result helps justify the usage of production 
function in analyzing economic growth from the long run.  
If we follow the traditional production function Y=F(K, AL), based on the shape of 
Y=F(•) in “Figure 4.2” above, the shape of sf(•) (f(•)=F(K/AL, 1)) will be similar as 
described in “Figure 4.3”. If we follow the logic presented above, the economic 
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history can be divided into three big time zones. Solow model, as is well known, is 
the basic foundation for modern growth theories. Following the standard notation of 
Solow model, we can estimate that the relative values of       (which is the sum 
of population growth rate, technology growth rate and depreciation rate of capital) in 
each period are also different. Before the industrial revolution, the three factors are 
quite small and then it becomes much larger after around 1820 AD. When the 
economy reaches the third time zone where the changing speed of the average unit 
transaction cost becomes slow again, it is reasonable to assume that the values of 
      will be smaller again. Combining the growth pattern based on Solow 
model and the theory presented here, we have “Figure 4.3”: 
 
Figure 4.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
 
Actually “Figure 4.3” is quite similar to the “Figure II” of Solow's 1956 paper. Solow 
also pointed out that k* and k*** are two steady states of capital accumulation and 
k** is locally unstable. However, Solow and the later economists usually apply the 
production function to test convergence within a relatively shorter period. This is not 
shown in “Figure 4.3” where the convergence k*** only happens in the distant future. 
It also shows that in the ancient economic history we also had a steady state point (the 
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“poverty trap”) but it is transformed by the industrial revolution. Thus concerning the 
current period, I contend to agree with the arguments of increasing returns of 
production of output by Romer (1986) based on the argument in this section.  
 
4.2.4 Implication for the issues of economic crisis 
4.2.4.1 A brief introduction 
Economic crisis is always accompanied with capitalism. It is reported that hundreds 
of economic crisis have happened since industrial revolution. The 2008 financial 
crisis was followed by credit crunch and has caused huge damage to the economy. 
The negative effect continues till now with the global economy frustrating with 
permissive expectations. There are many economic discussions on this crisis blaming 
on the neoclassical economics and thus Keynes’ theory again attracts much more 
attention.  The policies based on Keynesianism or the New Keynesianism, however, 
performed not so well that the global economy is still far from a prosperous economic 
upturn.  
One of the phenomenon happened during the crisis is that capital firstly flows much 
faster (escaping) and then changed to be very slow with bad expectations (waiting) 
while people are harder to find jobs and the commodity market suffers from fewer 
transactions. In this section I would like to argue that the above phenomenon of 
factors’ flowing has a crucial effect on shaping the crisis and the relative policy targets 
should also be based on the specific root. This viewpoint is originated from the theory 
of unit transaction cost presented above.  
 
4.2.4.2 Transaction speed and economic crisis  
Supposing that during the normal time without economic crisis, the economy is 
staying at equilibrium. On such equilibrium points, the demand side is equal to the 
supply side. When economic crisis happens, the former equilibrium is broken and 
then the economy comes back to a new equilibrium after some time.  
Let the demand side be Yt, and the supply side be F(Kt, Lt).             
   
   
    can also be seen as the equilibrium state of an economy when the total 
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demand equals to the total supply. This is one of the constant return to scale 
Cobb-Douglas production functions.  
Based on the definition of transaction cost defined in this chapter, we know that Y, K 
and L which representing commodities, capital and labor have different unit 
transaction costs which lead to different transaction speed. We define 
  
  
 
  
  
    
  
  
  
as the transaction speeds of the three economic elements in an economy.  
From                
   
   , we have 
   
  
     
     
      
  
         
   
     
  
  with      , A>0, K>0, L>0.  
The above equation shows the equilibrium transaction speeds of the commodities, 
capital and labor. The transaction speed of Y is a weighted sum of the transaction 
speeds of K and L. 
The potential problem of the above relationship stability comes from the speed 
“accelerations” of 
   
  
, 
   
  
 and 
   
  
 which are measured by their second derivatives: 
    
   
, 
    
   
 and 
    
   
.  
Let’s simply divide the economic crisis into two kinds: financially produced and 
physically produced. In the 1
st
 scenario, economic crisis begins with fast capital 
flowing and in the 2
nd
 scenario it begins with fast commodity production change. The 
1
st
 kind of crisis we call it financial crisis when financial organizations first step into 
serious crisis and the 2
nd
 kind we call it “over production” crisis when the enterprises 
go bankruptcy first.  
Thus we can look at the economic crisis from two angles: 
During financial crisis with bubble burst, we will have the relationship: 
    
   
  
increases suddenly, leading to 
    
   
 
    
   
 which further leads to 
   
  
     
     
      
  
         
   
     
  
  and thus the former equilibrium will be 
broken. 
During the crisis made by over production capacity, we will have: 
    
   
 decreases suddenly, leading to  
    
   
 
    
   
 which further leads to  
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  and thus the former equilibrium will be 
broken.  
But the above two processes are based on completely different causalities.  
Also, since the capital transaction speed and the labor market transaction speed will 
slow down after the crisis begins, the inequality direction will change into the 
opposite one: 
   
  
     
     
      
  
         
   
     
  
 .  
Let’s look at the current stimulating policies during crisis: obviously there should be a 
difference between the early happening period and the later crisis period. At the early 
period when the economy is beginning to break the equilibrium, the policy should be 
designed based on the two scenarios: the first scenario is the financial crisis when we 
should try to “cool” the fast investment transaction speed; the second scenario is the 
over-production crisis when we should either try to raise the commodity transaction 
speed or to lower down the capital transaction speed. For the first scenario, the 
method of raising commodity transaction speed is the wrong step because the problem 
comes from unhealthy investment “bubbles”. There are some ways of promoting 
commodity transaction speed during the second scenario like more opening the 
market or reduce the consumption taxes.  
The government could also do these before the crisis in order to avoid if it can 
observe the “bubble” or over-production phenomenon in advance. The in-advance 
treatment will be more effective since some of the policy options will lose their 
abilities after the crisis happened. For example, the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy during crisis probably has broken down and the fiscal policy will 
probably face the worse fiscal condition of the governments. This argument supports 
governmental intervening in the economy when it observes that the equilibrium is 
going to be broken or the economy is stepping into crisis.  
We will find that adopting Keynes’ policies at the early happening period of crisis will 
be harmful since it is exactly the opposite effect will be generated, that is, the capital 
flowing speed will be enhanced by such policies like reducing interest rate when what 
we need should the opposite: restrain the capital flowing speed with higher interest 
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rate.  
When the crisis comes to the later stage when the commodity transaction speed 
becomes faster, Keynesianism policies can make a positive effect on economy by 
promoting the capital transaction speed. I would like to oppose to reduce the 
commodity transaction speed during the stage since it is not where the real problem 
lies.  
How to judge the first period and the second period during economic crisis is a 
question we need to answer. In my view this is not so difficult to observe for the 
government. This analysis also reminds us the danger of “hot money” and the 
importance of monitoring the capital account.  
The change of “L” can also lead to crisis but such scenarios are rare to be found. I 
would like to argue that the more opening and freedom for laborers will be very 
beneficial for the long-term growth since it will naturally promote commodity 
transactions.  
 
4.2.5 Concluding remarks  
In this section of the chapter, we extended the analysis of the effect of transaction on 
economic size from the perspective of transaction cost. The concept of unit 
transaction cost has been established. We also discussed how the average unit 
transaction cost takes effect. Then we explored the implications of the theory 
presented for the long-run perspective and the issues of economic crisis.  
There are some future works worth trying, e.g. expanding the model into an open 
economy and testing the effects of traditionally accepted growth-enhancing factors 
like technology progress and human capital accumulation on the change of average 
unit transaction cost of an economy. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Effect of Income/Wealth Inequality on Economic 
Growth: A Rent Perspective 
 
In this chapter we discuss another side of growth-inequality nexus: the effect of 
income/wealth inequality on economic growth based on the analyses established in 
previous chapters. Different from the problem of inequality evolution during growth, 
this problem concerns the reversed effect exerted by distribution. So far, neither of the 
two topics has reached a common sense in economics. We already discussed the first 
problem in Chapter 2 and 3. The second problem is also a very important economic 
problem since it determines or influences the political attitude toward inequality. 
However, the studies on this problem are even more ambiguous in economic literatures. 
The relative results are much diversified. We will discuss these studies through a 
comprehensive literature review. Then we will present a descriptive as well as 
theoretical analysis on this problem based on China’s economic performance after 
reform and opening up. Our aim is to present a consistent and clear logic for the 
difficult problem. The discussions in this chapter are closely related to previous 
analysis in the dissertation. 
 
5.1 Literature review  
Unlike the pure growth theories, the studies of how inequality affect economic growth 
lack a well-recognized basic paradigm like Solow model in the growth field. In this 
section we review the diversified researches with contradictory results on the effect of 
income/wealth inequality on economic growth from the perspective of the general 
background which doesn’t treat China as the only focus.  
 
Theoretical Studies 
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Smith (1776) already put forward some arguments on this problem. He said high 
earning of labor is an advantage for a society since the improvement of the greater part 
of an economy cannot be seen as a bad thing. And no society can be prosperous with 
the greater part of an economy lives in poor. Thus his view is to support the negative 
effect of inequality on growth and he called for a more equally distributed society. The 
world when Smith lived hadn’t experienced any significant growth and thus Smith 
didn’t mention the concept of growth but the accumulation of national wealth. This, 
however, can be seen as a similar concept as growth. The argument of Smith seems to 
be a long-run viewpoint on this problem. 
Marx (1885) argued that the increasing inequality is the main characteristics of 
capitalism which will lead to crisis. Although he didn’t directly present a relationship 
between distribution and growth, the logic behind his ideology is that the effect of 
income inequality is detrimental for growth in the long run.  
Although most classical economists like Smith and Marx were claiming the negative 
effect of high inequality, in 20
th
 century, earlier theories tended to support the positive 
effect of higher inequality on growth. Kaldor (1955) argued that the propensity to save 
of the rich (capitalists who earn profit) is higher than that of the poor (workers who 
earn wage). So the higher degree of inequality can increase the aggregate social 
savings which tend to increase the total investment. More investment leads to higher 
growth rate. His analysis is based on functional distribution analysis. The basic 
formula he used is:  I/Y=(sp-sw)P/Y+sw  where I means investment, Y can be seen as 
the GDP, s means the marginal propensity to save, P and the footnote p mean profit 
and w means wage. We can see from the formula that the larger the profit share, the 
higher the investment rate.  
Another major argument supporting this positive direction is the idea focusing on the 
role of incentive. Mirrlees (1971) formalized the idea and argued that the incentives for 
the laborers will be diminished by the equity and thus less effort will be paid. Siebert 
(1998) contended that the larger income inequality will encourage entrepreneurship, 
risk taking and innovations. Okun (1975) also argued that there is a trade-off between 
equity and efficiency. Since efficiency is often viewed as economic growth, this view 
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also confirms the positive effect of inequality on growth. However, there are two ways 
of understanding this trade-off. One is that if the government wants to make the 
national income more equally distributed, the growth speed will be limited. The other 
is that the higher inequality will be good for the economic growth. The above two 
angles are similar but different. The first one is a policy analysis which is focusing on 
the opportunity cost of achieving equity and the second one is not to discuss the 
policy’s effect, although it contains the factor of policy reactions. This delicate 
difference should be aware of.  
Most of the above arguments are inclining to argue a dominant effect made by higher 
inequality on growth which means that with higher inequality, the growth rate will be 
higher too. They also didn’t differentiate that whether the effect is instantaneous or 
needs periods to realize.  
After years’ ignoring the problem in 1980s, in 1990s the problem of determining 
economic growth is highly welcome again, including the effect of income/wealth 
distribution. With applying more econometrics and theoretical modeling, the 
discussions became more diversified in details. For the theoretical discussions, there 
are still some arguments supporting the positive effect. Galor and Tsiddon (1997a, b) 
developed two theories to support the stand of positive effect. The first theory is based 
on that, for a developing economy, a high degree of inequality is a necessity for the 
growth of human capital which is crucial for the “take off” of the economy. The second 
paper argued that in early stages of development the inequality is good for growth and 
long-run equality as well.  
Interestingly, at this period more arguments were inclined to support the negative effect 
of income/wealth inequality again. However, the arguments concerning whether the 
effect is dominant became mixed. There are three broad categories for this side: 
credit-market imperfections, political economy and social instability.  
Banerjee and Newman (1993) discussed the effect of initial wealth distribution on 
subsequent growth. In their dynamic frame, the initial wealth distribution decides the 
occupational choice between workers and entrepreneurs. This is the effect of incentives 
under the background of imperfect capital market. Since the structure of occupational 
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choices also decides consumers’ behavior, a new wealth distribution will be followed. 
Results of the dynamic model are not unique. They argued that economies with initial 
high poor/wealthy ratio are likely to converge to stagnation in the low-wage situation 
with a possibility of overcoming stagnation particularly with a large middle income 
class.   
Galor and Zeira (1993) built a model to argue that under the conditions of imperfect 
capital market and indivisibilities in investment in human capital, the initial wealth 
inequality affects the economic growth both in the short run and in the long run. The 
logic behind this is that if the imperfect capital market means that the borrowing is 
costly, only who owns enough initial wealth can invest in human capital. Thus the poor 
people may have to work as unskilled. As a result, the distribution of initial wealth will 
influence the subsequent growth. One of the model’s results is that an economy with a 
large initial amount of wealth but with high inequality will end up as a poor economy 
in the long run.  
Aghion and Bolton (1997) built a model with capital market imperfection and moral 
hazard, proving that the higher inequality, the lower the growth rate. They argued that 
the inequality reduced the investment opportunities of the poor people. Also the 
inequality will increase the level of moral hazard of borrowers in capital market. As a 
result, they argued that redistribution will enhance the economic efficiency.  
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) created a political economy model of endogenous growth, 
applying the median-voter theorem. They found that the greater the inequality of 
wealth and income, the higher the rate of taxation decided by the voting and thus the 
lower the growth. The link is the redistributive policies. So the causality in their frame 
was also between the initial distribution and the subsequent growth. They also made 
empirical test for the theory. For the difficulty of testing the redistributive policies, they 
directly tested the effect the initial distribution on the subsequent growth, using data 
from 1960-1985 for most OECD countries and some developing countries. The results 
are supportive of their argument that the higher inequality is bad for the subsequent 
growth.  
Persson and Tabellini (1994) formulated a general-equilibrium model with overlapping 
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generations to argue that the inequality is harmful for growth through the channel of 
political redistributive decisions. They also empirically tested the argument with a 
panel data of 9 countries and the result is in accordance with their expectations in the 
democracies. Their test also shows that equality is good for investment only in the 
democracies which is contrary to traditional argument that inequality is good for 
investment.  
Besides, there are some studies arguing that social instability may be caused by 
inequality and then leads to failure of growth. Alesina and Perotti (1996) argued that 
higher inequality will bring higher crime rate and social instability which will check 
the normal saving and investment activities and thus be harmful for economic growth.  
Some other studies emphasized the role the macroeconomic volatility which is 
positively related to inequality and negatively related to economic growth. The 
argument behind this idea is that the volatility will weaken the incentive of investment.  
Galor and Moav (2004) developed a new frame in which they modeled economic 
development as a two-period process: for the early period physical capital 
accumulation is the growth engine and for the later period human capital accumulation 
becomes the growth engine. In the first period the inequality exerts a positive effect on 
growth through the channel of higher saving propensity which is required for growth. 
During the second period the economic growth is steamed by human capital when the 
inequality harms the growth under the background of imperfect capital market. 
Different from the traditional arguments of imperfect capital market, they argued that 
the deciding factor should be the comparison of marginal return to human capital and 
physical capital in different development stages.  
There are also some literatures focusing on the effect of redistribution plan. Aghion, 
Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa (1999) made a review on this and pointed out that the 
traditional view that redistribution policy is harmful for growth is strongly challenged 
and doubtful both from the recent empirical and theoretical viewpoints. They asserted 
that redistributing wealth from the richest to the poorest always has an overall positive 
effect on growth. The mechanism of such effect relies on imperfect capital market.  
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Empirical Studies 
Now let’s look at what the empirical studies say. Empirical studies on the effect of 
inequality on economic growth have started to draw attentions since 1990s with more 
applications of econometrics. Similar to the theoretical arguments, the existing results 
are also very mixed and confusing with different econometric techniques applied, 
different control variables adopted and different data chosen. Generally speaking, the 
results from cross-section studies often show a negative effect whereas conclusions 
from panel data studies and time series studies are quite mixed and unclear.  
Perotti (1994) traced the effect of inequality on growth to the effect of inequality on 
investment. He argued that since growth is lead by investment in physical or human 
capital, it is enough to test the effect of inequality on investment as a proxy. Further he 
used the income distribution as a proxy for wealth distribution. He doesn’t think this is 
a serious problem. There were three main theories to explain the channel through 
which the inequality affects growth: imperfections in capital market, voting on fiscal 
policy and political stability. All these three ideas point to the logic that the inequality 
is harmful for continuous growth. Perotti induced some results from each of the three 
theories and tested them individually using the panel data applied in the paper of 
Alesina and Perroti (1993, 1996). His results doubted the validity of the second theory 
that endogenous fiscal policies are bad for investment but supported the other two 
ideas. One thing should be noted is that he used the initial income distribution in 1960 
(his data is from 1960 to 1985) as the variable for testing the relationship between 
inequality and growth. This tradition appears in many later studies which believe that it 
is the initial inequality takes effect but not the contemporaneous change of inequality.  
Birdsall, Ross and Sabot (1995) discussed the issues concerning income inequality and 
economic growth in East Asian economies which performed quite ideal in both low 
inequality and high growth rate. They argued that education is crucial for growth and it 
also reduces income inequality. Thus some policies such as enhancing education 
quality will not only promote growth but also reduce the inequality. Thus there is a 
virtuous circle that lower inequality will leads to more investment in education which 
further promote higher equality. They argued that this is main reason to explain the 
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East Asian growth miracle.  
Deininger and Squire (1998) created a group of panel data of very high quality which 
has been continuously applied so far. The data they constructed covers 108 countries 
from 1960s to 1990s. They made a thorough research on the relative issues concerning 
inequality and growth. Their empirical results confirmed a negative but weak influence 
from initial income inequality on long-term growth for both developed and developing 
countries. They found that the effect of initial asset distribution matters more. They 
also made tests on exploring the channels for the effect on growth from initial 
inequality, finding support for the explanation based on imperfect financial market but 
not for the redistributive median-voter-based theory. They also found that it was the 
education level that most affects investment but failed to establish any independent 
links between the initial distribution and investment. They argued that schooling is the 
main channel through which the initial distribution takes effect and the further test 
showed that there is a negative relationship between schooling and initial wealth 
distribution. Thus in their frame, the higher initial wealth inequality leads to worse 
human capital which is bad for economic growth.  
Barro (2000) applied a group of panel data to generate the result that higher inequality 
tends to retard growth in poor countries (with per capita GDP below $2070 in 1985 
U.S. Dollars) and promote growth in richer economies. The overall sample effect of 
inequality on growth, however, is not significant and implies that the partial 
relationship between each other is close to zero. The data he used also covers roughly 
100 countries over 30 years since 1960s. Besides the data difference between Barro 
(2000) and Deininger and Squire (1998), Barro did not use the initial income or wealth 
distribution index but directly used the contemporaneous Gini index. His research also 
shows that the fertility rate plays a role in the relationship between inequality and 
growth. Concerning the affecting mechanism, Barro’s result shows some difference 
from both Deininger and Squire’s and Perroti’s. Barro didn’t find any solid relations 
between inequality and investment ratio or human capital. He did not give further 
explanation on the affecting channel. 
Forbes (2000) challenged the proofs that income inequality is bad for economic growth. 
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She argued that most studies generating negative relations are not robust and 
containing two potential econometric problems: measurement error in inequality and 
omitted-variable bias. In order to correct these problems, she applied the data of 
Deininger and Squire (1998) combined with some other source to retest the 
relationship, using fixed effects, random effects, Chamberlain’sπ -Matrix procedure 
and Arellano and Bond’s GMM method. Interestingly, she also tested the initial 
inequality’s effect but just one period before growth. Her results show that the income 
inequality in one period before has a positive effect on the subsequent economic 
growth only in the short (5 years) and medium terms (less than 10 years). The 
relationship is not significant for the long run.  
Partridge (2005) argued that it is not surprising that the empirical results are mixed 
concerning the effect of inequality on growth if there are different short-run and 
long-run responses. He tested the relationship using U.S. state data from 1960 to 2000. 
After trying varieties of estimation techniques for panel and cross sectional data, he 
concluded that the inequality is positively related to the long-run growth and the 
short-run income inequality response is less clear. His result again confirms a positive 
relationship but stands in an opposite position to Forbes (2000) who argued that the 
effect only takes place in the short run.  
More recent researches transited the panel data researches to time series studies. 
Gobbin and Rayp (2008) proposed to investigate the inequality-growth relationship in 
a cointegrated VAR-setting. They resorted to the Johansen cointegration method to 
avoid the traditional problems of heterogeneity, omitted variables and endogeneity in 
empirical studies. The data samples are for the countries: Belgium, the US and Finland. 
The test results are different for each of the three countries and thus they concluded 
that panel research including many countries is not a good way to study the 
inequality-growth relationship. Only the US data seems more in accordance with the 
result of Forbes (2000).  
Andrade, Duarte and Simoes (2011) analyzed the effect of inequality on growth in 
Portugal from 1985 to 2007 by applying VAR and SVAR models. Their results suggest 
that the effect is negative. But they also showed that the effect of higher inequality is 
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good for the accumulation of human capital in Portugal during the period and they 
contended that the negative effect came from the fiscal redistribution.  
 
Discussions 
The problem of the effect of income/wealth inequality on economic growth has many 
confusing angles. First of all, there is a difference between the effect of initial 
distribution effect on the subsequent or long-run growth performance and the 
contemporaneous effect of inequality on growth performance. Secondly, the effect of 
inequality may be different for the short-run and long-run or for different economies. 
Further, there is a delicate difference between the views of arguing that the income 
inequality is bad or good for the growth. Since growth rate can be affected by many 
factors with some factors dominating the effect, one of them means that the effect is 
dominating, that is, the higher income/wealth inequality will lead to lower or higher 
growth rate. The other point means that the effect of high inequality is bad only in the 
sense that it will partly influence the growth performance and may not be dominating. 
The traditional theoretical arguments mixed the above differences and thus made the 
whole story looks very confusing.  
Based on the literature review, I would like to argue that we need to form a 
comprehensive and flexible view on this problem rather than dogmatic. The analyses 
on this problem reveal that it is probably a better way to look at the effect of inequality 
from analyzing a single economy for a certain period.  
Reviewing the literatures, we can see that most of the recent theoretical arguments are 
based on modeling works (esp. endogenous growth frame). Such models are suffering 
four major problems: firstly, some of the key assumptions in the models are far from 
reality. Thus the results “proved” by these models are doubtful for looking at the real 
economy. This is also one of the reasons for the different results. Secondly, most of 
these models keep ambiguous attitudes on whether the effect of inequality on growth is 
dominant or not. In fact, it is very difficult to clearly illustrate this problem in 
modeling, that is, the relative setups usually cannot be flexible enough to incorporate 
all growth impetuses and all kinds of development stages into one frame. Thirdly, the 
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neoclassical models are pretty weak to capture the institutional factors which 
sometimes play a crucial role. The limitations of neoclassical frame on analyzing a 
complicated transitional economy like China should be noted. Finally and maybe most 
importantly, it is quite doubtful that the neoclassical frame is appropriate to analyze the 
problem since in the neoclassical frame production factors receive the revenue equal to 
their marginal productivity whereas the inequality problem in reality usually comes 
from deviation from this rule.  
Concerning the empirical studies, although the fashionable time series methods are 
more applied recently with criticizing the cross-section and panel methods, such 
studies are weak to differentiate the dominant effect and partial effect and their 
methods are always limited by the data quality.  
 
5.2 The implication of China’s experience on this problem 
The discussion of the problem focusing on one economy is very meaningful, since we 
argued that the effects of inequality on growth may be diversified for different 
development stages of different economies. China’s economic growth experience 
during the past 30 years, for example, can lead us quickly realize that some of the 
above results in the literatures are obviously wrong for a transitional economy.  
Firstly, as a basic fact, China’s GDP growth rate has been keeping staying at a very 
high level when its inequality situation keeps worsening (See Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 
in Chapter 1). An obvious implication of the above combination is that the effect of 
income/wealth inequality on economic growth is not dominant for China during the 30 
years. Thus if we say the effect is negative, it means that inequality exerts a partially 
negative effect on growth and this effect is overwhelmed by other positive effects, at 
least it is the case for China in this early transitional period.  
Further, China’s experience doubts the arguments that the effect of high initial 
wealth/income inequality on subsequent growth is bad and will possibly lead the 
economy to stagnation like what Banerjee and Newman (1993), Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994) and Deininger and Squire (1998) discussed. As introduced in Chapter 1, China’s 
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economic development starts from 1949 with a very equal income/wealth distribution. 
In the next 30 years, China’s economy collapsed several times and still remained as a 
very poor economy in 1979. Since 1979, China’s inequality situation has been keeping 
worsening. But the very high growth rates since then have never been really blocked. 
As a matter of comparison between the two periods, the economic institution matters 
much more than the inequality factor on growth performance.  
Reviewing the literatures on the effect of income/wealth distribution on China’s 
growth performance, most of them are empirical and they have also generated mixed 
results. Using panel data of provinces from 1987 to 2001, Wan, Lu and Chen (2006) 
estimated simultaneous systems of equations with distributed lag models. Specifically, 
they applied PIL (polynomial inverse lag) structure of Mitchell and Speaker (1986).  
With achieving a significance of 10% level, they got a nonlinear relationship and 
negative result irrespective of time horizons despite seemingly positive correlation 
between growth and inequality in post-reform China. They argued that the negative 
effects stem from the strong and negative influence of income inequality on physical 
investment which is contrary to Kaldor (1955)’s argument. But their results show that 
the relationship between income inequality and education level is always positive.  
Wang and Cai (2006) applied the Vector Error Correction Model with 
Granger-causality test, discussing the effect of income inequality on investment. 
Based on the results, they argued that only the income level of urban residents affects 
the investment in both light and heavy industries with more effects on the heavy 
industries. The income level of rural residents only affects the light industries; also, 
the change of the urban income distribution affects negatively light industry but 
affects positively heavy industry. This means that the higher income inequality in 
urban areas will promote the growth of heavy industries. The paper did not discuss the 
overall effect for the whole economic growth but we can conclude from their 
arguments that the higher income inequality of both urban and rural areas will be 
beneficial for the investment growth in heavy industries and the effect on light 
industries is not clear.  
Wang and Ouyang (2007) studied the effect of urban-rural income inequality with 
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Tale index from 1979 to 2004. The result of Tale index shows that the change of 
urban-rural income inequality experienced two stages’ fluctuation of “V” shape: 
1979-1994 and 1995-2004. Then they set up an estimation model based on the method 
of PVECM (Panel Vector Error Correction Model) with the year 1995 as the dummy 
variable which is treated as the separation line of the effects based on the observation 
of Tale index from 1979 to 2004. The results show that during the early period 
(1979-1995) the urban-rural income inequality is good for growth and during the later 
period (1995-2004), the disparity harms growth. They argued that their result can be 
explained through the theory presented by Galor and Moav (2004). Their research 
shows that different provinces have different level of effect although with the same 
sign (negative or positive) before and after 1995. 
Risso and Carrera (2010) analyzed the income inequality-growth relationship in China 
for two periods: 1952-1978 and 1979-2007, using the Vector Error-Correction model 
with Johansen’s cointegration technique. They achieved the results that 
inequality-growth relationship is positive for both periods and there is no directional 
causality in the second period from the Granger-causality test.  
Yang and Huang (2011) used panel data of 23 Chinese provinces from 1996 to 2007 
to generate the result that during the early stage of economic development when the 
average per capita education time below 8.973 years，income inequality will benefit 
economic growth and harm it during the late stage when the per capita education time 
above 8.973 years.  They argued that since in 2007 the per capita education time is 
8.185 years, till that time the income inequality had always benefited economic 
growth. Their results of non-linear trend is similar to that of Wang and Ouyang 
(2007)’s. But the separation lines of the opposite effects are completely different.  
 
Discussions  
In chapter 2, we argued from China’s experience during the past 20 years that the 
positive effect of income/wealth inequality on growth is strongly doubtful in the long 
run when a transitional economy is experiencing the tertiarisation process. The channel 
of the negative effect is mainly from the insufficient demand for sustainable 
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tertiarisation.  
Some of the empirical studies reviewed above support my argument on the negative 
effect of inequality on growth for the transitional economy in the long-run. But some 
of the results are pointing to the positive effect of inequality on growth. We should be 
more cautious about this stand. First of all, although the sign we achieved from some 
empirical studies is indeed positive, it doesn’t mean that the inequality is good for 
growth from the causality point of view. Secondly, some arguments supporting the 
positive effect, in my view, suffer various problems. For example, the argument that 
the larger inequality is good for physical investment ignores the problem of 
insufficient demand. The argument that richer people have a higher propensity to save 
(Kaldor, 1955) also means that the high degree of income/wealth inequality will cause 
the problem of insufficient demand. But for an open economy, this problem can be 
partly solved by international trade before the period of tertiarisation. So the effect of 
inequality could be good for growth only in the short run and this is unsustainable as 
economy develops. As for the argument that the initial inequality is good for human 
capital accumulation, it is not consistent with socialism economic experience. For 
China, the basic education cost for people is very low which is supported by the 
government. Thus the inequality hasn’t much relationship with human resource.  
 
5.3 Rent-seeking space, transaction cost and economic growth 
We built the positive relationship between rent distribution and income/wealth 
inequality in Chapter 3. The effect of rent, in theoretical sense, is not the same as the 
effect of inequality, although they have some similarities. The effect of rent on growth, 
as we will analyze, is mainly through the channel of negative externality whereas the 
effect of inequality on growth, as we introduced in the literature review, has its own 
diversified channels. However, the negative effect of inequality on economic growth 
in the long run can also be seen from the angle of rent-seeking. As we showed in 
Chapter 3, the distribution of rents is positively related to the distribution of wealth in 
the long run with the determining effect. If the income/wealth inequality evolution is 
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mainly caused by the rent distribution evolution in the long run, the effect of rent 
distribution on economic growth can also tell us the effect of inequality on growth.  
First of all, we give the formal definition of rent-seeking space: 
 
DEFINITION 1. The rent-seeking space is a space of the rent species   , rent revenue 
       and rent distribution . The rent-seeking space is defined as 
                        
 
Rent-seeking space can be seen as a description of one aspect of institution. We define 
the rent revenue gi(·) as a monotone increasing function of rent species Ri where i 
points to the rent specification. Rent species Ri represents the rent quantity of the 
specification i. The function gi(·) is concave and satisfying the Inada conditions: 
        
        and         
       . The concavity assumption means that 
the rent revenue is going to be larger as the rent quantity becomes larger. The 
increasing speed will slow down, however, when the rent goes larger. This is similar 
to the characteristics of the utility function and the neoclassical production function 
we usually apply. The rent revenue will bring utility which is the root reason behind 
our assumptions here. The concavity assumption here is different from the convexity 
assumption adopted by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993). So our analysis here is 
also an extension of their work. The rent distribution Ω  here is defined as the 
distribution of rent species.  
We define that the rent-seeking space   is a monotone increasing function of Ri, 
gi(Ri). The rent distribution Ω  is related to Ri and rent revenue: the more equal 
distribution of Ri will lower down the rent revenue gi(Ri). Noting that the rent quantity 
is consistent with rent revenue, this is to say that the more equal rent distribution Ω  
automatically means Ri is lower, vice versa. Plus, the increase of rent specification i 
means the society is more unfair and we can see that it is consistent with more 
unequal distribution Ω . From the above setup and arguments, we can see that the 
larger rent-seeking space   is equivalent to the more unequal rent distribution Ω . 
Thus from Proposition 1 of Chapter 3, there is a positive relationship between 
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rent-seeking space   and wealth inequality in the long run. From the setup we 
transfer our analysis with rent distribution to the rent-seeking space.  
Since the development of an economy will change the elements of rent-seeking space, 
the relative institutional innovations are necessary for checking the expansion of the 
space. Now we turn to analyze the properties of rent-seeking space: 
 
LEMMA 1. The principle of optimal allocation of rents Ri is similar to the principle of 
optimal allocation of economic resources in microeconomics that the rent-owner will 
allocate its different rents to the point that the marginal revenue from offering each 
rent equal in order to maximize the total revenue of his/its whole rents.  
 
Proof: Define a vector of rent species (R1, R2,…,RN) which is the rent endowment of a 
rent-owner. His goal is to maximize the total revenue from either selling the rents or 
using the rents themselves. Assume that the revenue function G(R1, 
R2,…,RN)=       
 
    which is concave.  Let R denotes the total rent he owns. We 
can setup an optimization problem:  
Max G(R1, R2,…,RN)=       
 
    
s.t.     
 
      
Solving by the Lagrangian method:          
 
           
 
     
We get 
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
The second-order condition is checked which confirms the Lagrangian result is the 
maximum point.  
This result means that the rent-owner will make each of his rent species has the same 
marginal revenue by allocating them rationally. The Lagrangian multiplier   is the 
shadow price of each rent.  
Q.E.D. 
 
Mao (1985) discussed the principle of optimal allocation of resources with similar 
structure. Here we showed that the rent, as a kind of resource, is also obeying the 
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same allocation principle in product and resource markets. The transaction cost in the 
dissertation, as defined in Chapter 4, is the cost of achieving an acceptable transaction. 
For some cases, transactions have no relationship with rent, e.g. buying normal 
commodities. However, there are some transactions contain rent-seeking. The price of 
the rent is related to such transactions. Traditionally, transaction cost (defined by 
Coase) has already been embodied in the analysis on the problem of rent-seeking 
activities (Hartle, 1983). However, the qualitative relationship between transaction 
cost and rent has never been established. Following the definition of transaction cost 
in the dissertation, we can establish a relationship between rent and transaction cost: 
 
LEMMA 2. The price of rent is the marginal value of the part of transaction cost which 
the rent is applied to reduce.  
 
Proof: Define the price of a kind of rent (not the total rent of a rent-owner) as PRi and 
the transaction cost related to Ri as TCRi, we have  
PRi=
     
   
     (1) 
The intuition of this relationship should be clear: the rent is applied to reduce the 
transaction cost and the price of the rent thus should be equal to the marginal value of 
the transaction cost related to the rent.  
The right side is the marginal benefit of the rent seeker and the left side is the cost. If 
the cost is less than the marginal benefit, the rent seeker will increase his rent demand 
which will eventually increase the cost and lower the marginal benefit. Oppositely, if 
the cost is larger than the marginal benefit, the rent seeker will reduce his rent demand 
which will lower the cost and increase the marginal benefit. This will lead the 
equalization of the two sides.  
Q.E.D. 
 
The above rule established is also consistent with the principle of demanding side of 
the competitive resource market. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 point to rules of the supply 
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and demand sides of the rent-seeking activities. Their interacting relationship will be 
explored in Proposition 1.  
 
PROPOSITION 1. The larger the rent-seeking space, the larger the total social 
transaction cost and the transaction cost has a concave relationship with the rent 
related to the transaction.  
Proof: The rent-seeking space is a monotone increasing function of both rent and rent 
revenue. From PRi=
     
   
 (1) we can get TCRi=          , where C is a constant. 
So if PRi is larger, TCRi will be also larger. TCRi represents the transaction cost related 
to the rent i. Further, in equilibrium, we have the relationship between Lemma1 and 
Lemma 2 that PRi=
     
   
   
   
   
. This means TCRi=gi(Ri)+C.   
The rent-seeking activity concerning rent i has both the private effect (for rent-seeker 
himself) and the social effect (Angeletos and Kollintzas (2000) treated them as 
internal effect and external effect), from this relationship we can see that the increase 
of rent revenue means the transaction cost associated with the rent will be larger in the 
private level. Since g(·) is also a concave function, we know that the transaction cost 
associated with the rent is also concave. This is private level transaction cost. The 
concavity property of transaction cost related to the rent entailed can be described by 
Figure 5.1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
TCRi= 
gi(Ri)+C 
0 Ri 
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According to the traditional rent-seeking theories, rent-seeking activity also has an 
effect of negative externality (social effect). Thus if Ri or        is larger, it will also 
cause the increment of social transaction cost (         from the negative externality. 
Since TC=TCRi+       , the overall transaction cost of a society TC will increase. In 
mathematics, this means that if dRi/dt>0 or d(       /dt>0, we have dTC/dt>0. Thus 
we have the relationship that the social transaction cost TC is a monotonic increasing 
function of rent-seeking space.  
Q.E.D. 
 
PROPOSITION 2. The “Harberger Triangle” type negative externality of the 
rent-seeking space grows with a convex path as the rent-seeking space expands.  
 
Proof: Rama (1993) adopted the concept of Harberger costs to describe the gap 
between the actual and potential output with restrictive regulation. The “Harberger 
Triangle” traditionally is used to analyze the welfare loss of monopoly or price 
distortions. The factor of rent-seeking can be included in the model as the monopoly 
degree which can be represented either by the steeper demand curve the enterprise 
faces or by the higher distorted price the enterprise can decide. These two directions 
are consistent.  
Figure 5.2 
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Figure 5.3 
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Figure 5.2 is the traditional monopoly diagram which was invented to analyze the 
welfare effect of rent seeking activities. The triangle Δ  is usually called “Harberger 
Triangle” which represents the pure welfare loss caused by monopoly. The Harberger 
cost can be viewed as the negative externality. P* is the Pareto optimal price which 
represents perfect competitive equilibrium. Pm is the monopoly price which can 
represent the degree of rent-seeking space.  
In Figure 5.3 we change the slope of the demand curve PQ to represent the change of 
monopoly power. P1Q is flatter than P2Q which is flatter than PQ. The flatter slope 
means the price elasticity of the demand curve D is higher. This means the market is 
more competitive where the rent-seeking space is smaller. Without changing the Q, 
we can see that the higher monopoly power owns a higher price determining position. 
The “Harberger Triangle” Δ  is becoming smaller and smaller as the market becomes 
more competitive. But is this decreasing speed convex or concave?  
We can check this by assuming the demand curve is         which is equal to 
P* 
D 
P1 
P2 
  
136 
   
 
  
  
 
  
.        . The higher    means the slope is flatter. Suppose the 
AC curve stays at the level P*=x. The MR curve thus can be expressed as    
 
 
  
  
 
  
. With the setup, we can get the base and height expressions of the 
“Harberger Triangle” Δ  and thus get the mathematical expression for the area of the 
“Harberger Triangle” Δ :   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
  
       
 
   
 
  
 
.  
From the above formula, we have 
  
   
    when   
 
  
 .  Since 
 
  
 is the intercept 
of the demand curve, we can rule out the possibility of   
 
  
 since no enterprise will 
keep operating with no profit. This result means that the “Harberger Triangle” Δ  
will increase as the market becomes less competitive with larger rent-seeking space.  
The second order derivative 
   
   
     which mean that the change of the area of 
“Harberger Triangle” Δ  follows a convex path with respect to the change of   . 
This means that as the negative externality measured by “Harberger Triangle” Δ  will 
has a convex relationship with rent-seeking space in the economy.   
Q.E.D. 
 
The rent-seeking space and the “Middle-Income Trap” 
In Chapter 4 we established the results that the lower average unit transaction cost of 
a society (or an economy) will lead the economic size to expand in the short run and 
the smaller the growth rate of average unit transaction cost of a society, the higher the 
economic growth rate will be in the long run. From Proposition 1, it is clear that the 
expansion of rent-seeking space means the increase of the average unit transaction 
cost of the society and thus is harmful for economic growth. Transaction cost, as 
argued in Chapter 4, is influenced by many factors, including technology innovation, 
institutional innovation, human capital, etc. This means that the rent-seeking effect on 
the total (or unit) transaction cost is also influenced by many other factors. The rent 
factor alone cannot cause a determinant effect on economic growth performance. Take 
China for example, China’s rent-seeking space has been obviously expanding sine 
1980s but this factor didn’t block the higher growth rate of China. Thus we know that 
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the role of rent only plays a relatively minor role in China’s economic growth during 
the past 30 years, although the rent-seeing activities keep distorting the economy. This 
is also consistent with our previous argument that the effect of income/wealth 
inequality on growth is only partial.  
The role of rent, however, is more crucial than we thought because of the convexity 
property of negative externality. Proposition 2 means that the negative effects will 
grow with a convex path as the rent-seeking space expands. This continuous 
expansion of rent-seeking space will exert more and more negative effect with a 
growing speed. Besides, it is argued by Tullock (1967) that the “Harberger Triangle” 
is only a part of the social cost of monopolies and tariffs. The opportunity cost of the 
resources applied in achieving the rent, for example, cannot be reflected by the 
triangle. This problem is called “rent dissipation” which is still open to discussion.  
I would further argue that in the dynamic analysis the opportunity cost can be even 
much larger than that under static consideration. In Chapter 2 we argued that the 
rent-seeking activities blocked the development of China’s tertiarisation process 
which is the opportunity cost during the dynamic development. Such opportunity 
costs are especially crucial for the long-run development of a transitional economy 
and such costs will become larger and larger as the development steps into the 
“middle-income” level.  
The convex characteristics of the Harberger-type negative externality of the 
rent-seeking space as well as the opportunity costs argued above have an important 
implication. Although the effect of rent-seeking space on the transaction cost related 
to the rent follows a concave path, the convex growth of the negative externality and 
the growing opportunity cost will eventually become larger than the other growth 
impetuses if the rent-seeking space expansion cannot be controlled.  
For a transitional economy like China, rent-seeking space controlling is crucial for its 
further development because the negative effects of the expansion will finally surpass 
all other growth impetuses and make the growth unsustainable. This discussion also 
confirms the results of the previous studies like Rama (1993) and Angeletos and 
Kollintzas (2000). And for Chinese economy, the arguments are also consistent with 
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the logics explained in Chapter 2.  
Figure 5.4 describes the effect of continuous rent-seeking space expansion:  
 
Figure 5.4  
 
    GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
         0                                    t 
                                               
Figure 5.4 means that the economy cannot reach its potential because of the 
rent-seeking space expansion and the growth will slow down much earlier than its 
potential. For a transitional economy, this is so-called “middle-income trap” which is 
often faced by development economies. The background of it, based on the analysis 
here, is the institutional problems concerning rent-control. So institutional innovation 
concerning rent is a task a transitional economy must resolve and this is more difficult 
than the ways neoclassical growth theories suggested, like technology innovation. 
This can also explain the puzzle that the “should-be” quick convergence argued by 
exogenous growth theories usually fails in reality.  
 
Discussions 
The above analysis based on rent shows that the rent-seeking space expansion is 
harmful for economic growth and will block the growth in the long run if the 
expansion is out of control. Combining the arguments at the beginning of the section 
that we established the positive relationship between higher income/wealth inequality 
and larger rent-seeking space in the long run, the arguments here also confirms that 
income/wealth inequality has a negative effect on economic growth in the long run, if 
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the income/wealth inequality evolution is mainly caused by the rent distribution 
evolution in the long run. This is also consistent with the results of Model 2 in Chapter 
3.  
 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
The chapter discussed the effect of income/wealth inequality on economic growth 
with exploring the properties of rent-seeking space. Our research in this chapter is 
related to previous chapters. We built a relationship among rent-seeking space, 
income/wealth inequality and economic growth based on the frame built in Chapter 4. 
The main result is that rent-lead inequality exerts a negative effect on economic 
growth in the long run.  
As an implication, rent-control will be good for both equality and growth. This 
requires institutional updates during growth. The successful growth story of China 
during the past 30 years can be seen as a “take-off” model for a transitional economy. 
The future success from a middle-income economy to a developed economy needs 
relative institutional reforms concerning rent-seeking space. This will be an even 
bigger challenge for China.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusions and Implications of the Dissertation 
 
Prosperity and common prosperity are always two different issues. However, they are 
closely related to each other. This dissertation studied the relationship between 
economic growth and income/wealth distribution dynamically. The background of this 
research is a huge transitional economy: mainland China. Our analysis reveals that 
institutional arrangements play a crucial role in this relationship.  
As a transitional economy, China is an ideal case for institutional analysis. The 
political and economic institutional arrangements of China are obviously taking 
crucial effects on its economic development. The dissertation tries to present a 
comprehensive and incisive economic analysis on this issue which can be summarized 
as several conclusions and implications for transitional economies’ development: 
 
1. If a developing economy hopes to successfully update itself into a developed 
economy, the transitional process needs the cooperation of institutional innovations. 
The main point is to limit the rent-seeking space through continuous in-time 
institutional innovations, especially during the stage of tertiarisation process. Both 
political and economic institutions matter for the transition. Mere policy innovations 
are not sufficient.  
 
2. Different periods during the transition have different growth motivations. A 
successful growth pattern during the early stage doesn’t mean it will be successful for 
the later stage.  
 
3. For a transitional economy adopting double-track economic system like China, the 
process of combining the double-track into a single track is a must for developing the 
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marketing economy. The political institution matters during the process through its 
effect on the rent-seeking space. A higher quality of law-ruled society is needed for 
further advancement.  
 
4. The economic orders behind the neoclassical frame, as argued in Chapter 3, are 
good for income/wealth equality with continuous economic growth. The key points 
are to equally distribute the rent-seeking space and to realize the perfect competitive 
market. 
 
The dissertation also sheds some light on economic theories: 
 
1. The frame of neoclassical economics cannot be brought to analyze transitional 
economy without any change on the relative models.  
 
2. The new institutional economics has a very strong explaining power on transitional 
economic development. The marginal analysis can be used to analyze institutional 
factors and is useful on exploring relative problems. The combination of neoclassical 
and new institutional economics can generate much bigger explaining power on 
economic reality.  
 
3. Transaction cost (defined in the dissertation) is the motivation of economic growth 
which is the channel for all growth-enhance factors like technology or human capital.  
 
4. Inequality only partially affects the economic growth performance. This point 
should be paid attention for future modeling works. But this partial effect can change 
into a dominant effect especially for the transitional economy experiencing 
tertiarisation.  
 
5. The angle of equilibrium transaction speed reveals some new ideas on the issue of 
economic crisis. We pointed out that the difference between early and later stages 
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during crisis should be paid attention to.  
 
6. The crucial way to create more equal income/wealth distribution in the long run is 
to control the rent-seeking space in the way to make the rent distribution more equal. 
This is the obligation of politics/government during economic development.  
 
A debate with Karl Marx: does the economic base determine the 
superstructure? 
Marxism theory has a very famous proposition that the base determines the 
superstructure. The base and superstructure are the two parts forming human society. 
The base is related to economic production as what Marx said in 1859:  
 
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, 
which are independent of their will, namely the relations of production appropriate to 
a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of 
these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real 
foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure. 
Source: Marx, K. (1859) A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Moscow: Progress 
Publishers: Notes by R. Rojas. 
 
The superstructure of a society includes culture, institutions, political structure, rituals, 
etc. Such contents can be included in a general and broader definition of institution. 
Kasper and Streit (1998) divided the definition of institution into two parts: internal 
institution and external institution. The internal institution is reflected by customs, 
ethical norms, etc. which evolve from human experience that tend to serve people the 
best. The external institutions which are often reflected as law regulations are 
imposed and enforced from above like agents who are authorized by a political 
process.  
The case of China’s development since reform and opening up, as analyzed in the 
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dissertation, shows the opposite direction of the base-superstructure nexus. It is the 
superstructure that determines the economic base which further influences the 
production force. The superstructure didn’t change much as the base changes, 
although the voice asking for change has never disappeared. The economic base’s 
relationship with production force is also difficult to be argued as that the production 
relation is determined by production forces. The production relationship, as analyzed 
in the dissertation, is prone to be determined by superstructure (institutions).  
Of course, the dissertation also shows that the long-run relationship and the short-run 
relationship can be opposite. The argument of Marx on the relationship between the 
base and superstructure is prone to be a long-run historical view. This view, however, 
needs to be adjusted when we look at the relative short-run history.  
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Notes 
1. The household responsibility system (HRS) was created by several villagers in 
Xiaogang Village in Fengyang County, Anhui Province, China. It was the end of 1978. 
As a try to promote the production, they took responsibility for their own gains and 
losses, with an agreement that if any of them were to go to jail for secretly embarking 
on this illegal system, the others must take care of their children. The test generated 
incredible results that at the end of 1979, the one-year production is equal to the 5 
years’ total production from 1966 to 1970. Seeing this result, the Central Rural Work 
Conference at the end of 1979 decided that the poorest residents in rural areas would 
be allowed to engage in this system. At the end of 1980, 14% of the production teams 
around the country followed the system and all production teams under the system 
achieved remarkable results that year. So in 1981 the government started to promote 
the system across the country. By the end of the year, 45% of production teams were 
in the system. Till 1984, 99% of the production teams were included. This story is 
usually seen as the beginning of China’s reform and opening up.  
 
2. Proof: Let 
    
 
     , if  >0, when t  ,  
    , thus the possibility is 
excluded; if  <0, from (3) we have         . When t  ,      .  This 
means that      which is our boundedness condition:     .  Q.E.D. 
 
3. The result can be seen from that the second term can control the last two terms and 
the first term can control the 3
rd
 term, when t is sufficiently large.  
 
4. Domar (1947)’s logic is as follows: Suppose the economy starts from full 
employment with total income 150 billion dollars. 10% is used for saving. With 
condition S=I, we have 15 billion dollars invested. But this additional supply needs 
equivalent demand power increase. But keeping income constant with 150 billion, the 
real income increase can only fulfilled by deflation, which Domar offered 4 reasons to 
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argue not always possible, including monopolistic power, deflation’s bad effects and 
relative price reduction speed between consumers’ goods and investment goods. So 
with assuming a constant general price level, the investment needs to expand every 
year to keep full employment, that is, the investment next year It+1 must be greater 
than St. This means that if the investment next year It+1 be equal to St, there will be 
unemployment in period t+1.  
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